THE ULTIMATE END OF GERMAN AMBITION.

Press, Volume LVIII, Issue 11009, 5 July 1901, Page 4

THE ULTIMATE END OF GERMAN AMBITION.

The pre.«»«nfc age is one in which political rulers hate awakened to the need of a longsighted policy. It has become evident that nations are to exist in the future on a far greater scale than in the past, and that the limited territories of Old World Powers will shut them out of the race in centuries to come. The available territories of the world are also limited, and hence the gaze of the nations oonso_ou_- of power is turned steadily to the possessions of weak and decaying States. Several Power* have long been known to cherish certain great (schemes for the future. Russia has steadily followed a policy of aggrandisement and consolidation. The "Will of Peter the Great" may be a myth} but the policy of th« supposed will has undoubtedly been followed. Russia has already made her position good in respect of territory. Come what will if she can escape disruption, -be already holds sufficient land to make her one of the greatest Powers of the world for all time, and the probabilities are in favour of her securing still more territory. The United States have had their Monroe doctrine and have resolved to domi^

nate the W_-temjCk>nt__a__nt. -This ambition they have aiready made good, and have recently stretched out their -toads to clutch territories beyond the Pacific. Britain, oonscioaaly or unconsciously, has secured po«____o_ of tbe territorial basis for an Empire the moat world-wide and potential in ail history. Her great policy now is to create common interests and sentiment*, and to solidify her possessions. Should she fail in this her position as a great Power must slowly wane before the growingjpopulations of her rivals. The ideal of France was to keep Germany weakened by division, to dominate the Italian and Spanish peninsulas, and to .extend France into Africa. The European portion of this programme broke down in tbe war of 1870, but the African scheme was pushed all tbe more earnestly, and was supplemented by a bold Asiatic enterprise. Lack of pppulataon will probacy render all her colonisang schemes abortive, and time is running steadily against her.

Meantime Germany has held for thirty years the proud position of the greatest military Power in the world. But her territories are small, and her frontage to the sea narrow. She has considerably more subjects of German blood titan Britain has of British blood. Fifty-six millions of Germans take it ill that they should be cooped in 200,000 square miles of territory, while 60,000,000 of English hold dominion over more than fjfty times that area. Germany, therefore, '**-' herself tie gigantic task of wresting commercial srupremacy from the English, believing that naval supremacy would also fall to the victor. In the first task she has made amazing progress, and ! though not yet victor, .he has com© sufficiently near to awaken serious and perhaps timely alarm. In regard to her fleet, she is making efforts almost beyond her means. Her object in these efforts is no doubt to be able to intervene with effect in questions regarding the possession of territories that may from time to time be in debate. It was the popular belief in Germany that Britain was weak and enervated, and that she might be forced, in some crisis, to disgorge some of her possessions. The Boer war has dispelled this dream, and hence much of the German bitterness. It is well known, that Germany made "repeated attempts to secure territory that wotfld make her contiguous to the Boer Republics. It is also known that Kaiser's telegrams to Kruger after the raid waa his most popular act, as his recent visit to England was his most unpopular one. At the outbreak of the war a German official indiscreetly said that if Germany had possessed sufficient sea power the history of South Africa would be altered. It can hardly be doubted that he expressed the heart's desire of his nation. To become mistress of a Greater Germany in South Africa, already occupied by a German people would have been a long step towards achieving the national ambition. Nearer

home, however, Germany has*other and even greater designs. To incorporate Holland in her empire is a stroke for -which she is biding her time. Besides this, the strong panGermanic sentiment cannot but keep her eyes fixed on events in Austria, with its ten millions of Germans, many of whom desire union with the Power that could keep their Czech neighbours in order. Should Austriainternal troubles break up that "geographical expression" Germany would strain every sinew to profit by the event. The extent of her ambition is indicated by her new interest in Turkey, and her enterprises in that decaying empire. Should /her military power remain unimpaired she may yet possess Austria-. Once established on ths Danube all comers would have to dispute withjier the heirship of the sick man's dominions, and her power might even follow her railway to the Persian Gulf. So surmises a writer in the ''Contemporary.'"