The Press THURSDAY, JULY 3, 1902. THE COLONIES AND THE NAVY.

Press, Volume LIX, Issue 11315, 3 July 1902, Page 4

The Press THURSDAY, JULY 3, 1902. THE COLONIES AND THE NAVY.

In considering the question of colonial defence we have from the first consistently taken up the view that our true policy is to contribute as liberally as we can to the cost of the British Navy, and that, putting aside the idea that we can defend ourselves >by any local disposition of war vessels, we must trust to the British command of the sea, as our only valid protection against the attacks of a foreign foe. It is some satisfaction to us to find Captain Mahan, the foremest living writer on naval strategy, taking precisely the same view, although it was only what was to be expected, seeing that he is merely reaffirming a general principle laid down in his 'books aod endorsed by most of the leading authorities on naval strategy. In the event of Great Britain being involved in a -naval war, the real defence of iAbs-

trail* and 2few Zealind might have to b* conducted in tire English Channel, ov, mote probably, in the Pacific in Ohio**"? ■waters. If tne British fleet -were defeated in the Chancel we should lose th« command of the sea, and any local squadron kept in these "waters would Jwolno (avail, either to protect onr commerce or to repel an invasion of Australia. The sea is England's first line of defence, -and *ke Channel Fleet is the first bulwark of her naval supremacy. We need not suppose, however, so disastrous a catastrophe as the defeat of the Channel Fleet. The first Wow might be struck in Chinese waters, and, -unless England could hold her own there, say, in an engagement against the combined fleets of Russia and France, the command of the Pacific and neighbouring seas would be temporarily lost, British commerce would be interrupted, and Australia and New Zealand would be liable to invasion by Russian troops from Vladivostock or French troops from Saigon. The Australian Squadron would be powerless to prevent ifs. By al the rules of naval strategy the first duty of the Admiralty in case of such a war would be to send tlie Australasian Squadron to reinforce the Chinese Squadron, with the view of "wiping out" the enemy there, and gaining the command of the Pacific. This principle is fully realised by foreign Powers. iLord Brassey pointed out in a letter in 'The Times' 'recently that Russia's entire available strength in sea-going ships is concentrated! in the China During the Chinese difficulty powerful squadrons were formed on the Chinese station, under the British, French, and Russian flags. We have little doubt that one of the motives influencing Lord Salis"bury in agreeing to tflie Angto-Jaipanese alliance was the increased protection which would be afforded to the Australasian colonies by the help of so strong a naval ally in Chinese waters.

We do not say that the Australasian Squadron ought not to be materially strengthened. Wβ think it ought to be increased numerically, and vessels of a newer type substituted for those at present

in commission. It ought, however, to be regarded purely as a reeerve for the China Squadron, and kept in readiness to reinforce the fleet in Chinese waters whenever wanted. Tba idea of keeping vessels tied up to a particular coast line, as if they were so many floating, fortresses, is absurd. From the days of Nelson, English victories have baen won on the seas by a steadfast adherence to the principle of seeking out the enemy's fleet, and attacking it. It is this principle whioli Captain Mahan is upholding when he urges that the defence of these colonies depends upon general naval dispositions, made with a view to securing the control of the Pacific. Of

course, if we want the Australasian Squadron strengthened, we ought to increase our contribution to the English Navy. At present it does not amount to 6d per head of the population—a purely nominal sum. On this point Mr Seddon has usually taken ;i strong Imperial view, although, we regret to note that of late he has gone off the track a little. He seems now to snuggest that -we might accord preferential treatment to British trade, and make tihis our contribution to the fleet. There fe ho connection whatever between the two subjects, and if it is to be a choice of the two policies, it would be infinitely better for us to make a substantial contribution towards the cost of the Navy.