The Press. Saturday, December 9, 1916. "The Truth About the Dardanelles."

Press, Volume LII, Issue 15769, 9 December 1916, Page 8

The Press. Saturday, December 9, 1916. "The Truth About the Dardanelles."

It might appear more proper to allow all controversy respecting the Dardanelles campaign to slumber until the appearance of the report of the Royal Commission of Enquiry. But books on the subject keep on coming out. and are being reviewed in British journals; and that being so, we cannot feel ourselves debarred by any scruple of propriety from noticing them. These recent books are not all controversial. Some of them are rough and ready narratives and sketches of experiences, mainly by soldiers who went through it J ;,. *!*• But two books stand out in im-

portance above these, and, in fact, belong to a totally different category. One is "The Truth about the Dardanelles," by Mr Sydney A. Moseley. Mr Moseley was one of three journalists sent out to the scene of operations, after the British Government, the British people, and Headquarters at the Dardanelles had had enough of Mr Askmead Bartlett. The other book is "Gallipoli: A Short History of the '"Dardanelles Campaign," by Mr John Masefield, who, like other poets, both in England and France, has been diverted from imaginative art by the fierce realities of the time. Both writers not only describe and narrate, but comment and argue. Eacli lias very decided opinions on the main issues. Each is almost stricken with awe at the terrible difficulties and discomforts endured, as well as at the amazing daring, endurance, and heroism displayed. The narratives of individual incidents, and the descriptions of attacks, are much on the lines with which wo arc familiar: though no familiarity can ever dull the sense of those great deeds, of that marvellous tenacity. Let us touch very briefly on ono or two of the larger problems as here

presented. Mr Moseloy's attitude is absolute confidence in Sir lan Hamilton; a. belief that the whole conception was a brilliant one, and fraught with tremendous possibilities: a conviction that the enterprise was ruined by the "crabbing" of irresponsible civilians, and the consequent paralysis of the great departments at home; uncompromising censure of the evacuation and of Sir Charles Monro's decision; a conviction that tho Straits could and ought to havo been forced; and a belief that, even with maimed results, the campaign had fully justified itself by holding up the flower of the Turkish Army, and thus relieving the pressure on Mesopotamia and Egypt. He brings us back to the days in February, 1915, when Europe was thrilled by tho first bombardment of the outer forts; and he shows by extensive quotations what stirring hopes filled men's minds from this new and picturesque enterprise. Coming to the great naval attack of March 18th, Mr Moseley seems to vacillate a little. One French and two British battleships were sunk. What should have been done then ? Gone on, of course, says Mr Moseley; the striking of mines was filacer bad luck; but wo funked after losing two old ships, and ran away. But a moment later wo are told that an amphibious campaign was essential; and there was no land force on tho Peninsula then. It is interesting to know that Enver Pasha afterwards expressed tho opinion that wo conld have got through with the naval force alone. This may be true, if the object wa s merely to run a gauntlet, knock Constantinople about a bit, and then retire. But the real object was 10 secure possession of the Straits. Then came the assembling and transportation of an army—an operation crammed with difficulty and danger under tho circumstances—followed by tho landing on April 25th, which experts of the German School had * pronounced impossible. It ought to have been impossible, but wo were taking big risks, and wo hung on. Tho real crux of the campaign, round which controversy will probabl y rage for a long time, came in August, with the landing at Suvla, and the attack on the heights of "Chanak Bair. Here wo get very little help from war correspondents, however accomplished. We only know that the summit of Chanak Bair, which looks down on the "Narrows," was ih oijf possession for forty-eight hours. Tho regiments which held it

ought to have been supported; but it is said that the supports iost their way in the dark. Sir lan Hamilton in Jiis last report speaks of a certain "inertia" and delay in carrying ont exeputive commands. Ho • is evidently skating over very thin ice, and we must -wait for evidence. Coming to October, we find Sir lan Hamilton summoned home, and Sir Charles . Monro sent out "to report." Mr | Moseley lias a great respect for Sir Charles; but he says he had only seen | the extraordinary difficulties of the i position, which everybody knew. What he had not seen was the .men fighting, and so did not know that they were capable of making minced meat of orthodox military calculations. After Sir Charles Monro camo Lord Kitchener ; and we are brought up against the question: What was Lord Kitchener sent out for? Mr Moseley says it was "common Service know- " ledge" that he was sent out to finish tie job; but that before coming to Qallipoli he had passed through, the depressing atmosphere of Greece and Egypt, and had his views modified. Here we are disposed to smile a little incredulously. Whatever Lord Kitchener's previoiis opinions may have been, he was hardly the man to bo much influenced by the plausiblo insinuations of King Constantine (fine strategist though he be), or the swaggering bluff of Turks and Germans, . with their talk of invading Egypt with ' three hundred thousand men. We have left ourselves no spaco to , deal adequately with Mr Masefield's -book. It is written with all that picturesque power to which we are accustomed in his poems: whether he [ is describing a blizzard, a bloody attack on covered trenches, or some . characteristic specimens of sultry anti- , podean diction. Mr Masefield merci- -, lessly hammers the armchair strategists who were wise after the event, and kept asking why did wo not land on , the Asiatic side? or, why did we not , attack the Bulair lines? He shows , exactly why, not as a professional ( , strategist, but in language which he who ~ runs may read. The book is thoroughly optimistic, in a solid, argumentative way; and we may recommend it as a tonic for those of our people out here, over whom the memory of the Dardanelles still hangs like a pall of sad- „ neat.

The English Crisis. The fact that Mr Lloyd George has undertaken to form a Ministry, with himself as Prime Minister, is a fair indication either that he feels satisfied that he will be able to command a majority in tho present House of Commons, or that he intends to go to the country and is confident of being returned with sufficient support to carry out his programme. Eegarding the second assumption, wc have already expressed the opinion that the country is undoubtedly with him, and wo believe that in the event of a dissolution he would be returned with a very substantial majority. We have now reached a "Black "AVeek" in tho war, which in itself will bring to a head the feeling which has been growing for some time that the Government has failed in its diplomacy and failed to infuse sufficient vigour into tho conduct of tho war. The disastrous position of affairs in the Balkan Peninsula, and the really alarming devastation which is being wrought among shipping by the German submarines, are quite sufficient to shake the confidence of the peoplo in the Ministry who have been managing affairs. As to the support Mr Lloyd George is likely to receive in the present Parliament, tho indications are decidedly hopeful. The position of parties after the last election was very remarkable. Tho Liberals and the Unionists each secured 272 seats, and Mr Asquith obtained his working majority of 12G with tho help of 42 Labour members and £4 .Nationalists. Tho by-elections which have since taken place havo not altered the relative proportions very materially. It is probable that Mr Lloyd George will receive practically a block voto from the Unionists, and it is stated that the Labour Party—which at present numbers 39 members—have ' decided to support him, as havo also 30 members of the Liberal War Group. Tho Nationalists, however, have not yet declared themselves, and it is obvious that if they decide to range themselves in Opposition, although Mr Lloyd George might still be able to count on a majority on a division, ho would not he in anything like so strong a position as it is essential he' should occupy if tho war is be carried on with the wholehearted vigour and energy which tho situation so urgently demands. In these circumstances it seems to us that the Labour Party have touched a most important point in their resolution expressing a hope that the Government will endeavour to settle tho Irish question with a view to tho fullest exercise of the nation's and the Empire's forces. Wo have now reached a crisis in which even so important a question •as the particular form of the government to be adopted for Ireland is a comparatively small issue. We have first to secure the safety of the Empire, and its right to shape its own destinies free from outside domination, and beside that overshadowing issue all internal questions shrink almost into insignificance. Tho suggestion wrongly attributed to Sir Edward Oareon a tew days ago that Home Rule should be conceded to Ireland, including Ulster, provided • Ireland adopted conscription, was put forward several weeks ago by London " Truth," a paper with strong Nationalist leanings. We should be glad to see this proposal seriously considered by all parties with a view to its adoption. To be perfectly frank, there is no doubt that the chief objection to conceding Home Rule to Ireland has been some' misgivings regarding the loyalty of tho section which has advocated separation as the ultimate goaL We are., now at death grips with a j common enemy, and if Ireland gave such convincing proof of her loyalty to the Empire a.« to consent to the enforcement of the same Jaw of universal [ service as has been adopted in England iuid Scotland, wo think sho might safely bo entrusted with the powers of self-government contained in the Home ' Rule Bill, and that these might he applied to the whole, country. We do also most sincerely hope that if Mr Lloyd deorgo forms his Government, Mr Asquith and his friends will put aside all personal feelings, and give the Government their loyal support until the Avar has been carried to a successful issue.