An End of Benevolent Impotence.

Press, Volume LIX, Issue 17815, 14 July 1923, Page 12

An End of Benevolent Impotence.

Mr Stanley Baldwin has delivered, his anxiously awaited statement upon thepolicy of Britain towards Germany, and in substance and tone it is such, as to encourage tho hope that British common-sense will supersede French passion as the spirit directing the negotiations for a settlement of Germany's liabilities. The British attitude is completely summed up in Mr Baldwin's statement that Britain is ''as determin- " ed as her Allies that Germany shall " pay reparations to the utmost of her "capacity, but if she is asked to pay " in excess, it would mean Germany's "ruin, which would be fatal to Great "Britain and Europe.'' Accordingly the Government is resolved to continue the discussion with Germany, and. has informed France, Belgium, and Italy that it will take the responsibility of drafting a reply to tho last German Note. This is the end of what has been called Britain's policy of "bene"volent impotence." Hitherto the French Government has not merely refused'to accept as satisfactory the successive proposals of Germany, but has even refused to consider or discuss them, rejecting them, indeed, before-* hand. Germany has not yet made any satisfactory proposal, and has apparently aimed at getting off more cheaply than she should, but she took a long step towards propriety when she expressed her willingness to allow her capacity to pay to be investigated and fixed by an international commission. It was a fault in Lord Curzon's treatment of the German Note in May that he did not promptly take up this offer, as was pointed out fry such sound organs of Brutish opinion as "The Times" and the "Spectator." Mr Baldwin's speech amounts to a recognition of the justice of the criticisms of these two important newspapers. The British policy is on several points in sharp conflict with the policy of France, and Mr Baldwin did not shrink from emphasising tho points of difference. In the first place, Britain dislikesLthe occupation of the Ruhr as a phenomenon rare and regrettable, and fraught with grave peril. In the second place, Britain holds that a debtor should not merely be called upon to pay his debt, but should 1» placed in a position to nay it. Hero Mr Baldwin is emphasising his opinion that the French policy is operating against Germany's capacity to settle her accounts. In the third place—and perhaps this is the most practically important point of all—Britain doe 3 not agree that'the quarrel is between Germany and France, as France would seem to imagine. His coupling of "the settlement of infcer- " Allied debts'' with the reparations problem, and his reference to the serious economic effect of the present position upon British trade and industry, amount to a reminder that Britain as well as France has claims upon Germany, and that Frencn unwisdom cannot be allowed to operate against British interests. Britain has a direct practical interest in reparations 1 and this the French Government, presuming upon the generous spirit of Britain, has taken the liberty of ignoring. It is not necessary to sympathise with Germany in her present plight. All one's instincts lead towards sympathy with France. But sympathy with France does not oblige one to sympathise with a French policy which contains the seeds of ruin for France and which is positively detrimental to British interests. Mr Baldwin's speech will be very disagreeable to French

politicians, and we may hear a fierce outburst of Anglophobia in the French press. If, however, we find—as must be hoped—a more reasonable spirit in the French reception of the speech, we may feel confident that a settlement -Rail soon be arranged.