SUBMARINE WAR.

Press, Volume LI, Issue 15279, 15 May 1915, Page 3

SUBMARINE WAR.

GER.MANY'S MURDER POLICY.

A SIGN OF FAILURE

What is to be the reply to Germany s policy of using submarine, for destroying our merchant ships-' Mr Archibald Hurd. the well-known writer on naval mat.,*.*, in the Lonaon VW Telegraph"). ... ... Of course, no one likes either the i.iconvenior.co or the monetary loss 01 the risk to human life: but this is *nrtime. If wo would preserve a true persnective we must always bear in our mind's ov P the sufferings « Belgium the over-running of Northern Jranre, and tho German invasion ot Poland with all that the enemy's p"**™ *£ meant in these arcas-and thank uoa for tho British Fl***;. „_j njs that It ought to go without sa y |n » h the naval authorities will » oi .. < J their strategic policy owing J** ™« development. But as I crmos a letter from a. correspondent *ho Ue rl-iros that "it is not creditable to our Krai v that a German submarine should lnro lM*n able to sail «P th? Jg. George's Channel and down the ><£ Channel, take P^" 3 "* 10 " ,°,L wrt her .Sea all day Saturday and disport Her •=elf in that enclosed water a s it tno Br tiih nK* had alrea.lv boon clestroyerl. sinking three, if not '"ore, Br t,sn ships, and chasirsr. several jdnps. inclnrlirc tho Dublin 7*** 1 *'^ r ''X the Belfast possnncer boat, whi^b1 onlj reaped by their alertness and superior SP What should the Admiralty do since it is not creditable to thorn that the Navy under their orders is protect ng us from invasion and outrage, feeding and c.othii.s us. and oroviding Us with paocr and ink. and all the; com orte of civilisation? Should the Admiralty for the sake of a few merchant "-.csscls. relax- it s hold en the enemy s mam 'fleet in the North Sea ? On the c* ents in tho main stratesneal theatre, no only our fortune, but the fortunes of our Allies depend, jw.ii Bnlisji n en-of-war. of which w R have a strictly limited number, cannot be in two places at once.

GUNS AND TORPEDOES. .It may be added that submarines do not sail. They are maritime mo; orcars, with the advantage that iv hen danger threatens they can dive beneath the "road," which no ordinary automobiles cai'i do. They are really very wonderful craft with which to pla. hido-and-seek. . , , I have by mc a description of the cnemv's sul'marino No. 21—L merely stand's for Unterseeboot. and to .speak of "submarine U 21" is theretore absurd—which was published heforc the war in a German paper. It gives somo idea of tho powers of tins vessel and her sisters :— _ nn Wo are arming our newest .»*">ton submarines with 14-pounder quickfinng guns on disappearing mountings. Ihe *un, of which two will be carried by each boat, one before and one abaft the ooniiing-fowcr, rests on a conical pivot, and the total weight of weapon and mount is about 13V cwt. _ The time occupied in making trie gun ready for action is twenty seconds reckoning from the moment the boat comes to the surface to tho firing ot tho first shot. Each weapon is served by three numbers, one hands up the ammunition from tno watertight and collision-proof magazine, number two loads and number three aims and fires. The gun can be elevated to OOdeg and teristics «ro similar to those ot Krupps, arti-aircraft qiiiddßring artillery. When tho boat is about to submerge tho "-un collapses on its supports and swings down to its resting place,, the operation hems performed.by a single lever A watertight hatch then closes Ser the cavity. The. weapon .is brought up to firing position ft rams? which also come into play b\ a sinclo movement. ~„_.„ Our new submarines are to havo armour protection over their* . tal narts viz... the deck, the conn ngEieV. nnd that portion of the hull which is exposed when the vessel ft awn<-h. Confident with the increased displacement the motor „„? been made much more Each boat will have two Diesel motois w tli . designed aggro<ratc of 1800 civinc a speed on the surtaco o knots The submerged **rlfo\ VS ve 2i kn whh.h \it understood that t -•. -r> n ntzic launched last February at the y .a in .n almost comnlet" state, is S« d fir»t reprientative of this improv6d Sul,marine 21 and about a do.en others of tho new type can ravel a* nmeh as 3000 miles on the f"*"™ c .*~ °" be ueV which they oany.,and seventy miles under water when they use c ec ffitv obtained from accumulators,; it oii; aboutmOO miles haven to the Lancashire coast so nil E talk ■of secret bases may be dismissed, because they are unnecessary R VFETY IN COMPANY. What shall we do? An analogy £ the new situation is familiar to the police authorities. • When a dangerou district has to be patrolled, go about in twos or threes The idea i* that if one man is struck, say, on Ibo back of the head, the other o others will turn and catch tho malefactor- +he alternative conclusion 19 tlmt no attacks will he made. "Ouriii, war tini" merchant vessels will probably find it advantageous to move in groups in ""row waters. In that event, what will happ«n. The submarine may come alongside one vessel and tell the pkmner and ciew to tnke to the bentis. Will the other yesS look on while this act of blindage is committed, or will one of them „,..W a Car-tain Kettle steam for the submarine and ram her, it being observed that, an under-water vessel fa'--at least tlrve minutes to submerge, .t may b« said that tho enemy may urea toq.odo. It may hit the target- On the other hand, it may not: and in the worst event vessels will be near for tne work of rescue. . .. This suggestion may sound a coldblooded remedy. War-particularly submarine war—is cold-blooded, and cannot be robbed altogether of all its ■risks. . ~ 'Hie onemv is fighting ruthlessly. Jt by this new development he can nicce~-.] in deflecting Admiralty policy from tlv pursuit of the main end of the war, lie will succeed: if he sink three dozen or ."-tOO merchant ships and fail in this object, he will fail. The British Empire will not be brought to its knees because some merchant ships have been sunk.

THE ENEMY'S Ai/VANTAGE. We are at a time of the year when the advantages which the Germans enjoy in pursuit of submarine warfare are considerable, because the nights are lone. These vessel-* must come to the surface for fresh air and to recharge their accumulators; these operations must be done when they cannot be seen. The long nights facilitate them, and render difficult the work of hunting the craft down. Between now and the end of June we shall gain about seven hours more daylight; in the extreme north—at Lerwick-, for instance— you can take photographs at midnight. For the Germans the sands are running out. , , The destruction of a few merchant ships is not going to do us much harm or the enemy any good. It is the policy of weakness'; an admission of failure in the prosecution of the mam end of war, unless there are many people who think (as does the correspondent quoted) and the Admiralty proves itself weak. 1 believe in neither possibility.. Ooza-

merce destruction on a scale involving many hundreds of ships did not rob *us of victory a century ago, and we may bo assured that it will not do so today. Grand Admiral yon Tirpitz and all his satellites admit that Germany js being starved economically by tho silent pressure of our sea-power,, and in sinking a few British merchant ships they are doing their best not to win the war, but to annoy us—and in th© process, as I explained yesterday, they arehitting themselves. If merchant vessels move in groups when in dangerous waters tho losses on our part will be inconsiderable, while the enemy's may he serious. Wo havo thousands of merchant shins, and can speedily replace those sunk; tho enemy ha. only about a dozen sea-going submarines like TJ2I, and they can be replaced only after great delay, and their crews " never. Germany is already desperately short of trained officers and men, as the Naval Secretary has admitted.