IF A CONFLICT CAME

Press, Volume LX, Issue 17981, 26 January 1924, Page 13

IF A CONFLICT CAME

JAPAN AND AMERICA.

HOW THEY STAND IX THE PACIFIC

(SPECIALLY WKITTEK FOB, "THE FBKSS.") (By XT. FARMER WHITE.) It is no secret, of course, that tlia relations between America and Japan have been far from cordial for a long tirno past, and tho position has seriously exercised the minds of thoughtful students of -world affairs. Many keen observers consider that a conflict is inevitable.

"When, in IS9B, the United States, by its annexation of Hawaii, established its first advanced outpost in the' Pacilc, an outcry was raised in the Japanese Press; and when, in April of the' folowing year, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to America under the treaty of peace, public feeling in Japan, fanned by the Press, was much aroused.

Hers is the position, as pat by aa American naval officer :

Th© Philippines arc there for Japan whenever she likes to tako them, and nothing can iter from seizing them when sl:o focis disposed to do so. As at present circumstanced, wo could do nothing whatever to protect them in time of war. If wo wens foolish enough to locate a fleet at Manila, tho history of Port Arthur would repeat itself, with us in tho role of tho Russians. An expeditionary forci, consisting of eighteou-knot transports, guarded by a squadron of reasonable strength, could leave the southern ports of Japan, roach Manila, in three days, and mako itself absolute master of Luw>n before succour could arrivo from Hawaii, our nearest, naval base, which is some 5000 miles away. Consequently, when tho "rescuing fleet" did turn up, it would findthe Japane.se flag waving over Manila, and itself, with depleted bunkers, forced to fight under tho most disadvantageous conditions, or to beat, an ignominious retreat without standing upon tho order of its going. That is not merely a. picture, of what might happen, but of what most assuredly will happen if war breaks out within the nest few year:].

According to Mr Hector Bywaier, who deals at length with tho whole subject in his book, "Sea Power in the Pacific," it was reported at the time that "tho Japanese Government had notified "Washington of its inability to acquiesce in this sudden thrusting forward of American influence right across the Pacific; but, be this as it may, Japan was faced with an acconv plislied fact, and she very wisely refrained from giving a more forcible expression to her disapproval." From that time on, however, the relations between the two countries has become more and more strained, and tho exclusion policy directed against tho Japanese in California has helped to bring about an ominous situation. Those who would like to get a full grasp of the problem of the Pacific, and, more particularly, of the relations between Japan and America, should certainly read Mr Bywater's book. Regarding Hawaii, ho points out thai it was impossible for Japan to claim, any special interest in the islands on the ground of geographical propinquity, for they lie some 4400 miles from her own coastline • and her attitude was hold by many foreign observers to confirm the suspicion that alio cherished some far-reaching schemes of expansion in the Pacific, and that Hawaii had been marked down as an integral part of tho future Japanese Empire. Geographically, the acquisition of the Philippines was of more serious import to Japan, and the language of the Japanese Press was so violent that the Government sought to j counteract it by expressing its satis, faction that American influences, "so fruitful of benefit to the human raco," were spreading in the "Western Pacific. "Camouflage," it was said, perhaps. But, personally, I believe that on© of the last things Japan desires (I leave the militarist party out of consideration for the moment) is a rupture with America. Th© first Power to appoint a consular representative m Japan was t'he United States; and ( 6he> was also tho first to negotiate a, treaty with Japan. In many respects; Japan owes much to America, particularly for the friendly part played by tho Americans in the difficult period during which the island nation was emerging from, her long period of ■ tion. And, when, the _ great earthquake occurred, America was' foremost in th© relief work. But "Bast is I3aj;t, and West and West, and never the twain shall Jneet," as Kipling says; and it is the colour lipe that is . responsible for all the trouble of recent years—tho colour line and. all that it means, the racial bar, tho difference of economic and living standard:?.

Bitterness Towards America. *' Issues that make the strongest poseiblo appeal to Japaneso patriotism ftre involved in the dispute with America," writes Mr Bay water. "No race is more strongly imbued with national pride or more sensitive as to its international status, It is lor' this reason that the spectacle of their kindred being the privilege of eitir/enship in the United States, on the score of racial inferiority, has already caused such passionate resentment in Japan,"/ And ho is quit© right when he Adds 1 that the bitterness lias been intensified. by the «vfctitude> of the United States towards Japanese expansion in China. Whether their object is a selfish one or not —whether, as the Japanese declare,' the Americans wish, to exploit Manchuria and Siberia for their own benefit—there' is no question but that Japanese ambitions have been, and are being, largely thwarted by tho Americans. Having seized the richest islands of the Pacific America now seeks (so runs the argument) to prevent Japan finding an outlet for her surplus population in Manchuria." "They have seen tho Pacific all but denuded of American warships. They have observed with amazement tha omission of America to fortKy her outposts in the Pacific, and to make adequate provision for the n'.*j.intenanoe of a fleet in the western area of that ocean. They have come to look upon the defenceless Philippines as theirs for the taking. It is true that a powerful American fleet has recently appeared in tho, Pacific; but, without defended bases in the west, it remains practically tied to its own coast. Pursuing thia train of thought, the Janpanese may . well ask themselves what they would have to fear in the event of war with thd United States, and whether it woui'd not b® better to settle once and for all a dispute which can never be satisfactorily accommodated by peaceful means,"

Some 1400 miles east of Guam lie the Marshall Islands, which came . into prominence during'the World War as one of the bases used by the German cruiser squadron, under Admiral von Spce. He coaled afc Brown Atoll and Enivetok, subsequently . moving to Majuro, in the same 'gToup, from which place the German raiders, ;Corrnoran and Prinz Eitel Friedrich, left to prey upon shipping in Australasian waters. Wht'n the Marshall Islands were in German ownership, the beginnings of a naval base had been made at Jaluit. Since the Japanese occupation, this base ia. said to have been further developed, and there is now a depot for tho storago of coal and oil. Similar' reports have been herad in connexion with Yap, Angaur (in the Pcllcws), Pulap, and Ponape, in the Carolines. Notwithstanding that tho military Government installed upon the first Japanese seizure of these islands has since been replaced by a civil administration, they are regarded primarily aa military ports, and very little information concerning tho works in progress there is allowed to leak out. .... Without in any way impugning the good faith of Japan, it may be as certain that these newly-acquired territories will henceforth occnpy a most important place in her scheme of naval strategy. They cannot therefore, be ignored in relation to Guam, which ia destined to become the principal American war station in the Western Paei/ie. That their proximity tends to reduct the value of this base is self-evi-dent. . . . The enormous . expanse of the Pacific makes base power and large steaming radius tho dominating factors in the strategical problems of that ocean. Without a chain of welldefended fuel'stations it would bo impossible for the American fleet to operate for any length of time in the Western Pacific. The gravitation of naval power • from the Atlantic to the Pacific is an event which is fraught with significance to the whole world, and to none more than to the people of Australia and New" Zea--land.' The provision of adequate defences in the Pacific is, therefore, a matter of vital moment to us. In another article I shall deal particularly with the position of Australia and New Zealand in delation to the Singapore naval base.

According to this authority, war with Japan in tlio immediate future would confront the American naval command with a task of extraordinary complexity. They would be faced with the alternative of waging a purely defensive war, which, by entailing the loss of all their possessions in the Western Pacific, would bo tantamount to a coiffeasion of defeat; or or fighting under conditions so difficult that a decesive success would bo practically impossible to achieve. J\"owhere in the embracing over 3000 islands, large and small, with a total area of 115,000 square miles, is there a base capable of supplying the needs of a big 'fleet; nor up to the end of 1920 were they any facilities for the storage of coal, oil, provisions, or ammunition in anything like the quantities required by a modern fleet. Of the three so-called naval bases in the Philippines—Cavite (Manila), Olongapo and Polloc—none is properly equipped for tne repair and maintenance of ships, though it is understood that the fortifications are being strengthened. "Whenever Sho Li&es to Take Theia." It is certain that the invasion of the Philippines, under present conditions, would present no great difficulty to Japan, whoso southernmost naval base is only 1300 miles distant from the islands. That -would moan tbo shattering: of American ere3tigo at' once.

The position eo far os Hawaii' is concerned is moro satisfactory. ■ America has a naval base at Pearl Harbour, about 12 miles from Honolulu, where a large dry dock, able to take warships of any dimensions, was opened in 19X9, lmt it is very doubtful if it could meet tho demands which would be made big fleet. There is another factor to be taken into consideration. Of fi total population of 200,000, no fewer than 110.000 are Japanese. When it js remembered that most of the Japanese are trained /soldiers —at all events, thejr aro reputed to bo—it will be soeri that the position of Hawaii would not bo at all reassuring to America in tho ©vent of war breaking out. But America has in tho Pacific an island of great strategical value, which could be made to play a important -part in case of war. This is the Island of Guam. To meat of us, Guam, is familiar as one of tho important cable stations, of tho world, Inut it has other uses. It is an island " 32 zniles long, with an area of 228 square miles, and it has in Apra Harbour, which is approached by a channel throxigh the coral reefs, an anchorage capable of accommodating a largo fleet. It is only 1500 miles from the Philippines. With a strong American fleet based on Guam, Japan's .'task of reducing the Philippines would Ix> immeasurably more difficult, than at tho > present moment. But little has been done so far to turn Guam t*> the best account. What has beep done during the last year or two—if anything—r we do not know; but in 1921 it was merely » coaling station, to ail intents and purposes unfortified, «nd . possessing no docks of any importance. If Guam ware properly fortified «nd equipped to meet the needs _of an . American fleet in the Pacific, it would probably decide the issue of a war between America and Japan. If report speaks truly, the'fortification of Griuim and the equipment of .. Apra Harbour as a big American naval base will bo proceeded with without further delay. So that Great Britain is not tho only . Power: that is taking steps to protect the Pacific possessions. ..Guam is tho southernmost iahind of the Marianne, or Ladrone," group. This is noteworthy for the iroasons that the . Mariannes, together with the Carolines, Pellew and Marshall Islands, a'ro new in th« poisseseion of Jnpeu- A special exception was mad<> in tho cose of Guam. Jt is quite true that under tho terms of the mandate Jap at . is not entitled to fortify the islands, i but it is too much' to suppoßO that' she .jj would not uso them ae bases in tha J event of an emergency. Hostile isub« ■> 'marines could easily be based on Saipsin Island, in the ■ Mariannep, within a. few hour's sail of (3uflm, <jr on Ysp, which was formerly the wireless cen. . tre in tho PeUenfeftroup. •'. In a special chapter dealing %-ith ; strategy in tli? Pacific, Mr Byw^tor,Says:-—. /•.'