CHISA AND HER ARMY.

Press, Volume LVI, Issue 10237, 5 January 1899, Page 3

CHISA AND HER ARMY.

HOW SOLDIERS ARE TREATED. Major A. E. J. Cavendish, Ist Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, A.A.A.G., Dußlin District (late Military Attache with the Chinese Army), writing in the Journal of the United Service Institution, says that in many respects the army of China presents a curious example of the survival of the nnfittcst. In the broad outline its scheme is simple and suited to the country ; nevertheless with the characteristic love of detail, in its minutise, it is exceedingly complex. to an c :uaHy characteristic ■want of exactitude, although returns, as .rendered by separate accountants, are often beautifully worked out to the, thousandth part of a tael, yet in a combination of these returns nothing balances. For members of Parliament, who cavil at the intricacies of the British estimates, I can imagine no worse punishment in the future life than to be set by Satan to unravel the mysteries of the Cliinese Military Budget. Every province has its separate "army," for whicn the Viceroy or Governor is responsible, and in 14 of these it consists of Tartar and Chinese soldiers vi certain fixed proportions. Any deficiencies in the military Budgets of the poorer provinces are met by contributions from the central provinces, the "belly of China." Grouping all these "armies" together, the troops fall into four great categories, namely: 1, Tartar soldiers or bannennen: 2, green regiments or Chinese territorial force ; 3. fighting braves ; 4, discipline troops.

The writer gives an interesting account of these forces, and proceeding to general remarks, says:—Much of the utter inefficiency of China's army is explained by the native saying, "Do not use good steel to make a nail, nor take a good man to make a soldier," which is most thoroughly acted up to. The "absence of nerves" and the animal ferocity of the Chinaman admirably adapted him for the deliberate extermination which characterises the suppression of a revolt; but in real courage, the abnegation of self under danger, he is woefully deficient ; he will do much for pay; he will fight when his rage is roused ; but his t>assion, violent as a typhoon, as quickly passes away. . . . On almost every occasion

in 1894-5 the Chinese troops refused to stand up to the despised Japanese. Small wonder! when of hundreds of thousands who, since 1862, have been . "drilled" with foreign weapons, not one in 50,000 has been taught their proper use. Musketry and artillery practice is limited generally to handling the weapon; and instruction in the use of rifles and field guns is not thought necessary, nay, it is opposed. In January, 1895, several thousands of men had been collected at Shan-hai-Kuan, under Gereral Wu-tu-cheng, to reinforce the army in Manchuria; new rifles and field guns had been served out, and the force was to move early in February, yet on January 20th the men fired their rifles for the first time, and barely 1 per cent, of hits on a target 200 yards distant ensued; as for the guns, not a soul knew how to < load them or set a fuse, and when* at length one was fired with a number of the foreigners present, the ammunition was so defective that, although the gun was laid for 300 yards, the shell only travelled 250. Yet these men were sent North to fight at Tien-chuangtai without further training, instruction by a foreigner having been haughtily refused. To be a soldier is to lose caste in China, to imbibe foreign notions is worse still, and incurs the hatred and suspicion of the civilians, who in reality govern the army and navy, so much so, that to be graduate of the foreign schools is an almost certain bar to promotion; in the military and other schools, established by Sir Robert Hart and the Viceroys at Pekin and elsewhere, the students have to be bribed to attend, so as to compensate them for the social disadvantages of a foreign education. If we add to this the natural contempt for foreigners ingrained in the Chinese nature we have potent causes for the wilful laziness and ignorance of officers which is duly appalling; alas, that they should add cowardice as well! The Commander-in-Chief at Shan-hai-Kuan told mc he did not believe in musketry instruction, for all; it was quite sufficient to have ten good shots in each "yingV to pick off the Japanese officers. His other theory was that the troops were defeated because they fought hungry, in which he was partially right. His remedy was to draw up his men in five lines; the first would fight for two hours and tihen retire to dinner, the second line having meanwhile dined, would take its place, and so on; thus he would get ten hours' fighting, and everyone would be fed! A general near there being ordered to keep a sharp lookout for the Japanese, whose landing was hourly expected, did so by asking the railway stationmaster to send two coolies to the coast to look for the enemy! His was the plan of arming the men with bags of pepper to be thrown in the faces of the Japanese, who,' while engsged in sneezing, would be slain by the Chinese spearsmen!

It seems a libel on the human race to say that out of the manhood of 300 millions of Chinese a body of good soldiers cannot be made; and with the example of the army which has been evolved from the Egyptian fellaheen, it may be premature to call it impossible. But China herself cannot do it; the very best human material and the most elaborate instruction would be wasted under the existing native official, who steadily resists all reform in his maladministration. Nevertheless, the docile soldiers and sailors of China have yet never had a chance of shewing under proper management what are their real capabilities. Should they under European tutelage ever prove themselves in any number to be of real military value, the "Yellow Terror" may not be a mere figment of the superheated brain.