RELATIONS WITH ITALY

Press, Volume LXXIII, Issue 22193, 9 September 1937, Page 7

RELATIONS WITH ITALY

THE MEDITERRANEAN QUESTION

MR CHAMBERLAIN'S LETTER

BRITISH OPINION DIVIDED OVER ACTION

(raoii oub owir correspondent.) LONDON, August 4. An air of reserve overhangs the "affair of the Chamberlain-Mussolini letters," as it has been called. Public imagination has been interested by the somewhat unusual action of the British Prime Minister, and, while one section of opinion is frankly enthusiastic, another maintains that the friendly 1 assurances between London and Rome I have been made to look rather more significant than they are. While it is recognised that the exchanges may mean the beginning of a new period in Britain's relations with Italy, it is realised that time is necessary before there can be any certainty on that point, and that there are a number of hard and somewhat unpleasant facts to be considered. At all events, nothing concrete is expected to emerge until after the holiday period, which is now beginning. The interesting feature of the exchanges is the action of the British Prime Minister Mr Neville Chamberlain. It is common knowledge that his Government is dealing with questions of foreign policy on a much more prompt and urgent basis than was the custom in Earl Baldwin's administration. The Prime Minister is himsell taking a more active part, in close consultation, according to constitutional practice, with the Foreign Secretary, Mr Anthony Eden. In setting the general tone for his European pciicy, Mr Chamberlain has insisted that British and Italian interests, in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, are not irreconcilable, and they must not be so regarded. He is determined to use his best endeavours to eliminate Anglo-Italian misapprehension, and to resolve any practical points of conflict which may be found to exist. An Unusual Course Proof of Mr Chamberlain's intentions was made manifest when he followed the unusual course of sending for the Italian Ambassador, Count Grandi, and discussed for 90 minutes the outstanding issues between the two countries. It was immediately recognised that it was certainly a good augury for the future that thp two statesmen could talk over current questions in a spirit at once frank and cordial. The favourable impression made in Rome probably owed something to Mr Chamberlain's name, for both his father and Sir Austen Chamberlain were known as friends of Italy. It was at the close of this interview that Mr Chamberlain wrote his letter to Mussolini, and it was handed to the Ambassador when he left. It was taken from Rome to Signor Mussolini's seaside home at Rimini by aeroplane. The Duce, who had no official or member of his Government with him, told the messenger to wait, wrote his reply at once, and sent it back in the same aeroplane. At present the text of these letters has not been made public, but it has been suggested that they should be published. It is understood that they did not deal with the details of AngloItalian relations, but were designed to establish the atmosphere of mutual confidence in which such details mighi be discussed. Both letters are saia to have the quality of spontaneity. Both, including the envelopes, were written by the statesmen themselves in manuscript, and e%ch covers four pages of notepaper. Mr Chamberlain's Oblectives At the present stage of these personal written contacts between the heads of the British and Italian Governments, details are -not under discussion. Mr Chamberlain's colleagues are aware that he would welcome the opportunity for direct talks, but recognises that this is impossible. It is for this reason that he has adopted the procedure of personal letters, supplemented by conversations between ambassadors and foreign secretaries. Direct conversations between the two foreign secretaries are probable at a later stage. It is thought that it is in this wav that Mr Chamberlain hopes to prepare the ground for a new agreement between the Locarno Powers. Since Belgium was relieved earlier this year of her major Locarno obligations, the agreement would be among the remaining four Locarno Powers—Britain. France, Italy, and Germany.

Those who incline to this view recall that the Prime Minister has made it clear that his conception of such an agreement is based on two fundamental objects: to restore confidence in Europe by giving to all States an increased sense of security; and to provide satisfaction for the legitimate aspirations of those States which labour at present under a sense of injustice. The attainment of these objects, they say, seems to presuppose parallel discussion of political and economic problems. Mussolini and Hitler An interesting sidelight on the Chamberlain-Mussolini letters is given by a "Daily Telegraph" correspondent. He says that there are reports of a communication between Hitler and Mussolini six weeks ago. Mussolini seems to have believed at that time that the British attitude on several important questions could be explained only on the hypothesis that Britain was preparing for an ultimate attack on Italy. This was, apparently, to take the form of some direct British action to check Italian aspirations in the Mediterranean. He expressed this view, it is said, in a long personal letter to Herr Hitler. In the course of the letter he asked whether Italy could rely on the support of Germany if such an attack took place. "It was suggested that an attack would be averted if it were made clear in advance that the Rome-Berlin axis would offer united opposition. At the time, it is understood, Hitler thought it imprudent to make such a declaration, at least until the situation in the Non-intervention Committee had been made clearer. It is now reported that the German Chancellor sent a more precise reply to Signor Mussolini on the day on which Mr Chamberlain's letter reached Rome. "According to this report, Hitler informed the Duce that he welcomed the closeir contacts developing between London and Rome, and was convinced that Britain's attitude was conceived in good faith. He felt that the Mediterranean and allied problems, like the Spanish questions, could best be solved by maintaining friendly contacts, and that these should not be associated with threats from any quarter."