The Battle of Verdun.

Press, Volume LII, Issue 15604, 31 May 1916, Page 6

The Battle of Verdun.

Writing on April lit on the fighting at Verdun, we ventured to express the opinion that the Germans were expecting a great offensive on the Western front, that they realised that they wero getting within measurable distance of seeing their man-power decline in the face of an enemy whose forces were iteadiiv increasing, and that it was with a view of forestalling this great offensive before the critical period in their fortunes arrived tnat thoy made thcii tremendous effort to take 'N crdtiu. A\c further went- on to point out thau the Germans ehosc almost the only sector | in which armies could bo moved with any freedom so early in the season. A\ e I added:—

"Ml along the line in I'iandeig and Franco, where the country is flat, the loads are a quagmire. A great p-u-t of the Eastern front was equally impossible for military operations. The Germans therefore felt at liberty t<j transfer large bodies of troops from the Kastern to tho Western front. There is reason to belie e that thev hoped not only to break through "in the Verdun sector, but whether they broke through ov not at least to compel the English, wit'i the idea of relieving the French, to commence their great offensive prematurely, under the most unfavourable conditions when, owing to the practical impossibility of moving guns and bringing up reserves, it would have been practically doomed to iailure. Fortunately the French were able to hold their o w 'n at erdun, and neither the French nor the English were foolish enough to play the Germans' game."

Glancing through the English newspapers which arrived by the last mail, we sec that the "Spectator," published on the same day that our article appeared, took precisely the same view. It says:—

"Wo havo little doubt the Germans argued soinotiiiug alter this manner: 'A successful attack on Verdun, lor it is bound to be successful, will convey a blessing. In the first place, it will give us command of a very important strategic point. Next it' wiif greatly depress the French. But, best of all, it will upset the whole of the carefully-pro-pared plans of the Allies for an advance in the late spring or early summer. While wo are pushing the French our hardest at Verdun, the Fronch Government aro almost certain to get into a panic and order counter-attacks all along the line, intended to distract our attention and weaken our offensive. What is even more important, they will call upon the English to assist them by similar counterattacks. The result of this will b? premature movements made in _ the wrong places and at the wrong time, -which will entirely upset the scheme of our enemies. In fact, we shall make the British and Allied gun go off at half-cock, and before it is properly aimed. ! . . Happily, these schemes havo entirely miscarried. The French, with a courape and tenacity which show that their Generals and their Army are in the hiphest state of moral as well as nhysical fitness. refused to bo awed by the fury of t-ha German attack either into making panic dispositions in their own line or asking for panic action from us."

Our readers ivill agree that this is a curious coincidence, nnd we reed hardly

say that we foe] fortified in onr conclusion by finding that exactly tho samo view of the situation was taken by our able and well-informed contemporary. In a later article we put forward the suggestion that tho Germans were persisting in the attack in spito of their want of success and frightful losses because a confession of failure in en operation on such a formidable scale could not be explained away, and would be bound to carrv the chill of dismay into the heart of the German nation. Wo still adhero to this view, which is strengthened by tiic cablo messages published this morning. We are told that tliere is no abatement in tho fighting on tho Verdun front, but even if the Germans make a further advance there is no reason to thinli that the French ore likely to lose their grip of the situation, which, it is unanimously agreed, is well in hand. So long as the Frcnch line holds, even if it bends, and so long as the German losses exceed those of the French, it may be said that the war is going in favour of tho Allies. The longer this process continues before they make their own great offensive, tho better will be the Allies' chance of success, because tho greater will be their predominance in manpower, and the more demoralised will the German Army become. The Allies can well afford to wait until August if necessary, as that will still give theuj timo to make a very decisive "movement before the rains of winter again set in. According to our cable mes-

sages, military critics at Home agree that the enemy knows he must succeed in the war this year or never. The indications are growing stronger that, although we may not bo able to enforce pcaco on our own terms this year, the cnemv will be so far beaten when ihe autumn comes that it will be only " prolonging tile agony " to drag out tlio wftr into another ycfir.