The Press. Tuesday, November 14. 1916. The German Chancellor and the War.

Press, Volume LII, Issue 15747, 14 November 1916, Page 6

The Press. Tuesday, November 14. 1916. The German Chancellor and the War.

Tho German Chancellor's latest speech, <onsidered in the light which is thrown upon its tone and meaning by various Herman newspapers of good standing (such as the "Frankfurt Gazette" and "Cologne Gazette"), appears to mark an advaneo upon his previous utterances—an advaneo which is obviously a function, as tho mathematicians say, of the changes in the military situation. His polemic against Britain is of less interest and importance than his disclaimer of any intention to annex Belgium und his declaration that after the war Germany would assist in any arrangement that would secure tho peaceful settlement of future quarrels, Tho Gorman newspapers emphasise these points, and declare that it gives evidcnco of Germany's readiness to

parley and to enter into negotiations. A\ e shall very shortly, no doubt, have the British reply to tho Chancellor, but wc may be sure that it will be the same in purport as Viscount Grey's specch of last month and Mr Lloyd George's famous statement at the end of September. Tn the speech of September 28th, to which Mr Lloyd George's statement was a reply tby anticipation, the Chancellor said nothing directly that could be called a readiness to parley, but there were in it evidences, nevertheless, of an anxiety to be able to talk peace and or a real fear of the situation. How, lie complained, could he make any offers, or declare his to negotiate, in the face of Britain's expressed intentions and of M. Briand's speech (the speech we. quoted a few days ago)? He went on to make a lengthy protest against M. Bi'iaud's attitude —a proceeding in itself strongly suggestive of a desire to let the French Premier see that he ought to open the door to negotiations. He paid particular attention to creating the impression that Germany was a much-wronged country and the onlv reasonable one amongst tho belligerents. "From the very beginning,"' lie said, "this war has been " for Germany nothing but the defence "of our rights of life and liberty. "Therefore, Germany, first and only "of all the belligerents, declared her " readiness for negotiations on Decern- " hor SJtli. 191-j, and later on several "occasions." On the occasion here referred to the Chancellor was in a fighting mood. He did indeed indi- | cate a readiness for negotiations, but in a way which ensured a hostile reply. The Entente had suffered enormous defeats, while Germany "stood far within " their territories," and "held valuable "securities." "If their enemies "brought forward proposals," he said, " proper to Germany's dignity, she " would always bo ready to discuss "them.'" Germany would insist oil satisfactory "guarantees" East and West, and he refused to say what he would require in tho matter of Belgium. But since then the war map has changed, and events are going steadily but irresistibly against Germany. Hence we find the Chancellor speaking in an almost conciliatory tone to-day. Nothing would be more' foolish than to suppose that the pressure of our' forces may safely be relaxed even for a moment, but wo may feel assured that the German cause is lost and that Germany knows it.

In nothing do Herr von Bcthman Hollweg's speeches differ from those of British and French Ministers more than in their unfailing insistence upon what ho alleges to the fact that Germany was forced into war and is fighting only in self-defencc. Tho Chancellor's position is a difficult one. The Germans are growing very critical of the Government, and tho extreme Liberals and moderate Socialists are beginning to doubt whether tho war was really a defensive war forced on- Germany by Russia. To retain their support* the Chancellor is obliged to give the ridiculous account of the causes of tho war and tho circumstances of its origin, which figures in all his speeches. But in striving to keep these parties with him, the Chancellor cannot avoid playing into the hands of those who hold him responsible for the failure of Germany through his muddling- of the fine plans of the military party. In a now famous pamphlet, to which he has replied with' great anger and bitterness, he has been accused of allowing his foolish hope of averting war to give the Entente Powers time to avoid a quick " knock-out." The pamphleteer says, and there is independent evidence to the 6ame effect, that the Chancellor was on July 29th, 1914, fighting th£ General Staff and the Minister of War. who had prepared for. and were urging, immediate mobilisation. For three days ho resisted the mobilisation order v and, it is. alleged, he attempted even after the order was finally issued to have it withdrawn. He is accused of

having caused untold loss by holding back the war machine, aad he retorts that the military party were anxiou 6 to commit that crime of mobilising in the midst of negotiations which, without any excuse in facts, he alleges against Russia. The facts are plain enough, and tho Chancellor's persistence in misrepresenting them is of interest only because of its evidence of tho existence

in Germany of some very serious and growing doubts—doubts which may tend towards the same effect on the German Government as the work of the Allied Armies. "