DEBATE ON DEFENCE.

Press, Volume LX, Issue 17990, 6 February 1924, Page 14

DEBATE ON DEFENCE.

O THE SEA AND THE AIR. ADMIRAL M. KERR AND VISCOUNT CURZON. ■'reov oui; OWN COIUVESPOHDKNT.) LONDON, December IT. Lord Ampthill presided at a largely-atti-nded meeting at tho Royal United Service Institution on Friday, when Admiral Mark Kerr and Viscount Curson discussed the subjects—'' The Navy, the Air, and the Empire." The Admiral considered that, in view o£ the advance of aeronautical science and the submarine and mine menace, the present type of battleship was.obsolete. The Viscount submitted that whether or no the capital ship was or was not obsolete, and useless depended entirely on tho assumption that the capital" ship could be destroyed by under-watcr or air attack. Unless they oould provo that the modern type of capital ship was unable to stand a reasonable amount of damage without being disabled there would seem to be overwhelming reasons for continuing to build such vessels. The Command, of the Sea. Admiral Mark Kerr held "that in order to preserve the command of the yjea it is necessary to adapt our warships and aircraft to modern requirements, since the present type of battleship no longer performed that function; the reorganisation of the naval bases thu3 becoming requisite.!' By. way of establishing this view, Admiral Kerr said .-that in an Empire like ours communications were as vital to us in peace as in war. Tho British Navy existed for' tho sole purpose of maintaining our communications and stopping those of ••the enemy in times of war. It could never win a war, but no . war could be won -without it. Throughout our history the lines of sea routes had been kept open for our merchant ships by cruisers of carrying types, and the mercantile marine of 'our enemy had"been captured or debarred from them by the same means. Great numbers of these light, fast vessels had been required, to carry out these duties, and the producing of a suitable vessel not too expensive, so that they could be available in great numbers, had been one of the principal problems of our naval constructors. In order that the cruisers could perform thoir function properly the battleship was produced to hold tho ring and prevent interference by enemy capital ships, and in this way we had, in old days, kept command of the communications, or in other words, the command or 'partial command of tho sea. '.. "The command of the sea," continued Admiral Mark Kerr, . is as essential to us now as it ever was. "Vvo must, therefore, investigate to see how it can bo maintained in the future, in spite of the modern inventions of submarines, mines, destroyers,.and aircraft that have come into being, assisted : by w-ireless telegraphy to give ' speedy information to all parts of the world. It is a maxim of strategy that it is. only to one side's advantage to fight a general engagement. In -the old nays", before tne' coming of those pests of the air and sea, it on© side did not wish to fight a-general engagement because it was not advantage-' ous.to do so, the battle fleet on the other side would chase it into port and there blockade it, and thus nullify its effectiveness, while preserving its own cruisers .from molestation. This 1 is no longer possible since the coming of tho flotillas of the underwater, the surface, and the sky. This, Admiral Kerr said, was the most important point, because it did away with tho principal function of the ■ Battle Fleet to hold the ring so that tho cruisers could work in safety. Let them visualise for a moment a situation in war, when one side was getting the worst of the struggle for communications, which was the only reason for the existence. of the Navy. Would this side send its Battle Fleet across tho ocean too near the enemy's coast, knowing that the enemy's fleet, not wishing.for an engagement, would not come out, and knowing at the same time that all tho pests that the Battle Fleet loathed and detested, and 'flew from liko the devil, would be attacking them day and night? From constant steaming the armour belts would shortly bo above the water, and the fleet,- or what was left of it, would eventually return, discouraged and discredited, to its own ports far across the sea. He had asked distinguished admirals if they would like to undertake such a job, and the only answer hi\ had received was an emphatic, "I would not like it at all."

Tho two principal headings of th© problem were:- -(!)' -What typo of ship should the present battleship be so that it can hold the ring under modern conditions ?

(2) How are we to command the sea communications .between our Empire "and other narts'of the world in face of present-day circumstances? From the earliest times man had striven for three things in order to win.in the struggle against the animals and other men—range, speed, and invisibility. The last word in speed was spoken by the air, whose craft could travel on unfixed routes at a rate of over .200 miles in the hour. For invisibility man came to using smoke screens on land, sea, submarines, and aircraft. He had observed the effect of ine flotillas of the air on the' flotillas of the nnder-water boat, and by the returns which were received it was

shown that never was a vessel sunk ! which was escorted by heavier-than-air | craft, and ho thought there was only one ease of a sinking when escorted by i a lighter-than-air vessel. The subloathed and detestedjlie air- , craft. \x, was the only enemy that could j strike it without itself being hit. | Man had always )>een striving for : a longer range. Would an officer com- < manding one of the present type of battleships, with a vision of twenty mi!es and n range of twelve miles, like ' to take on in combat a vessel with a vision of 200 miles and a range of equal length ? It would be like the Victory fighting tho Hood, or, in a lesser way. the Monmouth, with herCin guns, when she fought the Scharnhorst. Aeroplane-carrying Ships. |

"There will always be battleships, but their size, type, and armament will continue to change. A battleship may be a submersible of 5000 tons or an aeroplane-carrying ship of 15,000 tons, : or some other kind that we have not: thought cf, of 50,000 tons or five tons, ' but it certainly is not the present type, if it is to bo of any use. Let us find out what wo really want before spending money in feverish haste on what is of use no longer." 'Our nearest neighbour was already adopting tho > policy he advocated so far as increasing flotillas of the air, surface, and | urider-water went, and not by spending more money on capital ships.' | '"I believe," he said, "that the pre- i sent form of battleship should be an j aeroplane-carrying ship with some air- I craft, 21in torpedoes, others with depth-cliarge bombs, smoke bombs, and some fighting machines. There will be in attendance on her submarines and destroyers when necessary; according to the work and position of the ship. A secondary armament, of Cin guns.will , be provided for defence against the l submarine and destroyer, and the ves- j sel snould be .fitted with blisters and I well subdivided." ' i

How were they to command the sea of tho future? We had a chain of fuelling stations provided by the foresight of our ancestors all- over the world. Each of these could be made a sanctuary and kept inviolate by flotillas and mines. An island • with a sanctuary of 100 miles radius gave a frontier of 600 miles across which to send supply ships out from-or bring in the incoming convoys. No enemy could have sufficient vessels to patrol these frontiers in all parts of tho world. We could not afford to stay behind in the air, for we could bo struck a fatal blow in the heart by anyone within air distance of us before a single sailor or soldier had seen the enemy. He advocated a Minister of Defence for the fighting services; criticised the present proposals in regards to the Singapore base as akin to building a stable to hold ah elephant when it might in the end be wanted to house a terrier; and argued that the only way to get a correct proportion of money votes between the three services was to have one Minister responsible for the three services.

• The Lesson of the Jutland Battle. It was clear, said Viscount Gurzon, that Admiral Kerr considered that the present tvpe of capital ship was obsolete, and that the Naval Staff had been guilty of an error of judgment in going in for docks at Singapore. Further, that tho typo of battleship he had in mind was pome sort of air craft carrier. - With regard to Admiral Percy Scott, it had always been difficult to deduce from his" utterances and from his writings exactly what he had in mind, but his chief point appeared to be that the capital ship was "no damn good." (Laughter.) In this ho was supported by a mytliicd. midshipman. (Laughter.) When he was tackled by Sir Doveton Sturdee at that Institution the following passage took place: ' Sir Doveton Sturdee, in reply to Admiral Sir Percy Scott, was reported to have said. "If you were First Lord would you stop building battleships, even though other Powers continued to do so? Sir Percy Scott: Yes, I would. But I would build something in place of'them. Sir, Doveton Sturdee : What would you build ? Sir Percy Scott: That! will not say. 1 can tell their Lordships in secret, and I don't think they are very likely to ask me." (Laughter.) Apparently, Lord Curzon continued, the views of Admiral Sir Percy Scott and Admiral Mark Kerr are -identical. (Laughter.) He . (Lord Ourzon) submitted that whether or no the capital ship was, or was not, obsolete and useless seemed to depend entirely on the assumption that the capital ship could bo destroyed by under water or air attack.

This was the real point at issue Unless they could prove that the modern type of battleship was unable to stand a reasonable amount of damage without oeing disabled there would seem to be overwhelming reasons for continuing to build such vessels. (Cheers.) The existence of the capital ship had been threatened from time to time by various ne«- inventions, such as tlie torpedo, the mine, and aircraft. The advocates of these devices had prophesied the end of the capital ship, but it had been developed so as to meet their threats with success. Down to the present time the Naval Staffs of, tit© United States, Japan, and Great Britain, including that of a strong Nn-yal Board of Admiralty, headed by Earl Beatty, had accepted the battleship as the principal navalvunit. Their opinion wa-s reinforced by that of another naval officer of the greatest disr tinction, Lord Jellieoe —(cheers) —who described the present type of capital; ship as '"'the strongest pngine of war which exists for operating on the seas." Lord Jellicoe said that there was at present no apparent prospect ] of the submarine or aircraft defeating the capital ship in. tne next 17 years.' The Weapon of Precision. "In naval war," Lord Curzon continued, "the big gun is the most power-

ful weapon that human ingenuity has devised. Torpedoes, mines, and air bombs are all most powerful weapons, but they were not weapons of precision. Given favourable conditions the torpedo is fairly accurate, but I submit that it is not a match for the gun in any respect. ' "If wo consider what happened at the Battle of Jutland, where hundreds of torpedoes were launched, how many hits were scored? By far the greater percentage cf losses in the battle resulted from gun fire on both sides. (Cheers.) A German officer whom i personally interviewed just prior to the surrender of the German Fleet informed me that the German Fleet had no less than two complete destroyer flotillas at the head of the line, and yet when the action was broken off there was not a single torpedo left in any of these ships, all having been fired-. Each German destroyer must have fired not less than four "torpedoes, and perhaps a good many more, and, so far as I am aware, the only hit scored was that on the Marlborough, and she was able to maintain her course and speed and remain in action, only hauling out of line when the action was broken off." He could mention cases where many torpedoes had been required to sink a sinsle ship. A notable case was the liVht cruiser Falmouth on August 19th, 1910. He believed it took no fewer than five torpedoes to sink her. The Mine ami Air Menace. With regard to the mine this depended entirely for its action upon the work of Fate, and now that the paravane was practically universally used the mine might be considered to have lost much of its power. As to the menace frum the air it should be remembered that to hit with a torpedo or to' drop a bomb near a ship steaming an even low speed was a matter of extreme difficulty. It was certain to bring the aircraft within easy range of the counter-attack by air or gunfire. Aircraft also operated under other obvious disadvantages, such as weather conditions, etc.

Before concurring with Admiral Kerr that the command of the sea had passed from the capital ship of tho present type, it was essential that thev should exactly understand tho proportions of the menace to which it was subjected. He thought it was obvious that if the battleship was obsolete because of its vulnerability, the same argument would also apnly to the aircraft earner. All battleshins were now fitted to cfirrv aero •plane';, and yet thev did not satisfy Admiral Kerr's requirements.

Not to build the two new capital ships in the event of another war, within the next twenty years, would be to condemn thousands of officers and men in four older partially worn-out ships of inferior design, insufficient protection, weaker armament, and low speed to go to. sea and endeavour to fight an enemy within range of whom thev. might never get, and who might be able to destroy them as completely as the three battle cruisers were destroyed at tho Battle of Jutland by a better design of ship. The conclusion he reached was that the present type of capital ship remained, to-day. as it had always been, the unit on whioh all other naval forces must depend for support, and which, when the critical hour of the fleet action took place, became at once the dominating factor.

The country was faced with the choice of either relyinp; upon the decisions of the Naval Staff, composed of officers who served at sea dnrincr the or accepting the advice of Admiral Sir Percy Scott, who did not serve al sea. during the war.