BRITAIN AND THE ARMS CRISIS

Press, Volume LXX, Issue 21179, 1 June 1934, Page 11

BRITAIN AND THE ARMS CRISIS

I insistence on early decision PBAFT PLAN SUPPORTED gIR JOIIX SIMON SI'KAKS AT (.J.'NKVA (SfiITISB Ofni'lA.L WIKEI.-.5.-.) (Received May 31, 5.5 p.m..) RUGBY. May 30. The prospects of the Disarmament C on f e vence were frankly reviewed Sir John Simon (Secretary of gtate for Foreign Affairs) when, during the debate by the General Commission at Geneva, he expressed the views of (he British Government on the present situation. Sir John dealt at length with the ie cent diplomatic negotiations and asked what were the essential differences which divided the French and German points of view, as they emerged from the documents exchanged between the various powers. | In a statement of its views on April 16 the German Government defined the rearmament which it stipulated in the proposed convention, at the same time declaring it would agree to a postponement of a reduction in the armaments of other powers until the end of the fifth year of a 10-vear convention. If, therefore, Sir John said, an international agreement were to be reached, either this claim must be modified or conceded. Germany claimed that the convention should accept a level of German armament higher than that provided in the peace treaties, to the extent indicated on April 16. On the other hand it appeared that France would desire Mo stand fast by the limits suggested at the meeting of the bureau on October 14, with the modification contained in the French memorandum on January 1. The suggestions of October i propounded a basis which would ad- , mit of no immediate rearmament of ' Germany, other than the increase j to which she was entitled under the peace treaty. Germany rejected that suggestion and the contrast between that proposal and the formulated require- j ments of Germany on April 16 was , obvious. Were those suggestions, ' in the present circumstances, a pos- ! sible basis of international agree- | ment? The conference would make ' ro progress by avoiding or burying ' Ih°se crucial points beneath merely observations. * ! T hs only thing that mattered now va-j an agreement—to find out if . IVe were a possible bridge to be ; between the conflicting views \ «'md what was the contribution they j rv.r.t rooectivcly make to construct | that bridge. \ British Efforts The British Government had done its very best to be the bridge-build- ■ us. By the end of this debate they i ought to see more clearly where the foundations for such ; bridge must - belaid if the gap were to be closed. They could see already how overwhelmingly grave the consequences roust be if after all this effort and tee prolonged debates no bridge j could be built. i

in the opinion of the British Government the draft convention which the conference adopted as a basis still afforded the best solution. Reallsing, however, the serious consequences of failure to reach an agreera wit it _ determined to formulate 'Modifications, which were expressed 'n its memorandum of January 29. This contained proposals which were regarded not as ideal but as the most of acceptance The close approximation between that memorandum and the German declaration showed that the differences were benarrowed. The British Governme nt felt that the line of that memorandum was more likely to produce an agreement than any other concrete proposal. Indeed, he would go further. Uness something like them was agreed Pon then he did not believe a dis:,nJam®nt convention could be real=tr il e British Government was j engthened in that judgment by nut interesting memorandum forward by the Danish, Spanish, Swedish, and Swiss delations. A J -- n said that P firt °t" thc ilpiH • k- ln Sdom draft convention nn , u Wl , th secut 'ity along the lines svmn »£ hope for the fid Stated C °-° pcruUon o£ thG Russian Prooosal Criticised atinn k'tvinofi's declarencp * sat "mament Confertid' so far the direct object of toSn Cn !i was concerned, was ti nu • .dead, but should consecurit? because some pact of Simnn C 0U i, b ° cvoJv cd, Sir John w hen d iat c ' vcn ' n 1924, s bn .Protocol was under discusc ontemni 11 ] S j rurnent secl -irity was lion imf'i i- as coming into opera:vas reached armamenl ' a S rcement newtherefore, bo an entirely fere n p r ' ur f to transform a conIeCI.l eCI . for the Purpose of rle vi~inJ V lnt ° a conference for a "is tha? of security on the *** Possible" 0 disarrn;irnen '' at all toer ded^nt Ue ol ', security pacts clout on th ° n 10 lct ot ;i promise •'•rose nf certainty, jf (lie need 'be si®na«n^-' R vo Performance by v ' ew thprc. From ,llat Point of JicalvahL 0 migh >*' « hl R hcr prncy guarantees'' hi- lU n' u "'. l( ' rtakin e • °°arno ■ kc ' llu ' Ireaty of lte d anri , i, m Ko:r| e new, unlimVi^'i° r * ide c Hance tu to choose between the ? ent on tl f> r if laincd i of an aßrwbr°akdown ; lnd 'cated and a poac e effort '<l w hole of this 'Unlmiitc'i consec (uences Sd competition in armaL he World to the future of j as Ure. which no man could ? e fs W pre D e a a r S L enou Sh to say they 'f thev S° on working, femselve s a^ re + to 41 do justice to a'ties thosp * their responsii S c °Uld ennrif must be such Ssue of thp!l e , to f ho successful S tot ' The time was intr ■ hcy . could deluge *Pious exnrc • lma 8 |n 'ng that by , an a^pl Slol \ of ,hc 'ic.'-irc to were pr °"

Action Demanded "While we talk the world does not stand still," he said. "The British Government is still as convinced as ever that an international agreement about armaments will be the greatest contribution which could be made to the restoration of confidence and thc consummation of peace, and realises to the full the gravity of reaching no result. "But while wo will still co-oper-ate in any new effort which really contains prospects of producing a general agreement we will not lend ourselves to an indefinite continuance of vague and inconclusive discussions justified by nothing better than a sanguine hope that something in the way of a solution might still turn up: First, because we are convinced that such a procedure would inflict a great and increasing injury on the League and on the whole conception of effective international action; second, because if the Disarmament Conference is kept in being purely for the purpose of debate.' but without any real hope or prospect, of obtaining positive results, we are, in effect, debarring ourselves from whatever new effort might be needed." Me most earnestly trusted that the outcome of the debate might be to provide a solid ground for believing they could accomplish what they had set out to do, and the British Government would exert itself to the uttermost to that end. Was there not the necessary material by combining such agreements as had already been reached with the new concessions which must be made? And, in any case, could not they put into effective shape the protocols and make them ready for signature on two or three of the more limited but most important matters which appeared ripe for prompt and effective treatment? These he stated as: Chemical warfare. budgetary publicity, and tiie setting up of a Permanent Disarmament Commission. This would be needed in connexion with both the matters just mentioned*