The Position of Greece.

Press, Volume LII, Issue 15603, 30 May 1916, Page 6

The Position of Greece.

The entry of Bulgarian forces into Greek territory, and their occupation of Greek forts is explained by the Greek Government as something which, having already permitted the entry of tho Allies into Salonica, Greoce could not oppose without departing from her attitude of neutrality. Greece is now in an extraordinary position—unwilling to come to terms with the Allies, and unable to safeguard herself against attack by Bulgaria or the Central Powers. There is no positive evidence —at least, none has been made public—that Greece is anxious to assist the plans of our enemies. On that point Prince Nicholas of Greece has written a long and detailed defence of his country in a letter to Lord Burnham, defending Greece's attitude towards Serbia and charging Britain with having neglected Greek interests in the vain hope of winning over Bulgaria. There is plenty of evidence, on the other hand, that Greece recognises in Bulgaria a serious enemy. What the real policy of Greece may be is, therefore, a puzzling question. Tho Venizelist party are still active, and they have no doubt as to what the Greek Government ought to have done. In the "Kirix," the new official organ of the Liberal Party in Greece, there ajjpeared during April a series' of articles attributed to M. Venizelos himself, in which the so-called "conserva- " tive" policy of the Government is strongly condemned. M. Venizelos says that this policy of neutrality which admits Austrians, Bulgarians, and Turks into Macedonia threatens to cornpcl Greece to concede to Austria and Bulgaria such rights over the

port and railway of Salonica as would creato a veritable condominium. Had Greece remained loyal to the alliance -n-ifch Serbia, it is contended, Bulgaria would probably not have dared to draw the sword. But in any ease Greece should have joined the Entente Powers and helped Serbia, since these Powers guaranteed the integrity of her territory and offered Greece, in the event of victory, Thrace and Asia Minor. "If the Central "Powers are beaten," adds 31. Yenizelos, "as I am convinced they will be, " Greecc, by the adoption of my policy, would havo laid the foundations of a " prosperous and powerful State. In " the contrary event, we were assured " of a seat at the Peace Conference, " supported by five Groat Powers (two " of whom, Great Britain and Japan, can never be beaten); we risked no "loss of territory; we should have " gained the valuable possession of "Cyprus, and we should have avoided " any economic crisis, since the Powers " would have advanced our war expon- " diture and would have guaranteed us " their financial support for the future. " But, blind that wo were, we have " chosen to violate the Constitution, " and to follow a path that bas led to " disastrous results." The entry of the Bulgarians may not cause any immediate change in the situation, but there are signs that the Greek people are unwilling to endure the presence on , Greek soil of their special enemies. A ! cable message tells us to-day that sup- j

porters of the Government are joining the Venizelists. The intentions of Bulgaria must- remain a matter for conjecture. A few -weeks ago a correspondent of the New York "World." who had been spending some time in Bulgaria, declared that the Bulgarian and the Gorman views concerning the presence of the Allied force? in Salonica were widely different. Germany, according to a statement attributed to General Jckoff, would much rather have the Allied forces kept inactive in Greece than set free for operations elsewhere. The Bulgarians, on the other hand, feel uneasy, especially as they are uncertain as to the attitude of Roumania and Greecc. General Jekoff was reported to favour au attack upon Salonica, but the policy of Bulgaria is now dictated by Gcrmanv.