PERMISSIBLE VIOLENCE IN WAR.

Press, Volume LXI, Issue 11876, 25 April 1904, Page 6

PERMISSIBLE VIOLENCE IN WAR.

An incident, such as tlie Petropaulovsk disaster, impresses the imagination with the horrors of war much more vividly than the Bufferings undergone in a protracted campaign. -Its suddenness, tlie overwhelming destruction of human life at one blow, gives it a dramatic "intensity that appals the conscience. It io this, no doubt, that drey from President Roosevelt bis expression of sympathy with Russia, which, though carefully guarded by the reservation "personal," comes dangerously near to the things the Sovereign representatives of neutral States had better leave unsaid. In the face of the marked growth of humanitarian sentiment in regard to the conduct of war, the universal approval of such methods of wholesale destruction as ramming or the use of mines and torpedoes, may appear at first eight inconsistent. It is permissible to ram an enemy's ohip with all its crew on board, but it is an atrocity to assassinate a single individual. It is perfectly lawful to hurl a whole ship's crew into eternity, witboul a moment's warning, by the explosion of a mine, but the deliberate insertion of a drop of sulphuric acid into the head of a bullet,

from which it would exude on contact with human fleth, would be execrated as a gross violation of the laws of civilised warfare. But the inconsistency is only apparent; it is based on a well-recognised and perfectly logical principle. Tho measure of the violence which is permitted in war is that which is required to reduce the enemy to terms. Usage is based on a compromise between a dislike to cause needless suffering and a wish to use the most efficient engines of war. Henoe it is forbidden to use inst—iments or methods that inflict more suffering than is necessary in order to kill or disable an enemy, or that are likely to lead to wanton destruction of the lives of non-combatants. On the other hand, the amount of destruction which may be caused is immaterial if the result is conceived to be proportionate. Early restraints imposed by opinion on violence in war were grounded on the principle of fairness. Chevalier Bayard un sparingly condemned the arquebus, and a Council of the Church even anathemised the cross-bow on this ground. Even in mod-crn times barbarous or semi-civilised nations have given expression to similar sentiments. The Zulus, after Ulundi, expressed their surprise at honourable foemen condescending to use breech-loading rifles, which fired six times while they were firing once with their muzzle-loaders. But modern restrictions among civilised belligerents are based on tho idea of humanity, not on that of fairness. And in the amelioration of the laws of war r.n this principle, Russia, to her lasting credit, has for more than half a century taken a leading part. A majority of the most important humanitarian reforms in the theory of warfare have their origin in Russian initiative. When M. Henri Dumant, moved by the horrors of Solferino, set about to promote the Geneva Convention, it was at the Court of the Czar that he found the first and most effective encouragement; and when the Convention took shape in 1864, Russia was among the earliest of the signatory State*. Tlie St. Petersburg Convention in 1868 assembled also at the bidding of the Czar; its prohibition of the use of explosive bullets under 14 ounces was in itself enough to make its deliberations memorable. The deliberations of the Brussels Convention in 1874 did not, unfortunately, result in unanimity. But the resolutions passed to regulate tlie treatment of spies, deprecating the use of projectiles in balloons, improving the status of irregular levies and defining the rights of a military occupant mark important steps in the growth of opinion. Here again, Russia, though her representatives at the' Conference strenuously opposed some of its recommendations, in. her war with Turkey in 1877-8, ordered all her officials to observe them, and distributed among her troops a kind of military catechism which brought to their knowledge, in. a simple and effective form, the principles on which they were expected to act. And finally, when in 1898 Nicholas 11. invited the Powers to consider his proposal for general disarmament, although his ideal did not bear fruit in that direction, the resultant ieace Conference at the Hague contributed enormously by ita deliberations to the growth of the humanitarian principles, and will doubtless he found in the future to mark a decisive step in the progress -of opinion. The conduct of Russia in her wars is, unfortunately, not conformable to the excellent theories of her "benevolent despots.'.' The Blagovesehensk massacre, for example, and the subsequent decoration of its perpetrators, seems to give the lie to the Czar's sincerity. But a divorce between practice and precept is not peculiar to Russia; and though conduct in war unhappily lags far behind the humanitarian doctrines of publicists, these at least furnish a goal to which we approach appreciatively bfiiY mew, '1 (pofrensoß. shf preciably nearer with the years.