THE NAVAL DEFENCE OF NEW ZEALAND'

Press, Volume XLIX, Issue 14668, 17 May 1913, Page 5

THE NAVAL DEFENCE OF NEW ZEALAND'

(From a Contributor.)

TIIE LOCAL XAVY SCHEME.

Tho inauguration of the Australian Navy was, in its own '""ny, an unique ovens in history. Tho time- has scarcely arrived to criticise it, but nevertheless, some useful lessons can bo drawn from it. It had everything in its . favour to back it up. It had the good j will of the nation behind it, tho assistance of tho Admiralty, the naval experience of centuries, and the pick of the brains of the Navy. Vet has it been an unqualified success up to date? It is too soon to answer that, but if we admit the necessity for its existence* :n the future, and the initial stage is a success, so much the better, if a failure, it shows the wisdom of starting it whoa the political horizon is more or less clear. Hut in the present article wo will not discuss its necessity or otherwise, but .simply the advantages and disadvantages of a local navy as a means of defence. Under the existing regulations of tho I'oyal Navy, a man can only join through one of tho depots in England. This makes it practically impossible for anyone living in the colonics to become a long-service bluejacket. To enter as an officer, a boy must join the Royal Naval College at Osborne at the age of twelve. His parents may be able to afford to send him to England, and maintain him all tho time he is serving as a cadet, but thore are very few who care about saying good-bye—practically for life —to their boys at the tender ago of twelve. Consequently, one may say that for the vast majority of colonial-bred boys a naval career is barred.

That is a very unsatisfactory thing, and was one of the great inducements to start a local navy. It is not sufficient to provide ships and money, men are needed to man thorn. Moreover, under the old scheme, Australia felt that it was her duty to contribute towards the Imperial Navy, although it was considered by some that that contribution was inadequate. Now, no taxation without representation is ono of our cardinal principles, and, therefore, one cannot wonder at Australia wishing to have some say in the spending of her money, although at the time she was getting more than her money's worth in tho shape of tho squadron maintained in those waters. However, be that as it may, it wa»s a somewhat ignominious position for a great and prosperous country to feel that she was not paying her nroper share, and that whatevor she did pay she had no control over. By starting a local navy of her own, she was able to relievo the Admiralty of the entire burden of the Australian Squadron, and to assume control over her own fleet. Moreover, she foresaw that tho day would come when the strategical situation in the I'acific would demand a larger fleet than tho Admiralty would bo able to spare from Homo waters. A fourth point 'was that by having a local navy, tho srvecial requirements of naval flefenco in this part of the world mignt be studied with greater concentration and accuracy, and with more adaption to local circumstances than would bo possible whero the fleet was merely an unimportant branch of tho British Navy, and where officers seldom. Epont more than '/two, y'dars oT'thei r life. v ~'-'

It is, perhaps, a little difficult for the layman to realise i what a vast amount of study is necessary to obtain' a clear conception of tho scienco of war. Moreover, this is tho ago of specialisation. The law3 strategy never vary, they are tho' samo to-day as they wero when Julius Caesar conquered Gaul, and a knowledge of them is indispensable to a general or admiral. Yet, having that knowledge, ono must specialise. A continental general, who has been trained all his life to handle vast masses 'of men in more 'or less closo order, would feel quito out of his element if ho were suddenly ordered to tako part in bush warfare. Tho naval officer's ambition is ono day to command the three hundred odd ships that comprise tho .Homo Fleet-. Most of his time is spent in tho North Sea. ■ its own I problems are constantly before him, and being discussed all round him. In a word ho is practically always at work. Consequently when ho comes I out to Australia, say for a two-year ■ commission, knowing that at the end I of that timo he will return to the old continual round of gunnery, manconvres, and again gunnery, ono cannot wonder if ho does not regard i it to soino extent in the light of a holiday. If he were to servo most of his time in tho Pacific, it stands to - reason that ho would become just as conversant in its problems as he is now i in thoso of the Home fleet. j To sum up, tho local Navy scheme has four advantages to back it up:— : (1) It opens up a naval career to Australians. ; ('2) It gavo Australia a direct control over her money. : (3) Its existence in some shape or form appeared a coming necessity. (i) There appeared to bo moro chance of its grappling successfully with the special problems of the Pacific. j We must now consider the disadvantage ol a local Navy based on tj.o Australian model. In the first place there can bo uo doubt that the higher cost of labour in the Dominions involves a much greater expenditure on the same force than would be necessary in tho British Navy. TJie cost of building ships will be considerably more, as will also bo their maintenance and nnair. A much higher wage will have to bo paid to the men. if j not to the officers. So that with a ; given amount of money, a Dominion ' niight provide and maintain four ships , in th:» Koya.l Navy when she could only ; afford three in a. local Navy. i Another disadvantage- which is more, real than apparent is that in countries ' whero tho Government is more demo- ', cratic than in England, there is a | . great tendency towards political inter- j f.:rence in the affairs of tho Fleet. I That tho Navy should be above j i politics is a catchword that people, are ' very fond of repeating, but they clr> not alv/ays act up to it. A bluejacket, commits, some misdemeanour j ag.iinst discipline. His capiain, let us say. punishes him bv Mopping his lpavo for a week. Tho bluejacket, livins in a democratic country, and possessing a vote, complains to bis local mombr-r of Parliament. Tho j latter asks indignant questions in the i House and then down comes tho i Minister of Defence on to tho unfortur.ato captain, and demands explanations. How can a commanding officer bo expected to maintain discipline in his ship if he is to bo subjected to thi3 ' son, of tJ;i;:g? At any rate it is a • point which might bo studied to some ! advantage by certain Australian politicians. And in this respect it may be mentioned. that the question of discipline in a small local Navy is at i the host of times, a knotty one. i>isciplino is not an elaborate punishment system, nor is it rule bv fear. Discipline is a prompt nrd icady obedience to superior authorityIn newer lands, where there is a prevailing idea that Jack is as good as his master, there will bo no great fondness for tho strict discipline that is absolutely necessary in a man-o-war.

Nevertheless, it lias got to be. The diiliculty of maintaining an efficient disc'plino in a local navy will be- much greater than in the British Navy, whero it is more a matter* of custom than of rule. Another difficulty in connection with a local navy is that of international law. With ono navy, under one Admiralty, and in conjunction with tho British Foreign Office, the usages and customs of international law, so far as they relate to his Majesty's ships, are all cut-and-dried. With separato navies, under their own control, all sorts of difficulties are bound to arise-, and new precedents to bo made. That, however, is more a matter to be settled by laivyers than by sailors. There is also a drawback which counterbalances tho advautago we referred to above, viz., specialisation. While, recognising tho utility of specialising in the problems of tho Pacific, it must not bo forgotten that the small size of a local navy will, ipso facto, be a bar to its officers gaining that wide experience- that is only possible in a great service. Tho final difficulty wo havo to contend with is this: Concentration and centralised control being of enormous advantage in war, what means can wo adopt to cn.suro smooth working between a local navy and tho Royal Navy? The present idea in Australia fs that the Admiralty should, in time of war, assume control. It is,.perhaps tho best that can l>o done under tho circumstances, but it is an unsatisfactory thing to havo one system for peace, and another for -war. "Weighing tho advantages against tho disadvantages of a local navy, it would seem that, could a re-modelled scheme bo found, embodying the advantages, and eliminating the draw-r backs, it would bo the most satisfactory solution to our defence problem. The writer proposes to outline such a scheme in his next article. Boforo leaving tho subject of the Australian Navy, there is one thing that one cannot refrain from critic cising. In its present initial stages— what is its object? Surely to protect the coast aga'nst hostile attack. In other words, the scheme is purely defensive. Why, then, fling away two millions on tho ' Australia? She is essentially a weapon of offence, and. hy herself, unique in the Pacific; in fact, a, veritable white elephant. Tho same money would have purchased twenty destroyers, or five to six swift cruisers of the Bristol typo, e"ther of which would have been of much more use for coast defence than ono battlecruiser. It looks as though the Australians had rather lost sight of their original object. The danger of trying to do too much at once is that the taxpayer rnpidly loses his early enthusiasm and. consequently, the whole scheme might come to an untimely end. Nevertheless, in spite of erticism, one must pay all honour to .Australia for havin«< thought out the schorre which seemed best to her, and. in the face of innumerable difficulties, brought her navy into beino; i n four short years. I