CANADA AND THE NAVY.

Press, Volume XLIX, Issue 14686, 7 June 1913, Page 10

CANADA AND THE NAVY.

Tho announcement by Mr Winston Churchill that the miscarriage of Mr Borden's naval proposals necessitates an acceleration of British naval construction, is of great interest and obvious importance.- What the people of Canada will think of tho immediate result of the failure of Mr Borden's plan remains to be seen; but he will be a queer Canadian loyalist who will not feel ashamed that Canadian party bitterness has increased tho burden of the British people, for that is what Mr Churchill's statement really means. Cable messages which arrived last night show that the gravity of the issues raided is already appreciated; some of the newspapers are pointing out that the effect of the Canadian Liberals' action upon foreign opinion will be detrimental to the Empire. The bearing of the Canadian ships upon tho general naval scheme of Britain was explained clearly in a long and important statement by the First Lord on March 3lst last. Dealing in detail with tho rate of construction and the relative strength of the British and German navies, Mr Churchill quoted figures which, he contended, showed that, counting the two Lord Nelsons, the Now Zealand, the Australia and tho Malaya (but not counting the proposed Canadian ships), Great Britain would until 1917 have from three to eight ships over and abovo tho 60 per cent, superiority to Germany. He then proceeded to discuss "the maximum provision available for the 'whole world service' of tho British Empire," mentioning that it had always been understood that the 60 per cent, standard was to provide a certain number of ships for foreign service. The Admiralty concluded some

time ago that a 50 per cent, standard should be maintained in Home waters, so that the remaining 10 per cent. might be considered available for foreign service or the general service of the Empire. We need not give his figures, but it is a matter of arithmetic that until 101G this would leave from four to seven ships so available. This, he said, would be quite sufficient until Hll.i, but it was ''quite clear that the " margin of strength available for the " whole world service of the British " Empire will not be sufficient, after " the first quarter of 1916 unless fnr- ' thcr steps are taken either by the "Dominions or ourselves." Hence the Canadian ships were really needed; and Mr Churchill said that if they wero to miscarry for any reason the whole situation would have to t>o reviewed. Ho was emphatic in proclaiming that the Canadian ships were " absolutely necessary for the whole- " world defence of the British Empire '" from the end of 101o," and that "if " they fail a gap will be opened, to " fill which further sacrifices will havo " to be made without further undue de- " lay by others." In tho light of what has actually taken place, it will be difficult, we should say, for any loyal Canadian to read without a pang these further observations by the First Lord: "Tho fact that they (the three "Canadian ships) are necessary is no " measure of their value. For their " value far exceeds the value of three "ships. We can build three ships " ourselves if necessary. Parliament "has never refused to supply tho " money. ... It is the fact of " this great new nation coming for- " ward, with all its measureless " strength and possibility, to testify to " tho enduring life of the British Em- " piro that has already produced an " impression throughout tho world " which conduces both to the safety of " this country and to the peace of " nations." Mr Churchill's prompt announcement that tho Government will lose no time in repairing the breach caused by tho refusal of the Canadian Senate to accent tho Naval Aid Bill will bo gratifying to the believers in tho policy of an invincible Nnvy.