The Press. TUESDAY, JULY 9, 1889.

Press, Volume XLVI, Issue 7357, 9 July 1889, Page 4

The Press. TUESDAY, JULY 9, 1889.

The strange proposal made the other day by France to the British Government for the immediate evacuation of Egypt, its prompt refusal at Downing street, and no less hasty withdrawal by the French Foreign Office, toot only betoken that it is still a permanent object of French diplomacy to get rid at almost any hazard of the English in Egypt, and thus repair the effect of their own astonishing blunder of 18S2, —we refer, of course, to the sailing away of their fleet from the Bay of Aboukir, when Admiral Seymour opened fire on the Egyptian fortifications—but make it worth while to consider briefly what has been the position of Great Britain in regard to Egyptian affairs since she first undertook to put them in order, and to point out how much the case has become complicated by subsequent events. The whole thing began, as our readers will remember, with the necessity declared by France of an active intervention in Egypt in order to obtain satisfaction of the claims of her bondholders. England had bondholders too, for that matter, but the British Government has always repudiated the obligation to employ force in aid of those of her subjects who may choose to risk their money with the people of a foreign state. The interest cf England in Egypt consisted of course in the paramount necessity of keeping safe the highroad to India. When France speaks of intervention no one knows "whereto this thing may grow," as witness the results in Tunis and Tonquin, and it clearly would not have consisted with a due regard to English interests to allow France to go to Egypt alone. Hence the "Dual Control.' , The arrangement had the sanction of Europe,

and it was undoubtedly the best between the parties of which the situation admitted. But the machine never from the first worked smoothly. The subordinate officials of both nations were perpetually thwarting each other, and the salaries of both sets, considered especially in view of the smallness of the results, and, no doubt, also to the circumstance that "no Egyptian need apply " for any share in them, proved more than Ismail Pasha's patience could bear. The steps he took to free himself from the control brought down upon him the protests of Europe, and it was. sopa intimated to him that he must resign- The Porte was informed that the nomination of Tewfik as his successor would be agreeable to the Powers. proved both docile and loyal, and for a while all went well. There w,as a general prosperity, and Egyptian stock rose. But the impatience which had been exhibited by Ismail was not confined to himself. In the autumn of 1881 there came the military rising, followed up immediately by Abaßi's movement, the intervention and the double game played by the Porte, the necessity for decisive action, the readiness and even urgency of England, the vacillation of France, and at length the declaration announced through the Times " tnat England would take theinitiative." Then France decided to act with her. The Khedive was officially informed that in the event of disturbances the two Powers were prepared to support him* A combined fleet of twenty-four'war-ships entered the Bay of Aboukir. Arabi was summoned to discontinue the erection of shore batteries threatening the safety of the fleet, He promised, but went on as before. After twenty-four hours' notice Admiral Seymour commenced the attack, and the French fleet, as we have said, sailed out of- the harbour.

We are far from saying that the Dual Control had accomplished nothing. A grand beginning, and something more than a beginning, had indeed befSn made. But what was done was all undone by Arabi's rebellion, and it is impossible not to feel that its effect was most seriously aggravated, and indeed the rebellion itself made easier by the French default at Aboukir Bay. When one of the leading Powers of Europe thus allowed itself to be driven from its position —for this is how it appeared to the Egyptian—-success in dealing singly with anothjef of not greater pretensions might well seem to be within the range of possibility. The rebellion epread. Alexandria was in flames and Cairo looted. Society was resolved in Egypt literally into its first element, and England had once more no native instrument to work with but the docility and loyalty of the Khedive. To start at all fair in face of such a position so brought aboat, the abolition of the Dual Control was a foregone conclusion. England had again to take the initiative, and to take it this time alone. The immediate peace preservation was entrusted to Lord Charles BfiRESFORD the " well done Condor " Beresford. England gave pledges to the Powers to withdraw from Egypt as soon as she had provided for its permanent self-govern-ment. Sir A. Coi,viN was charged with the rectification of the finances. The unmanageable army of Arabi was disbanded, and ft nevr force substituted which, under English training, promised to become more efficient for meeting-the real wants «f-the-country. Lord Dufferin undertook the duty of preparing the scheme of a Constitution which, commencing with something like the shadow, of popular institutions, would for the present work effectively, and might slowly train up the people to an understanding of what might to them be meant by a practical voioe in their own affairs. That this last was no paper-work we may know if we realise the condition of the Fellah. Sunk in aebt, driven to work by the " stick," it was out of such materials that the Government of Jfigypfc bad to be created. It, is to be said that within twp years ao much was accomplished that • the English Ministers felt that, so far as depended Qα them, their work was accomplished, and Mr. Gladstone announced at the Mansion House that orders for the withdrawal of the army of occupation had actually been given. t Hardly had the mandate issued when it had to be suspended. Rumors sometime current of the advance of the Mahdi from the Soudan gathered head, and it became clear that an invasion of Lower Egypt was in actual

danger. Into the details of the struggle we do not now care to enter. It is not over yet, nor likely to be. Wβ lost Burnaby, and we lost Gordon. We gave up Khartoum. We established ourselves at Suakim, and we have not j left Egypt. But since then there has ! been a significant alteration of the official formula. We do not now—we have not for five years—promised to leave Egypt as soon as we have given her a safe and stable Government Our promise now is—and it is a change admittedly forced from us by the exigencies of the case—that we will not leave Egypt until the objects of our stay there are accomplished ; and the question now is, when, if ever, it is likely that that may be said. England went to Egypt, with the assent of Europe, for the protection of her own interests in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, endangered by the action of France. She stayed there because the internal troubles of the country required, in its interests also, that she should not leave until those troubles had been composed and the causes of them removed. The Soudan rebellion has introduced a fresh factor, the gravity of which may be illustrated by the fact that after five years of desultory fighting the dervishes are at Wady Haifa, three cataracts nearer to Cairo than when Gordon kept them at bay at Khartoum. Nor is this all. We are to save Egypt for the Egyptians, not for any other Power that may be waiting, as.soou as we retire, to step into our places. Wβ have lately seen a Russian detachment shot down by French troops almost within sight of Suakim, aud it needs no unheard of political insight to tell us who next would land at Cairo if the English forces were removed. And this restores the situation to what it was when we first went. It has been expressively observed in the Kussian journals that the interest of Eugland in the Black Sea " pales in the light " of her new hold on Egypt. Less than ever can she now afford to give up the key of the high road to India into the hands of a rival Power. Since England went to India, Russia has occupied Merv —an occupation costing us £8,000,000 in fortifying the scientific frontier. Since then the Egyptian question itself has merged into the greater question of Central Africa. England is now there under new conditions and with new responsibilities, and she must be left free to await the development of events still in the future before she cau decide whether the objects which must now be answered by her stay are fully accomplished.