The Press. THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1898. THE NEW JURIES BILL.

Press, Volume LV, Issue 10148, 22 September 1898, Page 4

The Press. THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1898.

THE NEW JURIES BILL.

The Juries Bill that has been passed by the Legislative Council will, we hope, receive some consideration at the hands of the members of the House of Representatives. The amendments made in the law of juries are—(l) That Grand Juries are abolished, and every person committed by a Stipendiary Magistrate for trial will be tried before a petty or common jury; and (2) that no special

jury can be got unless both litigant parties agree. If one party applies for a special jury, and the other party does, not consent, the trial must be heard before a Judge alone. Dealing with the abolition of Grand Juries, it does net seem to us that the Legislative Council have' sufficiently considered what is meant by the abolition of the grand jury system. They have viewed it solely from one point of view, and have said that if a Stipendiary Magistrate commits a person for trial, that person should be tried by a common | jury, and that no grand jury should interpose to prevent the trial taking place. We shall deal presently with the question of all committals being by Stipendiary Magistrates, but meantime we may point out that the members of the Council have not considered what is to happen i? a Stipendiary Magistrate does not commit an accused person foi trial. There is no provision left in our law if the present amendment is carried for any review of a Magistrate's decision if the committal is refused. The present law is that if a Magistrate refuses to commit an accused persen foi trial, the prosecutor can ask to be bound over to prosecute, and can present a bill or indictment to the Grand Jury, an?T the Grand Jury may, finding a "true bill," send the accused for trial before a common jury. Is such a safeguard necessary? The American people are democratic and liberty-loving, and people of strong common sense, and they have maintained the Grand Jury system. Let us imagine—and we will ask if it is stretching the imagination too much to picture such a case—that a Stipendiary Magistrate liable to be dismissed without cause by a Minister and virtually under political control, as our own Magistrates are, has to investigate a charge against prominent politicians or against the officers of a Government department ; may he not be biassed ? At present his decision may be reviewed by a Grand Jury. Is it wise to destroy this opportunity of review ? There was one case in Wellington that may illustrate this point. After Lotus Chemis was convicted* by the jury he made a charge of perjury against some police officers. A Magistrate heard the evidence and dismissed the information, finding there was no evidence to warrant sending the accused for trial. But that did not end the matter. The prosecutor presented a bill of indictment to the Grand Jury, and the Grand Jury investigated the charges. It is true that the Grand Jury came to the same conclusion as the Magistrate, but this right of appeal against the Magistrate's decision was open to the prosecutor and he exercised the right. Again, may jwe not imagine that there may be about the Licensing question much public feeling aroused, and persons who inform against publicans may be accused of perjury. Police officers may be so accused. Will the public be content with the decision of one who may be fitly called a political Magistrate ? And yet his decision, without appeal, is to be conclusive! Are we not theD right in saying that by the abolition of the Grand Jury a safeguard of the HLerty of the subject has been removed?

It will be noticed that all committals are henceforth" to be by Stipendiary Magistrates. * We confess we are not surprised at the distrust of the "Great Unpaid" that has been shown by members of the Council. Unfortunately there have been appointments to the honourable office of Justice of the Peace that are, to use no harsher term, very unfortunate. This is ono of the results of Tammanyism, and we must reap what we sow. If, however, the judicial work in dealing with serious offences is to be cast on the paid Magistrates only, then their number will have tojje increased. The proposal of the Council means therefore an increased expenditure of a considerable amount. Of course/ in these days when "money is no object" that may not weigh with the House of Representatives. The duties of Justices are now being so limited, and every new Act shows such a distrust of the Justices of the Peace that the time seems opportune, for considei-ing whether tha present mode of appointment should continue.

As to Special Juries, the partial abolition means that most cases will be decided by the Judge alone, and that a system which has been applauded as one of the bulwarks of English liberty, "and for which the British Constitution has been praised by Continental writers, will be destroyed. The Judge will have to decide both law and facts. Wβ doubt the expediency of such a change in judicial procedure. Keeping the Judge to law and the juries to facts ds, we believe, a better system than that system, called "muddle" by an able tfudge, when law and facts are ao interwoven that neither can be separated from the other. If the present scheme is accepted, both common and special juries will be abolished, and a single Judge, who is just as fallible as twelve honest jurymen, will haye to settle litigants' disputes. The system will increase the number of appeals, and it will fail to keep dissevered matters of law and matters of fact, to the great injury of New Zealand jurisprudence.

Wβ would ask the House of Representatives to lay aside this Bill if no better reform of our judicial system can be formulated. Wβ have pointed out the danger of allowing men under political control, without being subject to review, to refuse to send accused persons to trial. We Icok 'to those members of the House who admit "Tammanyism" is amongst us to safeguard the sacred rights of justice. We do not say Grand Juries have not often failed in their duty. They are but human; but this we do assert, that Magistrates have oftener failed* and Judges just as often. By increasing the power of Stipendiary Magistrates, without there being an appeal from their decisions, we are creating a species of Turkish Cadis, and the result of allowing any one officer to have great authority or power, especially if he is a political officer liable to be dismissed or transfered by politicians, has never been satisfactory. Abuses under such a state of things have always appeared, and we feel certain our proposed new experiment will be a disastrous failure.