Naval Rivalry.

Press, Volume LXI, Issue 18287, 22 January 1925, Page 8

Naval Rivalry.

Tho American Scnato's refusal to consider any elevation of battleship guns to match the range of the latest British weapons ends satisfactorily an agitation which was quite unexpected and had reached a stage when it was becoming embarrassing to the Administration. ' When the Washington Naval Treaty was published it was as plain to laymen as to experts that all it had done was to limit the tonnage in which rival building was possiblej But no ono anticipated that once "the ' 5-5-3 ratio for battleships wus agreed upon patriotic mathematicians would start, weighing respective broadsides and threatening a new racp on the plea of efficiency. American newspapers to hand this week show to what lengths tho discussion on the alleged inferiority of the American Navy had bocn carried when, as the "Herald-Tribune" puts it, President Coolidgo put an end to "rivalry talk" and decided to "curb" his impetuous Navy Secretary, Mr Wilbur. According to this paper the argument ended in a clash between Mr Hughes and Mr Wilbur, out of which the Secretary of Stato came triumphantly bearing a new pacific policy of "a well-rounded "Amorican Navy without being greatly "disturbed as to whether Great Bri"tain, or Japan, or any other country is "going just a little bit further than a "strict interpretation of the treaty "might warrant." An interesting comparison of ; the relative strength of the 5-5-3 fleets is made by a correspondent who was head of the statistical division of the American Naval Bureau of Construction and Repair during the war. He points out that jKfcile all the ships retained by

Great Britain and Japan are superDreadnoughts (Bhips carrying 13J-inch or larger guns), America has four which carry 12-inch guns and were launched three, four, and five years before the ■war, which means that they would be of little use in a battle. Not one American ship has a designed speed of ■over 21 knots, whereas the 20 British battleships can all do 21 knots, and some of them 25, and the Japanese ships are nominally even faster craft. In gun power (weight of the total broadside fire) the British Heet is stronger than the American Navy by 11$ per cent., and in displacement the selection of ships left Great Britain 10 per cent, ahead "of America. The conclusion he reaches is that America "could neither force an engagement "nor avoid one," and would have to fight on whatever terms an opponent elected to choose. If it is granted that the Washington treaty left Great Britain with a stronger fleet than America, it should not be forgotten that Britain at the end of the war had the largest military and naval forces in the world; that she began disarming as soon as peace was assured, and had already scrapped a formidable fleet when America: called the nations

to Washington. And tho American experts, we may be sure, realised the position at the time and so advised their Government. But the fact is, as American naval officers acknowledge, so many factors enter into the efficiency of a fleet that it is quite impossible with two so nearly equal in strength as the British and American Navies are to say which is really the more powerful. And as war between America and Britain is unthinkable, President Coolidge will have earned the gratitude of both nations if he has really put a stop to the thoughtless talk of narrow-minded experts.