ITALY AND ABYSSINIA

Press, Volume LXXI, Issue 21533, 24 July 1935, Page 18

ITALY AND ABYSSINIA

TO THE EDITOB 07 THE PJUBBS. Sir, —A month ago the three-year Gran Chaco war between Bolivia and Paraguay ceased, and the declaration of the Latin American nations in 1932 that "military conquest grants no sovereignty" was exemplified. The result of this conflict leaves both countries financially exhausted, and records some 90,000 killed and about 110,000 wounded combatants. The conflict ends with a break even or peace without victory. The present attitude of Italy towards Abyssinia as well as every major post-war crisis has been attributed to the Versailles Treaty and the politicians of 1919. It would probably be more correct to state the foundation and direction of these problems was laid in December,. 1916, when President Wilson's proposal for "a peace without victory" opened up the first and last opportunity of ending the world war with an operating peace. Then, as now, behind the politician could be seen that sinister force whose international interests worked inevitably for destruction, and whose axioms have always been to prolong war and destroy peace. The failure of the Peace of Right in 1916 led on to Versailles. It was largely by a promise of more territory that Italy was induced to come into the war, in fact a rectification of Libya's western frontier giving her access to Lake Chad and the Tibe3tl mountains was definitely promised her. Her treatment at Versailles has resulted in her succeeding to that dominating position in the Near East which Germany held before the war, and no doctrinal disagreement has kept Fascist Italy from being on the friendliest terms with Communist Russia.

. The rise of Nazi Germany undermined the French foreign policy and the former villain of Versailles (in Italian eyes) for a political quid pro quo in Europe gave Italy considerable concessions in Africa. The refusal of Italy to arbitrate has much more than the present crisis at stake. Much as both Britain and France may desire Italy instead of Japan to gein the upper hand in Africa's last independent empire, the principles of the league are at stake. On the other hand Italy's withdrawal from the league at. this juncture would jeopardise the Danubian conference, which threat is Mussolini's trump card. However, a cabte from Tokyo in "The Press" thfs morning states that Japan is specially interested in Abyssinia, and economically could not remain unconcerned in the possibility of war. A Japanese company has leased some 1,000,000 acres of cotton-growing land in Abyssinia, and Abyssinian tariff* on Japanese goods have been cut On the edge of the Abyssinian

plateau Mussolini has spent large sums on cotton cultivation in the hope of developing a supply of cotton for the Italian mills and in war time munition plants. Over the border Abyssinia has oiL .Italy requires oil. Japan is now the leading consumer of raw cotton on the world market, and aims at becoming independent of foreign supplies, the Abyssinian fields being important in this respect. Mussolini cannot make war on Abyssinia without the acquiescence of the British fleet, which controls the Suez Canal and Aden. When Mussolini ships his divisions to Eritrea and when Britain is unable to dissuade him, the lease and tariff agreement above referred to may become eloquent and be heard as a Japanese threat to British economic supremacy in Africa.— Yours, etc., WHITE WATERS. July 22, 1935. TO THB EDITOR Off THJ3 PMSS. Sir,—l really laughed myself to exhaustion in reading Mr Nino Di Somma's letter in "The Press" this morning, for his letter was so absurd, so puerile, so contradictory, and so misleading that I would have utterly ignored it had he not used It as a personal attack against myself. First of all, I would not think of being against any war if only those who advocated and engineered it took part in it, but the unfortunate part is that there are innocents who have nothing but suffering and death to reap from war; it is for their benefit that I am anti-militarist. In my previous letter I did not advocate the prevention of this Abyssinian war; I merely stated that if there were going to be a war the Italian people should be asked to voice their approval or antagonism by a national poll. Why are Mr Di Somma and his Duce against the Italian people having political liberties? Mr Di Somma knows absolutely nothing about Italian politics or he would not have mentioned the name of that fine man Signor Bissolati, who was the greatest enemy Mussolini ever had. Signor Bissolati was a socialist and became a warmonger, but one can but admire a man who showed the honesty of his conviction by living a life of suffering for what he honestly believed to be true, while Mussolini has always been the target of his friends' derision. His war medals date only since 1924; that is six years after the war was over and two years after he was Minister for War; nnd they were granted—motu proprio. But Mussolini has always lacked a sense of the humorous.

Mr Di Somma talks about Italy's rights being assailed, etc., etc., so will he kindly tell your readers Italy's casus belli? Mussoiini has been asked over and over again. to put his cafc before the League of Nations, but he has consistently refused. I expect Mr Di Somma to answer my question and also document his facts, if he has any!

However, I can assure your readers that neither Mr Di Somrna nor any of my countrymen in Christchurch will ever leave our liberty-loving New Zealand for Abyssinia.—Yours, etc., UMBERTO COLONNA. July 22, 1935. [Subject to the right of reply of L. A. Efford, this correspondence is now closed.—Ed. "The Press."]