MASTERLY INACTIVITY IN THE GREEK WAR.

Press, Volume LV, Issue 10012, 16 April 1898, Page 6

MASTERLY INACTIVITY IN THE GREEK WAR.

Some time ago, it will be remembered, Mr. Labouchere startled his readers with an amazing theory to account for the collapse of Greece in the late war with Turkey. That theory, as explained in these columns two months . ago, was to this effect.: King George of Greece threatened the war against Turkey from motives of personal ambition, in order to force the Ozar to consent to the marriage of his daughter, the Princess Marie, with the Grand Duke Michaelovitch. But the inflammatory and patriotic speeches he delivered in Athens in pursuance of this threat roused the national spirit to such a pitch that hie people got " out of hand," and unable to control them he had to embark upon the war as the only alternative to losing r hie throne. When matters had got this far, and disaster Was inevitable, he came to terms with - Russia. Ifc was arranged that the war should not be seriously carried out, but that it should be, so far as he could control it, a dramatic display, with the exits and entrances and all the "business" arranged beforehand between himself as stage-manager and the Czar as prompter. The latter power, ifc was alleged, had agreed not to suffer the Turks to advance beyond Thessaly, on condition that the Greek army in Epirus made no real stand, and that the Greek navy remained inactive.

The Labougbb&b theory read at the time more like an audacious hoax than a serious conjecture intended to be believed, although he himself professed to be quite sincere, and declared that he wrote on information supplied him by a foreign diplomatist than whom few could know better the inner history of the events referred to* Incredible though the theory seemed, however, facts recently difloloeed tefort a tribunal in Athens gave to it a strong appearance if not of probability, at least of possibility. The revelations at that trial are' are like a new version of " Pinafore," with the plaintiff Commodore Saohtoubis in the character of Sir Joseph Porter, and the defendant Koxoris. in the role of the Midshipmifce* The latter, an impetuous patriot, who was a midshipman on board the Psara, flagship of the Eastern squadron, sent a telegram from Skiathoa during the war to the Minister of Marine, denouncing his Commodore Saohtoubw, as a traitor, for non-fulfilment of orders during the critical first week of the ' war. Saohtoubis prosecuted him for " slanderous denunciation," with the result that he was acquitted, tfee truth of the " slanderous denunciation" being proved by official documents, and attested by 112 naval officers called as witnesses; and Saohtoubis will now himself have to take his turn as defendant, the Minister of Marine having filed an accusation of high treason against him. Nothing worse has been alleged against Chinese officers in the war against Japan than the "masterly inactivity" which Sachtoubis treacherously displayed. During the six weeks preceding the outbreak of war he did absolutely . nothing to put his squadron in fight-. -• ing trim. He ordered target practice *•., a few times--bat there were no L targets. More than half the projectiles for his turret guns were not filled , or primed. His staff-captain, Aboy80PUL08, devoted hie time to lobstwf

fishing when he ought to have been superintending the equipment of the fleet, and the Commodore replied to repeated remonstrances with the assurance that there was •'plenty of time" and that he "felt capable, in case of blockade, of meeting any one of the Powers in naval battle." When war did break out, he received orders to proceed with " all speed" to Platamona, destroy all Turkish vessels he might meet and all fortifications and stores along that gulf. He dawdled ten hours away after receipt of orders, and when he did sail his interpretation of " all speed" was five knots an hour, although bis ships were capable of fifteen knots and his torpedo boats of twenty. At length he arrived at Platamona and cent some marines ashore to destroy stores ; a few stray Turkish shots were heard, and at the first smell of powder the gallant admiral ignominiously ran away. He hurriedly ordered a retreat, sailed back to Tsayezi in a nervous flurry, leaving the stores untouched, and that same evening telegraphed to Athens a brief veni viiii vici telegram declaring he had "completely destroyed "the Turkish stores ! Next day he arrived with his squadron at Aikaterine in pursuance of orders ; after shelling a few dozen soldiers there out of the village he sent a party on shore, who set fire to a few heaps of stores, and after three fcours, apparently feeling tired, recalled his marines, and in answer to tbe protests of his officers said " Oh, fcever mind, we've plenty o! time; we'll come back to-morrow." Again a day later the Minister of Marine telegraphed orders to proceed without further delay to bombard Karabournon, a small fort six miles from Salonica. The orders were peremptory and perfectly clear. Finding he could not evade them, he called a council of oaptains, whom he got to concur with him in telegraphing back that the bombardment "would be attended with risks," and would be useless from a military point of view. Again, he was ordered to waylay two large steamers that were carrying Turkish contraband. Be hesitated to comply; a second telegram came, " Larissa has fallen; lose not a moment in striking;" and then he struck. With much ado he overhauled an innocent French passenger steamer, and after cruising about for a few hours, returned with his squadron to Tsayezi, as he said "to rest." By this time the exasperation of his officers and crew had reached boiling point; the junior officers of the fleet met, and drew up a remonstrance to the Minister, demanding the commodore's recall. But Sachtouris kept at his old tricks, " resting," •teaming with "all speed" at five knots an hour, and sending mendacious despatches to Athens. It was at this stage that the youngster EoKOßis, going ashore at Skiathos, in defiance of aU rules of discipline, sent bis impetuous telegram to the Minister denouncing the commodore and bis confederates "as traitors to the country's cause." Who were his ♦* confederates"—if any—still remains to be proved. But it is at least significant, and goes far to corroborate Mr. Labouchfue's theory, that the palace press in Athens during the progress of the trial has assiduously sought to direct public odium against the Minister and to screen the Commodore. The telegraph operator at Skiathos admitted in the witness box that Sachtouris was continually sending long telegrams in cipher to the King white his despatches to the Minister were plain, and though he hover received direct replies, long telegrams in Danish arrived frequently from the palace for Prince George, who held private conferences with the Commodore each-day. It is not necessary to believe with Mr. Labouchebe : that King George sold his country from sordid motives of family ambition; more probably he honestly believed Ibis course to be the wisest for Qreece to pursue in the face of certain defeat in the end. But the theory which at first seemed wildly improbable, that the operations of the Greek fleet were but a theatrical display arranged with Bussia, and intended to be innocuous, most now at least be considered within the bounds of possibility.