THE DARDANELLES.

Press, Volume LII, Issue 15485, 12 January 1916, Page 7

THE DARDANELLES.

THE EVACUATION. STATEMENT .BY MR H _ ASQUITH. \ RECOGNITION FOR NATAL N AND MILITARY OFFICERS, (By Cable.—Press Association.—Copyright.) LONDON, January 10. In the House of Commons, Mr Asquith stated that the latest retirement from Gallipoli without the loss of a single life, and also the earlier evacuation, had no parallel in military or naval history. All concerned deserved the most profound gratitude of the country, which make for them an imperishable place in the national history. It was intended to advise the King to specially mark the services of Sir Gharies Monro, Vice-Admiral J. M. do Itobeck. Rear-Admiral R. JS. Wemyss, Sir W. R. Birdwood, and Major-General F. J. Davies, and the other officers concerned.

THE TURKISH REPORT.

"BOOTY EXTRAORDINARILY GREAT." ALLIES' LOSSES. CONSIDERABLE. AMSTERDAM, January 10. A semi-official report from Constantinople gives no; details of "the battio of Gallipoli which began with our attack on Friday. The extent of the booty is extraordinarily great, and the enemy losses are reported to be considerable."

CELEBRATIONS 11V CONSTANTINOPLE.

THANKSGIVING SERVICES HELi). (Received Jannary 11th, Ji.35 p.m;) LONDON, January 10. A German wireless message-says "Constantinople is dressed tvith "flags and illuminated Tn celebration of tho evacuation of Gidlipoli Peninsula. Thanksgiving services are boing held in the mosques and churches." .

THE FRENCH REPORT.

BRITISH STATEMENTS CONFIRMED. V THE ENEMY SURPRISED. (Received January 11th, 10.35 p.m:) PARIS, January 10. An official communiquo says:— v "The French troops left six naval guns on Gallipoli Peninsula. These were included in tho seventeen mentioned in tho British communique. "The enemy opened firo at 4 o'clock on Sunday morning, when our embarkation was finished."

NEWSPAPER COMMENT.

SATISFACTION EXPRESSED. • i "Times" and "Sydney Sun" Serviced.) (Received January 11th, 5.5 p.m.) LONDON, January 10. "The Times," commenting on tho evacuation of Gallipoli. says: "Neither operation was possible to any but the boldest and steadiest troops. There was nothing to be gained by remain- 4 ing at Capo Holies after our withdrawal from Ansae and Suvla Bay. "The effect of tho evacuation on the general military position can only be good. The splendid troops who have added -to the proudest glories of onr Anny and who hnvo reaped for the their first laurels in the European war, arc now available for scrvice elsewhere. Thero cannot be any service more splendid than thac they have performed. "VVe trust it will bring them victories, which were richly deserved but were denied to them on Gallipoli Peninsula."

THE SUVLA BAY , FAILURE. _

AMATEUR STRATEGISTS CRITICIS3I. .MR ASHMEAD-BARTLETT SPEAKS. NEW YORK, January 10. Mr Aslimoad-Bartlctt, when interviewed regarding Sir lan Hamilton's report, said.that he thought it was a great mistake to publish it at this stage. lie preferred, lie said, to read General Hamilton's unabridged story, but nroceedcd to comment on the extracts from the despatch published is America. He declared thsfc

the schema had failed because of an operation which should' never Jiave been undertaken under such conditions or in such country. It was 6hcer nonsense to represent that the strategic plan had almost succeeded. Th© men of Anzac suffered 12,000 casualties without attaining their objective. A few Gurkhas only had reached tho summit of Chanak Bair and Kojachemen Tepe, which was only the lower slope leading to Sari Bair. The losses, were so terrible that, even supposing the troops had reached the top, jt would have been utterly impossible for them to maintain themselves there.

Why, lie asked, wore unskilled troops employed in the first Suvla Bay landing when the heroic 29th Division, which was unhesitatingly sacrificed later on, could have been utilised? Why were 2500 men of the Ist Australian Division sent to their doom in the effort to acquire the apparently useless position of Lone Pine? Why were thousands of men thrown away at other pests which wero disassociated from the main operations? If the objective was to get astride of Kojacfcemcn Tepe, why was the weight of the attack not thrown against that point? Why was there no control from Headquarters imon tho Suvla Bay operations? How could Lieutenaut-Genernl Stopford get his men forward if they bccamc split up and lost in the broken country without water or telephone communication, and harassed by enemy snipers? Apart from all other considerations, it has been insufficiently established declared Mr Bartlett. that even the Anafarta Hills and Kojachemen Tepe would have forced the Narrows or cleared the load to Constantinople. General Hamilton stated that in the middle of August the Turks had 110,000 bavonets against bis 55,000 and claimed that if Lord Kitchener sent 50,000 more he would have brought the campaign to a successful conclusion. As a matter of fact, all that he could have done would have been to bring tho 50,000 men to a. conclusion.

IN THE CAUCASUS.

A BUSSIA.N SUCCESS, The High Commissioner reports:— LONDON, January 11th (5 a.m.). In the Caucasus the Russians captuered the bridge and island of Arkhavay. Arkhavav, or Arkhave, is a port on tlie coast of Trebizond, close to the Russian frontier, and about 30 miles south-west of Batoum.