The Press. Friday, September 20, 1918. East and West

Press, Volume LIV, Issue 16322, 20 September 1918, Page 6

The Press. Friday, September 20, 1918. East and West

Tho article—summarised briefly in today's which Colonel Repington urges that infantry, infantry, and more infantry, and the subordination of all tho auxiliary services to the rifle and bayonet, should be the rule for the armies in the West, was intended as something more than a lecture on tactical operations. Colonel Repington undoubtedly intended to press homo the fact that all the infantry possible should be used on the Western front, and that nothing should bo allowed to operate against the maintenanco of tho greatest possible bayonet strength there. He was urging, that is to say, the "Western" theory of which ho and General Maurice aro # the protagonists. General Maurice is a confirmed Westerner, and he believes that sideshows are merely waste of time and power. The Murman operations he regards as unlikely to achievo anything of value beyond safeguarding tho coast and the stores at Archangel. He is not in favour of developing the operations ia Syria and Mesopotamia, and we <lo not think he believes in a Balkan offensive. He recognises the danger that Germany, baulked in the West, will return to what he conceives to be her original design, namely, development in tho East through Caucasia, but ne believes that this danger can bo met by developing the movement in Siberia, which has the advantage of offering the economical employment of Japan's power. Colonel Repington holds the same views even more strongly. He particularly objects to the Murman adronture, which he calls, in Stock Exchange language, "a gamble in Arctics." "At a moment," he wrote a few weeks ago, "when every man whom we can " raise and obtain is required in France, M «nd when every 6hip that we

" spare should bo engaged in bringing " American troops across the Atlantic, " the diversion of men and ships to the " Arctic Ocean is an operation the de"sirability of which must be shown by " those who have initiated it." He distrusts the Morman Regional Council, " alias Soviet," and he does not wonder that the Council, short of money and food, welcome an intervention that offers both. ''From the Murman point "of view it is all most enticing, but I " am just now thinking of what orders "may bo given to tho 47 divisions of ' Central Power troops in Russia, and " whether we have made safe the " Finns and Swedes." Writing on July 31st last ho warned the Government not to count upon the exhaustion of the German divisions. At this date 't is possible to see that Colonel Repington, who oonjectured that Ludendorlf would be able to write off the Marne as a bad debt, and concentrate for heavier blows on his wings, was a little at fault, but -at the same time what he said of tho necessity for concentrating the utmost possible strength on the West, either for defensive or offensive work, remains as true as ever. Since March last the Allies have diverted a considerable number of troops to the "side-show" areas, and now we are hearing of the opening of a large offensive in Macedonia. What the Westerners fear is that, while the position from the Lorraine to Flanders keeps Germany too busily oconpied to spare large forces for her allies' assist- | ance, these side-shows cannot become effective without .such a diversion of strength from the West as may leave Foch unable to break the Hindenburg line. In ooncluding his article on "the " gamble in Arctics" to which we,have referred, Colonel Repington said: "It " may, of course, be said that the " Allied contingent is very small, but " the idea of initiating attacks and adventures on the plea that if we fail " we shall not lose many men has been " responsible for more disasters in past " wars than almost any other heresy. " Wherever wo send our soldiers, there " we stake our honour and involve our " prestige. Our Vendean experiences "are not so pleasant that we should " hasten to repeat them, even at the " expense of a Soviet mob." This is true, but the great success that has continued from the opening of Foch's counter-offensive on July 18th makes it reasonable to believe that the unity of command has been accompanied, or followed, by the subordination of political and economic to military considerations, and if this is so we need have little anxiety as' to the result of what Colonel Repington would call the Easterners' "heresy."