SUPREME COURT.

Press, Volume LII, Issue 15693, 12 September 1916, Page 2

SUPREME COURT.

(Before his Honour Mr Justice

Denniston.)

HAMILTON v. NEW ZEALAND INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS.

His Honour delivered judgment in the case of Hugh R. Hamilton (Mr S. G. Raymond, K.C., and Mr Salter) v. the New Zealand Institute of Architects (Mr A. F. Wright). Tiiis was a caeo in which the plaintiff appealed against the decision of the New Zealand Institute of Architects to refuse to register plaintiff under the terms of th e New Zealand Institutes of Architects Act. 1013. On June 30th, 1914, plaintiff applied to the Board of the Institute for registration, and forwarded evidence of hie qualifications, which were not called into question. The Board requested th e production of the original certificates, and also asked plaintiff to make a statutory declaration that plaintiff wn® not engaged, and would not engago in any other trade or occupation on his own account or in partnership with any person or persona other than that of an architect solely, on the ground that the Act provided for the registration of architects ouly, and not persons engaged wholly or in part in other occupations. Much correspondence passed between the plaintiffs and the Board* His Honour held that the Board had not "received. considered, and determined" the plaintiffs application -n-ithin the legal meaning of the words of sub-sec-tion 11 of the Act. It was also clear that it had not considered the application on its merits; if it had, the Board would not hav 0 declined it. The Bi ard had introduced an extraneous element Into the matter —the refusal of the applicant to suiiqlv something the Board had no rigfit to require. He hold, therefore, that the Board had not considered the apn'icatiori on its merit*, and the olnint'ff was entitled the relief he asked. Judgment wouTd be for plaintiff, with costs on the lowest ficale.

A PROBATE CASE

His Honour delivered judgment in the case of the will of Stanley I. Dcugarde (deceased), in which the wife of deceased opposed the granting of probate. I'hc facts briefly were, that deceased hau appointee a woman, other than his wife, executrix of his will, to enable her t 0 obtain possession of certain shares which b e had given to her, but which he was not legally able to transfer to her before his death. His Honour decided that he would not oppose the granting of probate to the executrix. Even if h e was satisfied that he had power to pass over the executrix and appoint an administrator, he was not_ prepared to do • eo.' She was the choice of the testator, and it must be assumed that he intended her to havo any personal benefits which such an appointment would give her.

A QUESTION OF MAINTENANCE. In the case of Jane Walker Primmer (Mr Hunt) v. John Barclay (Mr Gresson), counsel for the appellant asked for an interpretation of the clause in the Destitute Persons' Act, 1910. This was- sub-section 2 of section 5, which stated that a Magistrate might, if he so thought fit, make an tjrder against a near i-elative for the maintenance of destitute persons, for an amount not exceeding 21s per week. Section 33 of the same Act also stated. that where there were two or more near relatives, distinct maintenance order could be

| i made against any or all of the persons « 'so liable. The old Act definitely stated that a destitute person was not en- ! titled to more than £1 a, week, but ho | submitted that the new Act did jiot so limit the amount. His clicnt was an elderly woman, not !n good health, and | at the present time an order had been made against tw<£of her near relatives for 10s Sd each, the Magistrate stating that he was not able, under the Act, to make a larger order, though he was willing to if he had been able to. On ; these grounds an interpretation of the • clauses was asked for.

; Mr Gresson submitted for the purposes of the case the first four portions of the Destitute Persons' Act only concerned them. The first section re- , ferred to the maintenance of destitute persons by noar relatives, the second, the maintenance of illegitimate children, the third, the maintenance of a i wife by her husband, and the fourth 1 tlio maintenance of children by parents. In the first, second, and fourth classes, one guinea per week was taken to be sufficient to raise a person from the class of "destitute persons," in the third class, three pounds a week was the limit placed. The Act was passed, he submitted, to prevent destitute persons from becoming a burden on the State and not for the-redistribution of family wealth. His Honour reserved judgment. I I