REPARATION FROM GERMANY.

Press, Volume LIX, Issue 17815, 14 July 1923, Page 13

REPARATION FROM GERMANY.

BRITAIN'S POLICY OUTLINED. IMPORTANT SPEECH BY PRIME MINISTER. {BT CABUt —P8133 ASSOCIATIOK — COPTWOHT.) (EEVTEI-.'S TELSGBAMS.) LONDON July 12. The statement by the Prime Minister, .Mr Stanley Baldwin, in the House of Cbmmons on the reparation question was eagerly awaited by a crowded House. Mr Baldwin said he indulged in the hope that thoy would be able to arrive at an agreement regarding the terms of a settlement. The Government confidently invited the sympathetic consideration of the whole of the Allies, and all interested States, to the British proposals, which had no other aim than the pacification of Europe and the recovery of an exhausted world. Reviewing tho position, Mr Baldwin stronglv emphasised the community of thought and action which bound Great Britain in the present emergency to the Allies. He made an especially allusion to France. The British Government was moved, -aa were the Governments of France and the other Allies, by the single desire that the goodwill between nations who had endured together should be maintained, and that each should obtain its uue - . ~ ~ French Failure in the Ruhr. The Prime Minister emphasised that British anticipations regarding the consequences of the occupation of the Ruhr had been largely realised. The indefinite occupation by one country of the .territory of another in the time of ' peace was a phenomenon rave and regrettable in itself, to which an honourable end should as soon as possible be found. Britain was as determined as her Allies that Germany should pay reparation to the utmost of her capacity, but if she were asked to pay in excess of her capacity it woud mean Germany's ruin, whicli would be fatal to Britain and Europo. Less reparations had been received saice the occupation of the Ruhij and what was now being exacted was at the cost of dislocation, and the probable colapse of the German economic system. Peace would not finally t* obtained and recovery ensured until a solution were found of the reparation question and the settlement of inter-Allied debts and the security of a pacified Europe. Britain's Loyalty to Allies. Referring to the Allies' common desire for settlement and pacification without further or unreasonable delay, Mr Baldwin said the whispers of interested parties on either side of the Channel, or in any part of Europe, could not be allowed to deflect Britain from that duty by any reservations or carefully fostered misunderstandings. "We are as determined as any of our Allies that Germany shall make reparation for the damage done by her in the Great War to the fullest extent of her capacity," ' said Mr Baldwin. "We have never wavered on this point. We are ready to use every measure to compel Germany to pay up to the amount of her capacity." Mr Baldwin emphasised that a spirit of sincere loyalty to the alliance contained, in the Government's opinion, the main security to European peace. "We are convinced that the present state of affairs in the Ruhr is fraught with grave peril. The local population is in many cases suffering severely. There is shortage of food in every country in Europe, which is paying the price of this state of affairs. We do not believe that in principle we are wholly separated, if at all, from our Allies. The divergence of methods should not be incapable of solution. So far as united action is possible we shall continue to pursue it." Seeking a Settlement. The Prime Minister referred to tho serious effect of the present position on British trade and the continued unemployment, which had involved an expenditure of £400,000,000 since the Armistice. It was becoming evident that the attitude of the principal parties concerned must ; be more clearly defined, and the period of conflict as soon as possible be terminated. The debtor should not merely be called upon to pay his debt, but should bo placed in a position where he could do so. The Government had no desire to deprive France aud Belgium of their legal claims, but wished to assist in t;heir realisation. "We have every reason to believe the views of tho Italian Government are in substantial agreement with our own." Referring to the German Note, Mi Baldwin said 'that VBritain was unable to agree that correspondence of this nature should be wholly onesided, or that proposals which might be found to contain the germs of a possißle settlement be treated with indifference. The Government held that these proposals should be examined and explored, in order to discover whether there lay within them the possibility of progress. What the exact nature of the reply would be it was premature to discuss at the present stage. British Note to Germany. A reply to Germany would be proceeded with forthwith. It was not too much to say that the recovery of the world wa9 in danger and peace at stake. In these circumstances the necessity for action had been increasingly impressed upon the Government that the German Note should not be i ignored, but explored. The Government had informed France, Belgium, and Italy that it would take the responsibility for drafting a reply, and would submit it to the Allies without delay. Such a reply had no other object than the pacification of Europe. •- The positive results of peace could not be secured until three questions had been settled: — (1) The payment of reparation by Germany. (2) A settlement of inter-Allieu debts. (3) The security of a pac.ifk-d Europe.

COOPERATION WITH FRANCE. VISCOUNT GREY'S VIEWS. j j i (Received July 13th, 8.40 p.m.) j LONDON, July 12. In the House of Loids, Lord Curzon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, made a statement similar to that of .vlr Baldwin. Viscount Grey said that while he had no criticism to make, he desired to say it was only the co-operation of France and Britain that would make the reconstruction and recovery of Europe possible. Our friendship with France had been so close that the idea of the British Government engaging in separate negotiations with any other Power at the expense of France was inconceivable. He admitted that France might make herself secure by a policy like that pursued in the Ruhr for a few years, but the lesson of history was that no nation or of nations could, in the long run, be made secure if security was obtained lit the expense of other nations. If Britain and France fell apart he could see nothing but the growth of mistrust and suspicion, and nations in separate groups preparing to make themselves secure against each other, and finally another war more terrible than the last. WHAT IF FRANCE WILL NOT AGREE ? LORD BIRKENHEAD'S QUERIES. (Received July 14th, 12.20 a.m.) LONDON, July 12. In the House of Lords, the Earl of Birkenhead, in a speech delivered in an acid, critical temper, asked: "What will happen if France does not concur in our reply to the German Note?" He bluntly added: "I do not expect France will agree. What do the Government, mean to do if that happens, as it will happen? Moreover, what will happen to our Army of Occupation if tho answer is as I have indicated? Aro we to keep it in Germany when no useful purpose is to be served? We should attain a complete understanding with Prance, not by encouraging I her to ignore the considerations which are influencing opinion in this country, but by complete frankness." The speech was plainly unwelcome to the Government Front Bench. Lord Curzon did not reply to Lord Birkenhead 's questions. SIX MONTHS IN THE RUHR. FRUITS OF THE OCCUPATION. (AUSTBAUAH AJH) B.Z. CABOT ASSOCIATION.) LpNDON, July 12. A Cologne message says that at the close of six months' occupation of the Huhr, the German authorities have issued statistics showing that France's and Belgium's army in the Ruhr region total 87,000. In the old occupied area there are 97,000 troops. There are 10,000 French and 1000 Belgian raii- | waymen in the Ruhr. Ninety-two Germans have been killed and 75,714 made homeless, and 169' schools have been requisitioned, causing 50,000 scholars to crowd into the remaining schools. There have been nine death sentences by court-martial, of which one was carried out. N CONDITIONS IN GERMANY. A POLICY OF DRIFT. ("THE TWWI") BERLIN, Julv 12. That Germany is just drifting is the only conclusion that can be arrived at. Neither the Government nor any authoritative body has a definite plan tor dealing with the situation. Everybody looks to Great Britain to help, but has only the haziest ideas as to how the help will be forthcoming. Prices rise daily and every individual is forced to take drastic steps to retain a solvent state either by curtailing expenditure or finding fresh ways of making money. - The Government alone goes on the old way, and still prints notes to cover expenditure and raises taxee. The Reichstag was dissolved without the slightest pretence of altering the budget to cope with the depreciation of the mark. The Prussian Parliament introduced a Bill automatically! adapMng taxation to the mark's value, but Herr Hermes, Finance Minister in the National Parliament, declared that it was impossible for Germany to act similarly. A BRITISH LABOUR DEMAND. LONDON, July 12. The annual conference of the British Federation of Transport Workers passed a resolution demanding an international agreement based on Germany's ability to pay the reparation indemnity, in order that the free flow of international trade ehould be resumed, and requesting the Prime Minister to convene a world conference, including Germany and Russia.