MANCHURIA AND SHANGHAI.

Press, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20470, 13 February 1932, Page 15

MANCHURIA AND SHANGHAI.

CAUSES AND EFfTSCTS. HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE. To the casual observer it would appear that China lias failed in her treaty obligations to Japan, Tvritcs P.G. in the "Sydney .Morning Herald." Whether this failure is due to a deliberate policy on the part of the various Chinese Governments, or whether it is due merely to the fact that the Central Government has little or no control over her more distant dominions, is not apparent. That this lack of control exists is not to be denied; in fact, the recent Thorbnrn affair would lead one to suppose that there is little enough control within oO miles of the capital. The present, unfortunate situation would appear to have had its immediate origin in the now almost forgotteu "Waopaushan Affair last June—an attack on Korean farmers (Japanese nationals) by Chinese, allegedly aided and abetted by police. This was followed by anti-Chinese riots throughout Korea, which resulted in great loss of life. It would seem that the Chinese were the original aggressors. Koreans had leased certain land from a Chinese, u.io refrained from telling them that lie had no permission to do so, and that further the water rights were reserved to the local authorities. The Economic Boycott. The Koreans built a dam, the Chinese tore it down, it was rebuilt, and the subsequent attempt to destroy resulted in bloodshed. The anti-Chinese riota in Korea led to the reprisals in Manchuria. Japan drafted troops to Manchuria to protect her nationals from reprisals, and hardly had the echoes died awav when the present trouble began on the -.ianchurian railway. In the meantime China had instituted a general and effective economic boj-cott of Japan, which proved to be the last straw on the Japanese camel's baelc. I rom an unbiased viewpoint, here is a situation in which right might give way to expediency. Japan has large vested interests in Manchuria, and is able to set up a stable and efficient Government, which China certainly is not. The League of Nations might, therefore, give Japan a mandate over Manchuria till such time as China has set her own house in order, and is able to take over the control of affairs. The Shanghai Position. _ But however justified Japan nuiv be in asserting her treaty rights in Manchuria, there is little justification for the conflict at Shanghai in China proper. Ihe excuse that the action was rendered necessary by attack on Japanese priests is childish. The attack took place in the Settlement, where the Chin ese writ does not run, and where Chinese sovereignty is"de facto" non-existent, whatever the National Government mav claim. Therefore, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the municipal authorities as an ordinary crime. It would appear that Japan is trying to force the issue. The -latest statement by the Japanese Foreign Office does not throw much light on the situation. It seems that the massing of Chineso troops round the Settlement and the consequent declaration by the municipal authorities of a state of emergency were the result of the landing of additional marines at Shanghai by Japan and of .her threat to occupy not only the Chinese municipal area, but also the Foreign Settlement. Further, granted that the Japanese forces merely took up their allotted posts under the general scheme of defence, this would not include the occupation of the Chinese Post Office in the heart of the Settlement, an act which would be bound to eause great in convenience to foreigners. Despite ali denials, the present activities of. the Japanese constitute a flagrant breacn of that neutrality which has always been a bulwark of defence and promoter of that security on which Shanghai'-; prosperity is based. Firing of Chapei. In any case, from the point of view of the foreign community, the indiscriminate firing of houses in Chapei is to be deprecated on all grounds. Chinese houses are flimsy enough at best, and by virtue of the lack of natural boua daries, a fire started in Chapei migii!, well end in Nantao, having traversed the Foreign Settlement en route. The establishment of, a neutral zouo as suggested by Britain should case the situation if accomplished, as the presence within the Settlement boundaries of large numbers of plainclothesmen, soldiers, bandits, Communists, or just plain criminals, constitutes a grave menace to the safety of the Settlement. Domestic strife in China always has had its reflex on the Settlement, and the recent civil wars and banditry, and the turning adrift of disbanded soldiery have inevitably aggravated the crime situation in Si.anghai. With the horde* of refugees that invariably crowd into the Settlement oji the outbreak of hostilities outside, the situation is one that must sis-suredly cause great anxiety to the authorities, particularly in .view of the fact that one of the combatants happens to be a foreign Power, with-large numbers (18,000") of nationals settled within the Settlement. Chinese Mentality. China is a member of the League ot Nations, and doubtless those gentlemen who represent her there are as worthy as any other delegates. But after all they represent but an infinitesimal portion of the national thought. The Chinese still thinks along the lines of ilia ancestors, and would settle a dispute in the time-honoured fashion. The 'typical Chinese is a goodnatured. even-tempered, peaceable individual, ready to do his part in life without shirking, and asking only for imr treatment. But his equilibrium is liable to he disturbed by sudden Lr.rsts of passion. China would settle the present dispute along the lines of a family or village squabble. Is it any wonder that. Western diplomacy fails?