The Press. TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 1890.

Press, Volume XLVII, Issue 7525, 15 April 1890, Page 4

The Press. TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 1890.

Whether or. not . the..telegrams really explain something o_ the difference between Prince Bismakck' Atfd ; the Emperor, they do, at all events, seem to throw a far _ncf©;;_iopeful; liglstson the prospects oif .he peace of "Europe. i We are inolined to believe that, so far ! as they can be belied on, they do both, | and what they do Bay is so little —that Were- is A iti them some sort of guarantee for their reliableness. The telegrams have tjro wipeots—■-one whichfaces towards the future constitutional development of the empire,- and the other regards its _oreigii -"eliilons. It appears on the one hand that the | Emperor has expressed himself as not being averse to responsible govern-; ment, and on the other that he has decided upon making substantial advances towards a better understanding ftritii Fr_&6& | We i n«ed f hardly^nol&t | out to bur" readers how simply im- ' possible it would be for Prince Bismarck to take part in carrying out either of these policies. As regards France it has been the key-note of bis whole war of revenge* wag sure to cdtxiß &o*n&*xk;Ut&, stud that the only safe line was to use every effort to that Germany should; again from the contest,, and in the meantime to put it off as; long aapoaajriblaji ;A? this,* he has held it to be essential that the; policy of the Empire should on noj account be left to the chances of party* conflict, but that there should always; be at the head of affairs one supreme} head whose will was practically law.. No one who has paid any attention to' the course of German history for the last twenty years, or even longer, will have any disposition to deny that the above has been the policy of Prince _&s___bc__ The wonder will be,

if it turns out as the telegrauis '__$-• virtually telling us, that the Emperor has been able to see that this kind "of policy, whatever have been, its merite in the past, has had its day, and that it is now time to proceed upon wholly different lines. The conception attributed to the Emperor is certainly a grand one. A ootidl fide good \inderst_i_dmg once secured with France, and put upon a basis,.,which may be expected to last say for the next five years; and it may be said that Germany is at once, by the very fact, placed in a position to impose abstinence on Russia from her designs in the south-east of Europe. Let Germany but be safe ou her western side —which such an understanding with France would make her —and she can line the whole of the Polish frontier with a force whioh would render. it impossible for Russia to move southward. The march of her armies both from Moscow and Warsaw, and whether to Odessa, to the Danube, or the Galliciau frontier, will be exposed to be taken in flank at every step by overwhelming numbers. And" why, one cannot but ask, should it be impossible for France and Germany to become allies. Leaving out the sentiment of wounded pride, of which we will speak presently, there can hardly be two countries whose interests are more independent of each other. In the extreme east—-Tonquinand Cochin China—Germany has no temptation to interfere with France. In the PaciEo there is more than room enough for both. In Africa, where both at this moment are acting with eue.gy, it so happens that their spheres of influence, except in the Niger, are as wide as possible apart, and on the Niger they are parted by intervening British settlements. If Germany can only soothe the wounded pride of her great rival, it should seem that they ought to become as fast friends as States can be expected to be. But here, of course, comes the difficulty. The neutralisation of AlsaceLorraine has been spoken of; but we confess we do not see how this is to be. There are still the fortresses, for the sake of whioh Germany insisted on retaining the territory. And not only so, but there are now the line of counter fortresses erected by France at a prodigious outlay. How, in the face of this state of things, can the territory which these fortresses both guard and threaten be possibly neutralised ? The question of Egypt— the only other point which appears to offer an arrangement—seems at first sight to be even more insoluble, for in this case the Emperor will have to reconcile the pretensions of France and Great Britain. It may be conceded that Great Britain would be willing to accept of any arrangement, consistent, of course, with the safety and welfare of Egypt herself, which Bhould not leave Frauce at liberty to occupy the country as soon as she herself evacuated it. But what possible guarantee, it may be asked, could be offered that France would nob do this. Her whole conduct from the day when she committed the fatal mistake of sailing out of the Bay of Aboukir has betokened one settled purpose ; and that has been by every means Bhort of .war, to render the position of England in Egypt untenable. It can hardly be said that in this course her policy has been governed by her interests. Her enormous possessions in North Africa are in no sense; endangered by the position of England in, Jlgypt. The French colony. in Egypt itself cannot be said to furnish; any claim to more than the customary good offices between States. The interests of France in China and in .the' South Pacific no doubt render it ■neoßs-; sary to her to be able at all times to make use of the Suez Canal. But this is a necessity shared by other. Powers as well as herself. To Ger J many, in particular, is it requisite, if for ho other reason in connection with her interests on the Zanzibar coast J -But it may be said with confidence that no other Power eicept France has any wish to interfere with the position of England in Egypt. She may be said indeed to hold that position by virtue of. a mandate from the Powers, conditional upon her preserving the passage of the Canal lor the use of all Europe. Germany might well be willing to oblige France in the matter, were not her own inte-j rests more completely bound up to ._, naval alliance with England, Tbe difficulty of the case it is obvious is extreme. But it must be remembered that there is probably no one more exactly informed than the JBmperor now is of what are the wishes of England in the matter, and how far it will be possible for her to satisfy the amour propre of France. It is the business of diplomacy to deal with enormous difficulties, and it is, we apprehend, in this direction, if in any, that the solution must fee sought which will bring France out of her isolation, and restore the setwe of peace toj Europe.