The Press. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27, 1912. THE ECONOMY OF DREADNOUGHTS.

Press, Volume LXVIII, Issue 14314, 27 March 1912, Page 8

The Press. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27, 1912. THE ECONOMY OF DREADNOUGHTS.

The public has heard so much about the burden of naval armaments of recent rears, particularly from politicians and newspapers solely 'interested in legislating away the inequalities of life, that many persons -will probably bo surprised to learn what- economies havebeen effected by the adoption of the Dreadnought policy. Dreadnoughts are such colossal engines of destruction, and cost so much individually, that peoplo unconsciously associate them with an enormously increased annual bill for naval expenditure. But, as frequently happens, tho iwpular impression is wrong, and t not only is the British taxpayer getting' more naval protection than over before, but ho, is getting it considerably cheaper. A. very strikjns comparison can bo obtained, oven if it has no great value in tho light of present conditions, by comparing the cost of defence a century ago with the cost to-day- In the year of Waterloo, with a population of nineteen and a quarter millions and a debt of nine hundred millions, as compared with a population of fortyfive millions and a debt of seven hundred and sixty millions, the .Arruy and Navy cost £78,000,000 a year, or a sum approximating the present expenditure. But, of course, it is with the expenditure of recent times that: wo are chiefly concerned, and a comparison of tho fivo years preceding the advent of tho Dreadnought in 1905 with tho fivo years that followed gives very striking results. The figures show that tho average annual expenditure on new construction from 1901 to 1905 was £11,415,058. From 1906 j to 1910 it was £10,V05,188. Clearly, it is cheaper to_ protect tho Empire with Dreadnoughts than with tho kind of vessel that preceded them. Tho chief reason why tho Dreadnought type has proved a triumph of economy is beeatiso when the original vessel of this class was laid down, it rendered obsolete 38 foreign battleships which were in course of. construction. By tho stroke of statesmanship that adopted the "all-big-gun. ship" these 38 vessels of the six other leading navies were so completely outclassed that in 1915 they will

hardly enter into the calculations of naval strength. But for the Dreadnought, Britain would have to construct a number of vessels of the preDrcadnoiight type to neutralise these 3S foreign warships. As the naval correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph" puts it:—''Tho Dreadnought 'cleaned tho " slate,' and paralysed the Admiralties * ; of the world, with the result thai: '"we have to-day twenty vessels of the "new and world-recognised type enm"plete. or practically complete, and " Germany has nine, and the rest of " the European Powers none." When it is borno in mind that tho British Navy is admittedly stronger to-day than any two navies of the world, tho results cf the Dreadnought policy are a very striking Testimony to the value tho British taxpayers aro obtaining for their naval expenditure. The rivalry in the matter of naval and commercial supremacy may be keen, but Britaiu is still able to maintain her position without any disproportionate increase in the cast of tho Fleet, and that in itself is v matter for creat satisfaction not only in the Home Country but in every part of the Empire.