THE LARGE, LONG VIEW.

Press, Volume LII, Issue 15498, 27 January 1916, Page 8

THE LARGE, LONG VIEW.

IS GERMANY BEATEN? 'By F.W.W. in the "Sydney Daily Tiifegraph.") November 20. "Germany is bea-ten" was the title of nn article in a recent issue of the "New York Tribune,'' which naturally excited a good deal of interest in England. From the beginning of the war tho "Tribune's" sympathy with the Allies has been naked and tinashamed. As befits its proud position as tho leading organ of the Republican party, it is always a bold and independent vigorous critic of affairs. It does not spare what it deems to be the shortcomings and blunders and weaknesses of the Allies. It has a fund a particularly candid severity to dra«- upon when it exposes or denounces what it does not like in the policy of the British Government. But all it writes in that strain is animated by the faithfulness of a friend. So Ave may pay respectful attention to its general views of the war. Tbev are characterised by tho robust tone of the journal. And the "Tribune" has convinced itself, and would be pleased if it could convince all who listen to what it says, that Germany is already beaten. Tlie argument which has led it to this conclusion is not unfamiliar to the world. Probably the mass cf English people have not yet arrived at the "Tribune's" conclusion. 'Tlicy hare not been convinced, so much as comforted, by the argument, which at least suggests that Germany is .well on the way to defeat. DOOMED TO DEFEAT. Briefly, the argument is that the Allies' resources of men, munitions, and money are incomparably larger than those possessed by the enemy; that the Allies' sea-power, mainly British, has already won a monopoly of the advantages appertaining to " the freedom of the seas; that the enemy is bleeding to death on the several battlefields, while the Allies could stand the drain on their vitality, great as it is, indefinitely; that, militarily, Germany's one chance was to get an early decision, and it lias gone; that in France and Belgium, from the sea to the mountains, Germauy is hardpressed and barely holds her own; that the hope of extinguishing the fires of Russian patriotism and reducing the Russian armies to impotence is now only a pretence; that the enemy's general situation cannot be retrieved by temporary successes in the Balkans ; that the Allies' economHc pressure upon the enemy is severely felt now and will add terror to the winter; and that all the peace-kites are flown from Berlin, none from Petrograd, Rome, Paris, or London. The "Tribune's" article covered much of this ground. Germany, jt insisted, is beaten. She cannot win. She may delay the unconcealable end, but not avoid it. Sho is doomed to defeat. All thoughtful Englishmen agree that th e Allies are justified in looking forward with infinite confidence to ultimate victory. Our pessimists are as sure of it as the optimists. The difference between pessimist and optimist in this country has very l,itt,l o to do with the final result of the struggle; it is concerned rather with the amount of energy and the tactics necessarv to hasten the triumph. The Efnglish pessimist yields to tho temptation, one which is never absent from a considerable war, to magnify the doings of the enemy and minimise the doings of tho Allies, particularly those of England, so as to get a basis for s<u appeal to England to put more power into the fight and thus keep down the- cost of victory. If we did more now, we should not in the complete course of the war have to do so much. He does not doubt that at the finish the Allies will be on top. but he believes that when we come to the day of the counting of the vast expenditure of blood and treasure we shall have to confess to a deplorable and irremediable waste, the inexorable penalty of irresolution and lethargy. The English optimist does not deny blunders or reverses; but lie says you cannot have war without them; yon go astray from wisdom if you allow them to depress you unduly ; von arc foolish whenever you shut your eyes or minds to the things that count in your favour; and he maintains that, if all the facts are taken fairly into view, it will be seen that the Allies have not done badly and may face the future with a cheerful ns well as unconquered and unconquerable spirit. Yet even the English ootimist hesitates to take up the portion of the New York journal and tell the world that Germany is beaten. Hie says that Germany will b e beaten. He is suro of that. Sympathetic critics in the United States—the "Tribuno" is not alone —go further than we do. Are they justified? As critics of tho war, they have one advantage over lis: they have the detachment of neutrality and distance. They are not so immediately excited by the conflict; they are not obliged every day. for example, to glance down the casualty lists; nor have they the participants' direct and interest in the result. So it is imaginable that they have got the war in truer perspective than is possible to us. 'It may be, then, that Germany is beaten now —that the future fighting cannot avert defeat— that defeat is inevitable and not probable or imminent—that the Allies cannot by bungling throw away victory. The idea is not to be dismissed as nonsense. The new thrust in th e Balkans does not necessarily disprove it. That may be the last throw of the gambler for the sake of securing a broader ground on which to.open negotiations f<rr a settlement. TAKING NO RISKS. The French are saying now that if Germany could get to Constantinople she would at once take peace-soundings in any and every likely direction. But the English people do not know or try to persuade themselves that Germany is beaten. They are not tempted to say that to themselves while in the west and east of Europe she occupies Allies' territory. None of the Allies is in much danger of nursing a belief that 1 would have a paralysing effect upon the believers as fighters. Better to wage the war with ever-increasing deadliness till Germany herself hoists signals of distress and surrender. If we may trust the preponderant voice of neutral visitors to Germany, the German people, taking them in mass, are not troubled by any suspicion that they and their friends*'in Europe are in danger of succumbing to the Allies. On the contrary, their mood is generally one,of exaltation. Of course, the rulers, the Kaiser and the politicians and the generals, find it much easier to deceive the peoulc than to deceive themselves. They, with more reason than has been set forth by the ••New Y'ork Tribune," mav know that Germany is beaten. To them the continuance and expansion of <fhe war may be a bold bluff for a profitable peace. They cannot have forgotten what they expected to achieve when they broke the peace of Europe. They are anxiously watching shrinking resources. Keeping un appearances in a big war is a very difficult task, and they, are not ignorant of the shifts that have to be resorted to. They are not blind to the time limits of vast expenditure. Still, the political obligation of the Allies is to assume that Germany is unbeaten, and to go on with the* job of beating her. It may take another year or two, to exhaust so stubborn and clever an enemy. It is unconditional surrender, acknowledged irnpo-

tence, humiliatine and absolute defeat, that the Allies have set their hearts upon. A peace that would only be a truce will not content them. Germany has fought so unjustly and savagely that safety in the future must be sought now in an absolute smashing of her fighting power. It is an imperative necessity to disarm such a foe. Germany is the criminal of all the ages, and it is a moral obligation to deal with her in a way that will assure the world of protection. Men, munitions, money, food, generalship; these are the essential requirements of war. Only one of them is open to doubt in the comparison cf the combatants: generalship. German militarism has borne the fruit of a so far plentiful supply of officers retained to the tusks of hi eh command. Germany has had to find the generalship 'for Austria and Turkey and Bulgaria, as well _as ' for her own armies. The quality of the enemy troops is certainly not superior, and is probably inferior, upon the whole, to that of the Allied troops. Man for man, our men are not in the least awed by the fighting ability of their foes. But the ireat strategist is an intellertunl nix:duct. The war. however. is itself a school of command, and we may hope that more and more it will develop the generalship that will lead our forces to victorv.