The Press FRIDAY, MARCH 18, 1938. After Austria ...?

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22354, 18 March 1938, Page 12

The Press FRIDAY, MARCH 18, 1938. After Austria ...?

Austria’s loss of national status has _ been brought about so completely and with so little prospect of its return that there is some excuse for the question: What next? Herr Hitler has presented the world with a fait accompli in Central Europe, and whatever attitude the Powers may decide to adopt towards his action, it is painfully clear that, short of embarking on the dangerous hazard of an avenging war, there is little to be done but regret lost opportunities for firmness. Even the reflection that what has happened could have been prevented by an earlier show of determination must be qualified by the thought that Germany is not the sole author of Austria’s downfall. The Treaty of Versailles, which stripped Austria of her economic and military strength, also pruned away from her all non-Germanic elements, and left her ready for absorption when Germany was ready to brook .the disapproval of the Western Powers. The opportunity was to hand; Hitler took it. There could be no clearer evidence of the world-wide acceptance of the Austrian coup than the ease with which public opinion has passed on to speculation on the future - of Czechoslovakia. Germany has given assurances to Czechoslovakia that she has no aggressive designs, but in the light of past experience, these assurances are not meeting with a ready acceptance. The main argument in support of the belief that Germany may advance against Czechoslovakia is the vast mineral and industrial wealth at stake and the presence in Czech territory of a large and powerful German minority, the Sudeten Germans. This minority has lost no tfine in restating its claims for better treatment, and has issued a warning that Czechoslovakia would be well advised to grant voluntarily what may be taken from her by force. As against this, however, it must be remembered that in annexing Austria Germany has acquired responsibilities and handicaps no less than advantages. Austria is in no state at present to be placed on a war footing comparable to Germany proper. Her economic position is not only unsound, but is unprepared for the complete regimentatipn, which has been carried out in Germany. * The Nazification of Austria will no doubt be as rapid as German ingenuity and thoroughness can make it, but even so it will be some years before Austria can be regarded as anything other than the weakest area in the German Empire. The position of Czechoslovakia is strong. As Mr Winston Churchill stated in the House of Commons this week, she is alone a second-rate Power, but the Little Entente to which she belongs is a first-class Power, occupying a highly strategic position in Central Europe. In addition, France and Russia have made it clear that they will lend assistance to Czechoslovakia if it is required. In these circumstances it would hardly be prudent for Herr Hitler to embark upon hostilities. The history of his adventures in statesmanship suggests that he is not likely to undertake any plan that has not every assurance of success, and there is no such assurance in respect Of Czechoslovakia. The attitude of Britain is one of the most important factors in the present situation, not so much for the value of her armed strength as - for the power she has to lead and consolidate the anti-Fascist forces. France, Russia, and the Little Entente, without the aid of Britain, should be more than a match for a German-Italian combination, but Britain’s voice may be needed to turn the scales for war or peace. In such a situation it is particularly unfortunate that Mr Chamberlain should have been caught without a definite line of policy. The hesitation which domestic and Imperial considerations have imposed upon him may so easily be misconstrued as irresolution or worse that the need for a consolidation of policy becomes increasingly urgent.