SUPREME COURT.

Press, Volume LI, Issue 8727, 24 February 1894, Page 5

SUPREME COURT.

, ■ 0. SITTINGS aH CHAMBERS. Tkdax, Fxnmmkx 23. B»for» Via Honour Mr Justice Denniston). Hie Honour safe in Chambers at 11 fc.m. RX J. D. GARWOOD, DBCBASKD. In this case, which was an application re Registrar'■ report, his Honour struck out the notion, inasmuch as no one was present to aove. VICKEBT V VICKERV. In this case, which was an application low to add a plaintiff, Mr Stringer said that the eldest son had >een served with notice, and did uob ibject. His Honour said that Ihe application was irematMre, and therefore no order would >c made. .. * RE VICKERT, DECEASED. On the application of Mr Bruges, his lononr made an order herein for letters of idminietration. VALKER V STANDARD ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPAKV. Mr Stringer applied herein on the part of ihe defendant for a special jury of four. His Honour made the order, fixing the :ime of trial for Thursday, Maroh 6th, at Lo.3oa.in. KB ANDREW DUNCAN, DEOKASED. Mr Weston applied herein for leave to borrow money and to execute a mortgage. His Honour made the order subject to the approval by the Registrar of the mortgage. RE SARAH COOKSLEY, DECEASED. Mr McConnell applied herein for probate. His Honour made the order as prayed, jyg SOLICITOUS. Mr J. B. Fiaher brought before his Honour the question of interim suspension. Mr Wilding said that he did not intend to make any observations on the merits of the case, nor to challenge in that Court the affidavits that had been filed. Ho was taken by surprise when the question of interim suspanaiou was raised lust week. He understood that the duty of the Law Society and the attitude adopted by its Council was to leave the discretionary power vested in a single: Judge entirely to the Court. There might be ' cases when the interest of the public demanded instant suspension for wilful malpractice. The power was given for the purpose of preventing mischief to the public, not for the purpose of punishing a silicitor who had yet to be heard. This was not a case in which the power should be exercised. The public did not need warning. There had never been a bankruptcy in the colony which had attained such a notoriety. Besides the b&nkruptcyproceediags, which had been fully published, the criminal proceedings bad formed, the subject of newspaper reports, articles, and letters. It was nearly a year since the bankruptcy and eight months since the rule nisi had been moved. All this "time no suspension had been asked for, and considering the long delay His Honour pointed out that the delay had been at Mr Wilding's request, very properly, as he his Honour had held, until after the criminal proceedings were disposed of. Mr Wilding *aid that was so but still the delay had occurred and he submitted that as his client had been allowed to continue in private to practise a suspension now would inevitably convey to the public and to the other Judges the idea that his Honour here had been forced to entertain an unfavourable opinion on the case. No member of the Law Society, and no member of the* profession, could for one moment suppose that his client, whose character for personal integrity and honour stood so high, would abuse hie position now. The persons who consulted him knew everything that had taken place and continued their confidence. The only material effect of interim suspension .would be to condemn his client to enforced idleness— he could not even serve in a subordinate position in an office—and deprive htm ,of the; power of supporting a wife and family who had no other means. If the Court of Appeal should be compelled to take a yifew unfavourable to his client, no harm wiJft have been done by allowing the few weeks asked for. If, on the other hand, the Court should discharge the rule and accept his client's answer, this Court will have ' been placed in a position to be regretted by inflicting interim suspension. Hβ iioped; on the" grounds urged*that his HonourfWould not think fit to exercise the discretionary power given by the Statute. Mr Joynt , said that he had but little to add to what had been said; by his learned friend, Mr Wilding. He'did not understand now that the Law Society asked for the suspension. '".'■'.■■-. ■ •■'• ." ■■"..■. ' ■ Hi* Hondtu , —ls that so, Mr Fisher ?

Mr Fisher—Yes, your Honour,. "I merely thought it my duty, to call your Honour's attention to the matter.

HieHonour—Thenthatmateriallyaltersthe aspect of the matter.' I certainly understood Mr Fisher to move for the order- of suspension. Mr Joynt—l understood, from the way in which my learned friend, Mr Fisher, spoke, that he was simply calling your Honour's attention to the Act, and not moving on the part of the Law. Society for suspension. ■ Mr Fisher—That was my intention. .

Mr Joynt went on to argue that because there was a reference to the Court of appeal,' there need not necessarily be suspension even if asked for. In this case he understood that Mr Fisher did not move formally. He pointed out that these gentlemen were not practising ostentatiously, but bad quietly carried on their profession in their chambers. Again he would'submit that the time at -which' the Court of Appeal sat was very close. He would refer his Honour to the case of a solicitor io Auckland, with which his Honour was familiar.

His Honour—ln that case, Mr Joynt, the Court did not make an order of suspension because the party was in gaol, and therefore there did not seem to be any necessity for the order. . ' ■ r

Mr Fisher said ho had been, instructed by the Law Society to bring the matter before the Court. Hβ had no desire to comment on the matter before the Court, but merely left the affidavits and the anewer ai filed to be dealt with in its discretion. He asked the Court to deal with the question of suspension because he submitted it followed under the Act on the remission of the other portion of the application to the Court of Appeal. His Honour—lβ there any practice on the subject? Mr Fisher—l have been unable to find any, your Honour. TJiere have been some suspensions, but the practice does not appear to be settled.

Hμ Houour said that the action in this cue by the Law Society wu based on the allegations thfct the firm had misappropriated large same of money. The gentlemen now before the Court did not challenge the allegations, but met them by saying that they did not know that there was any fraudulent conduct going on. They sought to establish such, an ignorance of the transactions as woald offer an answer to the culpability which called for the exercise of the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Court over solicitors, 'lhe onus of proof was undoubtedly with, the solicitors, and if the Law Society had asked as he had understood they did, for the suspension of these gentlemen, it would have been bis duty to have gone into the affidavits. The Law Society had not done so, and, therefore, he must take it that the Society did not wish to interfere with the practice by these gentlemen of Chamber business and settling up the affairs of the tirm. That being so, he had looked for the practice on the matter, but there was none to be found, nor had any been cited to him. Hβ could not find that the practice had been to suspend except in jcases where the case was entirely undefended. Suspension was punitive, and the ultimate decision rested with the Court of Appeal. Before suspending any of the parties in this case, it would oe necessary for him to go very carefully into the voluminous affidavits in the matter, and as suspension might be regarded as a penalty, be did not care to do anything which would seem to prejudice the question for the Court of Appeal whether tae answers filed by these gentlemen to the charge* made against them were snfficient. In deciding that matters should remain as they were until the sitting of tbe Court of Appeal, he was largely influenced by the face that the Law Society did not directly apply to have th* suspension en*»—a, I'fceVafore he had oorne to the eon*

m t ' , i i i ii i ifcj ■■*** that they had jremftinwS proceedine commenced, ffihe Court then jkwo. ,