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NOTES ON THE WAR.

and Sterkstroom is the present headquarter? of Gatacre's division. *. '■ *' \ THE REPORTEITbOER RESERVE. From Capetown comes a report that tbe members of the Afrikander Bond have stated that 8000 officers and men skilled in tactics and the uses of artillery have been held as a reserve at Pretoria. We cannot uiuierstand bow they could obtain the services, of such a number, unless they have' been Importing troops wholesale through Delagoa Bay. THE SENTIMENTS OF THE DUTCH. "The Times" correspondent, in summing up the Dutch character, states that it. is fear of the consequences that** keeps many of the disloyal Dutch from joining the enemy's ranks, but that 1850 of them were present at Stormberg, and fought against General Gatacre. We also learn that at least one thousand of the Cape Dutch have joined the enemy on the Tugela. It is, therefore, probable that every Dutchman and Boer in the enemy's lines is fully aware of the reverse** our troops have experienced in every part o* South Africa. We believe, however, that ;n the long run it will be all the better for England and the future of South Africa, ii every Dutchman that entertains any -disloyal sentiments should join the enemy,, aa tbe sooner we know what numbers the enemy will be able to mass the sooner we will be able to take strong measures to bring the war to a termination. THE BOER FORCES IN THE WEST. The faot that the Beer armies, under Cronje, on the west, in'front of Lord Methuen's camp, number 20,000 men, and that at least 60u0 more are required to keep up the cordon that is drawn about Kimberley, and that at the lowest estimate 3000 additional are required by Cronje to keep Baden Powell hemmed in at Mafeking ought to be taken as conclusive evidence ttiat the Cape Dutch 'have furnished to this command of the Boers at least 20,000 men; and the further fact that Generals Gatacre and French are opposed by at least 20,000 of the enemy's troops, and yet the Boer commandant in Cape Colony is able to send ranforoements to ju.n the Boer army in Natal proves beyond a doubt that up to the present, fully 40,000 Dutch rebels are fighting against our troops. If the readers of these notes will turn to letters published last July, they will find that it was then stated that the number of rebels that could be depended on to join the enemy was 85,000 men, which might, under certain circumstances, be increased by 10,000 additional waverers. The first part of the Boer plan of campaign failed by reason of the slow progress of the commandos thatwere sent into the northern part "If Cape Colony, and the failure of Cronje lo eaptme Kimberley and Mafeking, and this delayed the rebel* uprising untiL after the defeat of Gatacre, which was so closely followedrby the failure of Methuen and the reverse of Buller. Then we.find that in a few days Cranje's army is almost doubled, and yet there seems to be no decrease in the numbers- of the enemy that b opposing French and Gatacre. This may be taken to mean that the Dutch are now convinced that tbe Boer threat of driving the English into the sea was no empty boast, and that their confidence in the success of the Dutch Republican forces has been restored, and that for every mile of British territory they occupy the Dutch residents will reward their efforts by cast-, ing off the veil of loyalty and openly joining the ranks of the invaders. This is just what we expected to happen, but we were somewhat surprised that so many of the Dutch delayed so long before they decided which side to take. We attribute the delay to the slow progress made by the Boers at the start, and we are now certain that the reverses experienced during this month will greatly add to tbe difficulties our generals will have to encounter to bring the war to a successful issue. In view of all this, it is reassuring that in Great Britain the spirit of the people is equal to any demands-that may have to be mode upon the resources of the country for men and means to meet the conditions as they exist; the applications from 20,000 men to join the proposed Imperial Yeomanry division plainly tell how a challenge by any of the European Powers will be -received by the British .public. Coupling the news that comes from 'Odessa that Russia has hastily ordered reinforcements for the.East, with the well-known desire of European Powers to take every advantage of our difficulties, it behoves Great Britain and every colony and dependency of the Empire to organise, arm, and be ready to engage in a struggle that is bound to come sooner or later. It may be said right here that when that struggle does come we have ourselves to blame, because we have in the past, and we are. at the present, inviting an attack, by reason of our inability to resist. Have we shown the world that we are capable of controlling over one-sixth of its surface, or .that our military preparedness is what mipht be expected from a PTeat nation with such a glorious record? Have we lived on the records of our past and failed to look to the future? Forgettintr the plain fact that in these days- of rapid transport we cannot take time to prepare for war after a state of war exists, if we are determined to hold India and share in the commercial development of the East we must be prepared to place at least oOO.CKX) j troops in India wrtliin thirty days, besides ' keeping our garrisons in the Mediterranean I Sea and at our coaling stations up to war strength.

By ah Ex-member or thk Intklug-enck DKFABTMKNT OT SOOTH AFRICA.) ' METHUEN AND CRONJE. Gable messages dated Capetown, 27th inst-., state that Commandant Cronje has nottfied that he will refuse to hold any communioatian with Greneral Lord Metbuen during the continuance of the war. This is a atrange proceeding on the part of the Boer commandant, unless some serious friction has existed between Lord Methuen and himself that we ore not fully informed about*. It •will be a- matter that may involve serious consideration, aa the necessity for certain comttuirientiooa passing between tihe two armies Is obvious. In fact, the requirements of etviHsed warfare make it neceesary that such ooouirandoatioai become a matter oi almost daily occurrence. JPEVER AND "PINK-EYE.-* * Fever and "pink-eye"are reported to be very prevalent in the Boer camp on the Modder. "Pink-eye" as also said to be very pjeevmlent at De Aar and at Stwkstroom. ifcver at Kimberiey and Mafeking is sure to be life, aodjf it him broken out in tbe Boer lines on the Modder we may rest assured that, it hi also very bad in Lord Methuen's camp. Our knowledge of African and typhoid fevers tbat are so deadly in South Africa makes us ooosider the situation of our garrisons at Kiinberley and Mafeking very serious*, We expect when the history of the war is written thai the losses of life chargeable to t|Ms» two d*T"iuMMi will jar out! number the -losses inflicted by the enemy.! "Pink-eye" w disease that takes tbe horses, and is very deadly in ka effects, being a good second to .fcorse sickness and lung sk*-kaess that annually 101 lso many bones in Booth Africa. We regret 'very much to hear that this Afammn is prevalent in and about De Aar and ttterkMzrxwn, as De Aar is tho base for Lord Jlattoen's aad General French's diviaioru,

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP18991229.2.62

Bibliographic details

Press, Volume LVI, Issue 10540, 29 December 1899, Page 6

Word Count
1,279

NOTES ON THE WAR. Press, Volume LVI, Issue 10540, 29 December 1899, Page 6

NOTES ON THE WAR. Press, Volume LVI, Issue 10540, 29 December 1899, Page 6

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