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Press, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20712, 24 November 1932, Page 8

JOHN F. CURTIS F.8.0.A., F.S.M.C., F. 1.0., LONDON OPTICIAN 709 COLOMBO STREET ♦Phone 30-064 for appointment

The League and Manchuria. The present session of the League Council, specially convened to deal with the Lytton Report, 13 faced with the most difficult and important international problem that has arisen since tbe War. It is not too much to say that the whole future of the Far East hangs on the question whether the Council will be able to secure the acceptance of au internationally guaranteed regime. in Munclraria on the lines suggested in the Lytton Report. If the present situation is accepted as unalterable Manchuria will become to China what the Danzig Corridor is to Germany and Chinese nationalism, instead of developing peacefully under the tutelage of the Powers, will take the form of a crusade against foreign oppressors. But the effects of whatever solution is arrived at will not affect the Far East alone. In the last twelve months Japan has disregarded the obligations she assumed by joining tho League, violated the clause in the Kellogg Pact which required her not to seek a solution of any dispute by force of arms, and dishonoured the promise she gave in the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 to respect the sovereignty and integrity of China. Her excuse is that, as there was no formal declaration of war during tho Manchurian affair, the question of. her treaty obligations does not ariso. There may be enough in this argument to provide a debate for lawyers; but it is certain that if what happened in Manchuria is held to bo outside the scope of the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact, and the Nine-Power Treaty, thoso instruments, and indeed the whole postWar international system, will be dangerously weakened. It is, however, unpleasantly obvious that the Lcnguo Council lias now even less chance of settling the Manchurian problem than it had six months ago, when hostilities were si ill in progress. The failure of the Powers, in the critical weeks of September and October, 1931, to enforce a truca while they had the chance, was a confession of weakness which encouraged the Japanese Government; to do what it might not be able to undo even if it had the will. The success of the Manchurian campaign and tho