The Press TUESDAY, MAY 24, 1938. Great Britain and Czechoslovakia

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22409, 24 May 1938, Page 10

The Press TUESDAY, MAY 24, 1938. Great Britain and Czechoslovakia

To say that during the week-end Europe went through the most serious crisis since 1914 is to repeat what has been said so many times in- the last few years that it has ceased to be impressive. Yet it is certain that the crisis of the last day or. two has had a very different ring about it from the crises which followed the military reoccupation of the Rhineland, the union of Austria with Germany, and the various crises which have developed over Spain. On none of these occasions have the Powers shown any disposition to risk a major conflict. Whether war was ever an immediate possibility during this last week-end the public does not yet know. But what has been demonstrated very clearly is that Czechoslovakia is an issue on which Europe is ready to fight. With admirable coolness, the Czech Government has defined the limits within which it is prepared to negotiate with the German minority; the French Government has reaffirmed its intention to fight should the German Government use force to support the demands of the Sudeten Germans; and the Russian , Government has reaffirmed its pledge to support France. The German Government has not attempted to allay the tension, which it could do with a word; nor has it said anything which commits it to support Herr Henlein’s demands. Its desire to exploit the situation can, however, be inferred from the calculated viciousness of the German press campaign against the Czech Government, This is the one noisy element in a situation which otherwise is characterised by an ominous restraint. Literally and metaphorically, Czechoslovakia, France, and Russia are standing to their guns. And although the balance of probability is that the crisis will pass, nothing is more certain than that it will recur in a more acute form. For the governments and peoples of the British Commonwealth the period which is beginning is one of peculiar anxiety; they are the unknown and the most important factor in the situation. By refusing to commit itself one way or another over Czechoslovakia, the British Government has incurred a responsibility for the course of events in Europe far greater than it would have incurred either by guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia or by declaring for a policy of isolation. It is therefore most necessary that, in the next few weeks, the governments of the British Commonwealth should take stock calmly and realistically of the situation which has arisen and of the policy to which the British Government has in fact, if not in theory, committed them. The situation, fortunately, is as clearcut as any such situation is ever likely to be. The Sudeten Germans, though they have been treated better than any other national minority in Europe, have certain legitimate grievances. Outside Germany and Italy, the willingness of the Czech Government to remedy those grievances is not seriously questioned. But the Czech Government is not prepared, and cannot reasonably be asked, o concede a degree of autonomy to its German subjects which would amount to a dismemberment of . the Czech State. Fortunately, too, there is no conceivable excuse for making Czechoslovakia the victim of a crusade against a fictitious Red menace or for calling in question the, Czech ability to maintain order. Since the end of the Great War, no country has been more liberally or more wisely governed than Czechoslovakia. The foreign policy of the British Government, as it affects Czechoslovakia, was laid down by Mr Neville Chamberlain in a speech in the House of Commons on March 24. The existing specific commitments of Great Britain, Mr Chamberlain stated, were the defence of France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression, and the defence of Portugal, Iraq, and Egypt in terms of certain pacts of mutual-assistance. In addition, and here Mr Chamberlam quoted and reaffirmed what had 'been said by Mr Eden, British armed forces might be used “ in bringing help to the victim “ of-aggression in any case where, in pur judgement, it would be proper under the provisions “of the Covenant to do so.” This passage, Mr Chamberlain indicated, might be taken to cover the attitude of the British Government to the problem of Czechoslovakia. There are two obvious comments on such a policy. The first is that it is curiously unreal and inconsistent.' Mr Chamberlain can argue plausibly enough that the lives of Englishmen should not be pledged irrevocably to the defence of Czechoslovakia; but if, he does so he cannot at the same time'argue that the lives of Englishmen should be pledged to the defence of Iraq because there is oil there or of Portugal because she happens to be an old, if not very highly respected, ally. The second comment is .that such a pplicy is a compromise which embodies the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the extremes, which it avoids. In the desperate'situation which has arisen, there is something to be said for a policy of complete, isolation, of avoiding war at all costs on the grounds that war means neither victory nor defeat but disaster.. But) Mr Chamberlain’s policy is not isolation; indeed, it is highly doubtful whether in fact he has retained freedom o/action over the question of Czechoslovakia. Great Britain is pledged to defend France against aggression, not for altruistic reasons, but because it is an axiom of British policy that no hostile Power can be allowed to dominate the Low Countries or the Channel ports. Prance is pledged to go to war with Germany should Germany attack Czechoslovakia. It is therefore almost a certainty that Great Britain would be involved sooner or later in war should Germany attack Czechoslovakia. Granted, then, that Great-Britain cannot allow France to be overwhelmed, is not the best way to minimise the risk of war to guarantee the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia? This much should be plain. Great Britain can contribute something to the peace and stability of Europe by declaring that she will fight for Czechoslovakia. By actually fighting for Czechoslovakia she can do no good to anyone. There can be no question of driving the Germans out of Czechoslovakia and restoring the status quo.: If , war does come, it will plunge Europe headlong into a chaos which will obliterate the greater part of what now imiui for European civilisation^-