EMPIRE DEFENCE

Press, Volume LXXI, Issue 21484, 28 May 1935, Page 17

EMPIRE DEFENCE

to rug *ditob or rii» press Sir,—Since the beginning of this j eentuiy, when Joseph Chamberlain's] proposal for a triple alliance of Great Britain, Germany, and the United States had fallen ; through, the diplomatic history of England has more than ever reflected the influence of geographical position and European "balance If after the Boer War Britain realised ttsent has become necessary for the air and water defence, of the Empire. Jf after the Boer War Britain realised tbat isolation was more splendid than pru.'ent, the fateful days of July, 1914, reversed this lesson as Britain's concern for the balance of power and friendship for one of the Continental gioups spoiled her influence for peace, and this was surely a precedent of lasting significance. As it is becoming clear that it is impossible for Europe to effect a reorganisation of her international life no that co-operation will replace the antagonisms of nationalistic groupings, the diplomatic developments of current political intrigue have for us in New Zealand a special significance. I consider the present secret diplomacy the danger spot of modern democracy, that is, when a foreign Minister can evade or refuse to give answer to questions by mere assertion that it is not in the national interest to do so, and can pledge the lives of millions of ram to policies of which only a very few are aware. However, one must view diplomacy, except where it is colowned by international idealism, as siraply war without the fighting; and in an age when, economic interdependence calls for closer .political connexion, view economic imperialism a deterrent to security. The harvest ox international discord we are now reapinjf was sown years ago, and has been cultivated by»ambitious and predatory groups; consequently we must face up to facts as they present themselves to-day. . , During the last century Britain dominated the western Pacific, but in the last few decades her power has waned in this area, where diplomacy cannot be successfully practised without certain reserves of force. Hence the importance of Singapore to us here in New Zealand, the weakest area in the Empire, and our vital interest in the foreign policy of Britain, especially in her attitude towards Germany, which has wide ramifications. There is one aspect of "this wild and wanton escapade of Singapore," as one statesman once described it, that is pertinent to our interest in Empire defence, that is its efficacy to us es a strategical pivot. Japan has now converted herself into an industrial nation without, htwever, developing within herself the purchasing power to support her Industries. A year ago, when Mr Runciman announced that import quotas would be fixed for foreign cotton and rayon textiles the "Manchester Guardian" attacked that policy on the grounds that Britain had thus fired the first gun in a trade war of incalculable consequences, and had sacrificed the interests of her dominions to those of producers. Yet economic penetration is a powerful weapon, and trade cannot be disentangled from political control or such control divorced from military and naval power. It there-/ot-e takes little time to realise tnat Japan's Asiatic campaign has only, bejitun. Her incursion into Manchuria was a prerequisite to her next move into the richer lanis i» the south, as wjtnee# the abdication of pro-Bi*itis.n Piaja»3h:pok of Siam, ana«apanest influence at Bangkok, even to the extent of the proposed canal at ivra ««cro.>* the Malay Peninsula as a direct route to the Indian. Ocean, it would be lnvldloui to pretend that CtioAapore does not stand as a threat E Japan (the fighting radius of a ftodern fleet proves that), bin it is Kmtlally a move to prevent Japanfit naval. political, and industrial exfittioa into lands bordering the Infln Octifin, and necessary to protect

important trade routes connecting the Suez Canal, India. Malaya, and Australia. On the other hand, Singapore unfortunately puts a certain strategic emphasis on these islands of ours, in the event of hostilities, on the present workings of foreign policy, it is unlikely that Britain could spare her Atlantic or Mediterranean fleet for Singapore, and at present, despite modern fortifications, it is questionable whether the base v/ould prove im: pregnable to the Japanese fleet in any case, Singapore, without a Pacific fleet, loses much of its significance to us as a strategical pivot, and only emphasises our need for air and uncierwatcr defence co-ordination. hi tins connexion it is interesting to note that what may be surmised or described as the Han'key-Allenby plan puts considerable stress on aircraft in the defence zone, and while air control of the South Western Pacific could considerably delay the operations of an enemy fleet, it would not deter a portion of the Jananese fleet from occupying the oilfields of Borneo and Sarawak, and causing havoc on the east coast of Australia. Having in mind the Nishimura incident at Singapore last year, one can draw the corollary that the possession of New Zealand presents a valuable contribution in any flexible plan of submarine or cruiser campaign, apart from the export of her produce on foreign routes.-Yours May 25, 1935.