German Diplomacy.

Press, Volume LIV, Issue 16221, 25 May 1918, Page 8

German Diplomacy.

The main positive charges against the policy of Germany which are made by Prince Lichnowsky in his famous memorandum, the concluding portion of "which we print to-day, liavo been denied, by the German Government, but the manner of tho denial, made in general terms, was such as to rob it cf all convincing force. What is of just as much importance as the Prince's testimony to German perfidy is his testimony to the good faith and pacific purpose of Britain. In German oyos it cannot but seem of even greater importance. One German paper observed that even if Lichnowsky errod concerning his Government, not being always on the spot, he could not liave erred concerning Britain, where lie was oh the spot, and tho only conclusion was that the story of a war forced on Germany was nonsense. It can hardly bo doubtod that Prince Lichnowsky was greatly misled by his own Government, and was a victim of the peculiar system of dualism practised by Germany in the conduct of its affairs abroad. Sir Valentine Chirol, in a letter to "Tho Times," gives an account of tho working of this system, ■which ho lias had special opportunities of observing. There was the public policy directed towards more or loss avowable ends, and the "higher policy" to be promoted by means of discreet! propaganda and the underground working of sectional interests and prejudices. "Hence in tho moro important posts " abroad it was the habit of the Wil- " helmstrasse to rely mainly upon the " Councillor of Embassy, both to check " the proceedings of the Ambassador " and to manipulate all tho complicated "threads of its diplomatic notwork, in " which, for various reasons, it was "deemed inexpedient for the Ambas- " sador to get himself entangled, some- " times lest inconvenient disclosures "might impair his influence with the " Government to which ho was accre- " dited. and sometimes —as in tho case " of Princ© Lichnowsky in London and "of the lato Prince Haaolin in Paris— "because the Ambassador's personal " sense of honour or his belief in the "superiority of honourable statcsman- " ship recoiled from the duplicity o( " 'the higher policy.' " Sir Valentine Cliirol gained an insight into this complex machinery through his friendship with Baron Holstein, who had been Bismarck's confidential agent, and who. as Councillor of Embassy in Paris, had worked apart from and against the Ambassador. On one occasion Sii Valentino was pressed by tho Baron— ■who believed in fomenting Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian antagonism—to support an appeal to Downing street for co-operation with tho Italians in the Sudan, a course that would have irritatoi French susceptibilities. Sir Valentine liappened to know that Count Hatzfeld, Germany's Ambassador iu Jjritain, understood and appreciated the British Foreign Office's reluctance t< irritate France, and he said frankly thai he could not reconcile the Baron's suggestion with Count Hatzfeld's view 3, The Baron at once produced a lettei from Count Paul Metternich, the Councillor of Embassy in London, written on different lines and in a very differoni I spirit from the Ambassador's. "Wher Sir Valentino expressed his surprise the Baron laughed, and explained thai with Germany tho Councillor of Em- ! bassy was often more important thai the Ambassador: "Count Hatzfeld is i i i; great gentleman, and I have the ut- " raos£ regard for him as such. But hi; " usefulness is just for show purposes "Tor real business we have to "upon Paul, and a very sharp fellow hi " is, too." Modern German diplomats history abounds in cases of this con- ' flict between Ambassadors and Council lors, with the Ambassador usually fall ing a victim to the crooked dual systen without which Germany has never triec !to get along. The "secret diplomacy' i of which many people complain, [ with some reason, -arss not the cause o

this war. The secrecy of Britain's diplomatic work was not- a veil for nefarious designs; on the contrary, it ■was a quietness and silence v.'hich best suited Britain's efforts for peace. The day may come when the Governments of the world can make no engagements without publishing them to their propies, but even if this had been the condition for some years before the war, Germany's hidden and unavowed intrigues -would still have led to the grout conflict. It may be desirablo to end sccret diplomacy and to give Parliament as much control over foreign policy as over legislation, out still more urgent is the ending of the German system of fraud and mischief-making behind the backs of their Ambassadors. That system will end, of course, only when the iierman peonle, who must now realise the futility of Bismarckian methods in the world of to-day. have obtained somo real direction of the mind of their Government.