The Press THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1935. Boards and Commissions

Press, Volume LXXI, Issue 21630, 14 November 1935, Page 12

The Press THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1935. Boards and Commissions

A favourite catch-cry, in this as in other elections, is that the powers of government are being taken out of the hands of the elected representatives of the people and delegated to boards and commissions. Like most catch-cries, it does not bear very close examination. Most of the commissions referred to have no administrative or executive powers and have no other function than to investigate or recommend. Their value is that they enable the government to secure the assistance and advice of experts outside the public service and to obtain an impartial review of the facts of any situation. It is perhaps arguable that the work of the Native Affairs Commission or the Companies Commission could have been carried out by departmental committees; but it is certain that, had this course been followed, the reports would not have been free from the suspicion of political influence. Moreover, critics of the practice of appointing commissions are apt to forget that, in modern conditions of government, the pre-requisite of successful legislation and administration is an accurate and detailed knowledge of social and economic facts. It is worth remembering that almost all the great reforms in the government of England in the nineteenth century were preceded by Royal Commissions and that the remarkable efficiency of English local administration is due mainly to the appointment of Local Government Commissions at fairly regular intervals. The charge that the powers of Parliament are being delegated to boards and commissions with executive powers is based on a misconception of the whole problem of government. Parliament's function is not to govern the country. It is to watch and-criticise the acts of the executive and to examine legislation. The powers delegated to boards and commissions are powers, not of Parliament, but of the executive, and the delegation takes place for three reasons. The first is that the work of the executive has increased so rapidly in recent years that delegation is necessary and desirable in the interests of efficiency. The second reason is that State trading concerns are invariably more efficiently managed when they are divorced from political control. The history of the New Zealand railways is a good illustration of this point; and few who are now declaiming noisily against boards and commissions would be bold enough to suggest that the Government Railways Board should be abolished in favour of Ministerial control. The third reason is that there are some services in which the need for impartiality so outweighs all other needs that political control would be dangerous. It is unthinkable, for instance, that broadcasting should be administered by a government department. It can, of course, be admitted that the delegation of powers to boards raises difficult problems of co-ordination, as is shown by the tendency of the Railways Board and the Transport Board to come into conflict. Furthermore, it is desirable that salaries and conditions of employment for members of administrative boards should be more closely approximated to salaries and conditions of employment in the public service. But these are difficulties to be overcome and not reasons against administrative devolution.