MIMIC AIR RAID.

Press, Volume LXVII, Issue 20343, 16 September 1931, Page 4

MIMIC AIR RAID.

55 TONS OF BOMBS. LONDON ATTACKED. I.YBUM Ul'r OWS COKS-ESPO-iM-VI.) LONDON, August 7. Vi'lui. poiavs in iind around tlxo sprawling mass of London, geographically the most' vuncrable city to air attack, were the objectives of ninetytwo bombing raids whicli penetrated ' the dofenea system curing the . Eoyal Air Force mimic war. Hostilities spread over three days and three nights, involving forty-live hours of intensive "wr.r" ilying, engaged nearly three hundred bombers and fighting aeroplanes in a picturesque struggle notable for dramatic speed of action, and sudden, unexpected incident. .An official summary of the " war 1 states that the aircraft considered to have penetrated the defences "dropped" u-i tons of high explosive and Itons of incendiary bombs on pre-determined objectives. But of the twenty-four daylight raids, no fewer than twenty -were intercepted by defending lighters, and thirty-nine of the sixty-eight raiders during the nighttime were also brought to combat by the defence. v This marks a high standard of successful air interception, and the Agues of machine casualties assessed by the umpires—S4 "Blueland" Bombers, and 09 ".Tiedlaijd" fighters "destroyed" iu aerial combat —pay further tribute to the defenders. Low raids by swift day bombers during the day, directed mostly at defending 'aerodromes, and thrilling aerial battles at heights of less than 1000 feet above the ground wbieh sometimes engaged simultaneously thirty or forty aeroplanes, provided perhaps tho most exciting moments. Less spectacular, but of paramount' importance, was the astonishing;, celerity shown by certain fighter in getting off the ground to intercept the enemy. One unit, equipped with 1 - ,the new ' Tury'' single-seater biplanes- which climb faater than any other war aeroplane in the world, and can exceed 210 miles an hour with full load on .board, was actually in tlio air one' miiiute and forty seconds after the alarm was received at tho aerodrome. frequently an entire squadron was off the grouud within two mjiiutes. ' Observation Network. The volunteer observers at their lonely posts in fields away from the towns did magnificent service. Men of every class, retired Army and Navy officers, artisans and professional men, took their turns of duty iu this veritable first lino of England's air defence. So efficient is the organisation, that barely half a minute suffices for the report of raiders overhead to pass by telephone right to the office of the air defonce commander-in-chief. Thirty seconds after the observer locates tho enemy, a tiny flag, showing his exact position at that moment is pinned on the operations map at headquarters. Frequently, too, the observor is able to give a good estimate of the height at whieh. the enemy is flying. The non-regular squadrons of bembers attached to the "Blueland" forces, two units of tho Auxiliary Air Force (sometimes called the "air territorials") flew with splendid judgment, and on some raids eluded the defence to score heavily in bomb attacks on important objectives. Though flying machines many miles an hour slower than the swift "Hart" biplanes-flown by two of the regular "Blueland" squffdrons, the • auxiliary airMett,to 'skilful and imaginative leading, gave the defence many anxious hours. The auxiliary airmen include men of alt classes who devote their spare time and. holidays to training which will fit' them to take a prominent pari in defending their country iu any future confliet. Coat of Raiding London. The air strategists are now at work digesting tho results of the exercises, whieh are known to have supplied most valuable data. In general terms the " war'' has shown decisively that a certain proportion of raiding bombers, particularly if they are able to move with the speed of the new British craft, must always elude the defence. The price demanded by the defence for that partial success however, should be very heavy. Even with the skeletonised scheme of defonce existing to-day —the Home Defence Force is no fewer than twelve squadrons loss than the quota of 52 planned in 1923—enemy raiders would undoubtedly suffer alarming casualties, either on the way in to London, or when making for their own aerodromes af-ter attacking , the city. In a few days, given moderately clear weather, the enemy would probably be discouraged from continuing his effort's, particularly if success attended the counter-attacks on his aerodromes and other vital points whieh would certainly constitute the chief and most formidable weapon wielded by the defence. No Accidents. Later in the "war" the weather improved slightly from the low clouds and bad visibility of the early stages, and the Air Staff were able to call a halt at 9 a.m. on July 23rd, instead of carrying on till tho pre-arranged "all clear" at 3 a.m. on the 2oth. But conditions were seldom near the ideal. No accident of any kind marred the days and nights of strenuous flying, the only incident officially reported being a forced landing duo to fuel exhaustion, the pilot apparently losing his way iu low cloud and mist. Not ■ only is this proof of the remarkably high standard of flying and navigational skill in the E.A.F. and the Auxiliary squadrons; it is also a fine tribute to the trustworthiness of British service aircraft and aero engines. Once again tho "Hart" bombers did magnificently, their turn of speed making the task of lighters sent up to intercept them exceedingly difficult. Among the defending squadrons, a composite unit of "Hart" two-seater fighters —the first aircraft of this kind employed in the Koyal Air Force since tho war—and sturdy "Bulldog" singleseater craft did particularly well. Including this unit, six squadrons of "Bulldogs," .now the standard fighter of the JTorce, took part in the "war,", and all maintained a creditable proportion of intercepted raids. The "Fury" squadron, -flying new single-seater fighters at least twenty miles an hour faster than any other engaged in the exercises, were required to watch a sector of the coast apparently too large for any single unit to patrol efficiently, and they had little success. Their task -was made yet more difficult by the fact that no warning could be received till tho raiders had already crossed the coast, a limitation not likely to be paralleled in actual warfare. Dovetailed into their proper place in the defence scheme, perhaps at aerodromes farther from the coast, and augmented in numbers, these new fighters are certain to add much to the strength of the protective system. '