R38 DISASTER.

Press, Volume LVII, Issue 17318, 2 December 1921, Page 8

R3B DISASTER.

FINDINGS OP COURT OF ENQUIRY (FROM OtTR OWN CORRESPONDENT.) LONDON, October 14. By command of tlio Air Council a Court of Enquiry was constituted to investigate the circumstances occasioning the loss of H.M.A. R3S on August* 24ttti, and to express an opinion as to possible causes of the loss. A report has now been issued, but the Admiralty are conducting a full investigation into the history of the design of the airship and of tlie initial stages of ita construction up to October, 11)19, when responsibility for tho design and construction of airships was transferred to the Air Ministry, and tlve result of this investigation will be published in due course. According to the re]>ort of tho Court of Enquiry, the sequence of tho events as disclosea by evidence is as follows: That the airship, having completed some tlhirty hours trial, including fifteen minutes at full speed (60 knots), w«a flying at <i height of about 120i}ft. Shq was carrying out rudder and elevator tests at a speed of 46 to .50 knots. Almost extreme helm, with a quick reversal, was being used, which brought a heavy force on the after portion of tho hull, duo to the swine of the stern. During this manoeuvre the ' structure! failed between frames 9 and 10, the first indication of which, to ground observation, was a slackness of the fabric at this point. The ship then broke into two portions. The forward portion caught fire at the fracture at the moment of, or shortly after, separation. The fire probably originated in a spark ■from tho electric leads, which became fractured at a point in the immediatel vicinity of a similar fracture in the petrol mains. As all sources of electrical energy- were situated in the forward portion only, the rear portion was not affected, as electric leads in tha latter portion became dead immediately the fracture took place. The fir© in the forward portion spread rapidly, due to tho presence of escaping petrol in the keel. An explosion followed, which led to the collapse of the structure and the ignition of tlhe liberated hydrogen gas. A. second explosion took pine© when the forward portion reached the water. Meanwhile, the after-portion descended comparatively siowly, but did not catch fire; four of the five survivors were in this portion, and were rescued uninjured. The Court wish to bring tflie following points to notice: — 1. That H.M.A R3B was designed in August, 1918j in the Department of Airship Production, Admiralty, to meet requirements which, appear to the Court to be greatly in advance of those previous British airships; tihat the requirements as to m&ximum height and speed, together with the limits in lev imposed by the only available c truotion sheds, necessitated the utmost •economy in (hull weights and materials. Many new features were introduced in the design, and it appears evident that in some cases there was a lack of vital aero-dynamical information as to the effect of these modifications on the strength of the structure; that the first frames of the dhip were completed in October, 19J9, at Cardington, by Messrs Short Bros., and in the same month the Airship Department was transferred from tne Admiralty to the Air Ministry. Cardington was taken over from Messrs Short Bros- in April, 1920, by the Ai| Ministry, and became the Royal Airfilhip Works.

2. That, having regard to the great difference in the between R.M.A. R3B and previous British airships, the design should have been examined and discussed by an official and competent committee before actual construction was commenced. There is no evidence to dhow that this bad been done, although opportunity arose after the armistice, wfien information as to tho details of ships built elsewhere became available. 3. That the system by which bot/h, the construction of the ship and the inspection of the work aro centred in one head, as was the case at tlhe Royal Airship Works, Cardincton, is unsound 4. 11l at, although there can bo no doubt that efforts were made towards the end to complete the ship in tflio shortest pctssißle time, there is no evidence that the work on the hull structure suffered.

5. That one parachute was provided, for every person on hoard; rant the total complement numbered" forty-nine. No survivor ow4d his escape to a parachute, though evidence showed that at least one parachute descended with two men below it, but they were not amongst the survivors. Tho general break-up and rapid spread of tftie fire in the keel prevented tne more successful use of these appliances. ۥ That no oombs or other high explosives were being carried. 7. That the weather during the wfhole flight was calm.