The Press. MONDAY, JULY 23, 1888.

Press, Volume XLV, Issue 7125, 23 July 1888, Page 4

The Press. MONDAY, JULY 23, 1888.

Wβ are glad to find from our further files from Home that the subject of naval defence, to which we referred lately, is being ■ followed up there by the highest authorities, and gives every promise of being energetically prosecuted. We may return to this in another article. Meanwhile -we will draw attention to a wave of thought of a somewhat extraordinary character, as it appears to us, which is evidently passing across the stream of public opinion. For the moment it is likely to be overborne altogether by the decided set of the main current, but it is intelligent, and has found influential expression. It is impossible to say therefore, how far it may not ultimately influence the action taken by England in some future stage of what we all know as the Eastern Question.

We placed before our readers not long since a view suggested by the Spectator as to the interpretation to be put upon the recent conduct of Germany. It was supposed that possibly it might be Prince Bismabck's plan to effect an arrangement between Russia and Austria for the mutual division between them of the Balkan Peninsula, Russia taking the eastern half with Constantinople, and Austria tho western with the scarce, to her, less valuable port of Salonica. We gave the suggestion for what it was worth, and at the moment the break of the telegraph lines disabled us from forming any decisive opinion as to its probability. Since then, howeyer, the telegrams have come in, and one of the earliest certainly authenticates this suggestion as being in fact under consideration. This telegram, again, is followed up by another, in which the Czar appears as the proposer of a new tripartite league between Russia, Germany, and England, to be based upon the assurance given by his Majesty to the English Government that Russia harbours no designs against India, That these are not mere telegrams will probably be accepted without much discussion. What is more to the purpose is to note the new line of thought which at the same time is finding utterance among the leaders of political opinion at Home. We find, for instance, in the June Contemporary, a paper written by Mr. Henry Dunckley, strongly urging a reconsideration of England's policy in regard to Russia. The article purports to be a contribution on the subject of national defence, and the earlier part of it is taken up with a caustic criti-

cism of the military alarmists. While believing, however, that England is prepared for war should it arise, the writer goes on to enquire at considerable length why she should concern herself in any way with the advance of Russia in the south of Europe. The continual pressure, he urges, of a strong power upon a weak one can have but one ultimate ending, the eventual acquisition by Russia of Constantinople, which it is idle to attempt or pretend to avert. England has unfortunately committed herself hitherto to the policy of preventing it. In pursuit of this policy she has entered upon the Crimean War, forced upon Russia the treaty of Berlin, and added Cyprus to her own already burdensome possessions in the Mediterranean. But in all this he insists England has throughout made a great mistake. Let Russia, he says, only be satisfied as to her natural and, indeed, inevi" table wants in the South of Europe, and she will find better occupation there, than pursuing further conquests among the half-barbarous races and unprotected steppes of Central 4sia. We need hardly give the answer to all this which justifies England's present course on the necessity of protecting against every hazard her highway to India. It is better for her, it is commonly said, if she must choose, that Russia should be obliged to march to the attack of India across a space occupying half the globe than that she

should be able, by the possession of Constantinople, to intercept .England on her road through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. This is the generally recognised view of the English policy. But this again is now being met by the question whether ludia is worth preserving. This is not a new point, ft -was raised some years ago by Mr. Robert Lows in the pages of the Nineteenth. There have always since been found advocates of it, and it is now being put in a new form, in an article of unusual power and closeness of reasoning, in, the last number of the Contemporary. In this article Mr. Mebedith Townsend does not attempt to show that India js not worth preserving, but leaving this as an underlying assumption, betakes himself to demonstrate that it is simply impossible England can hold India much longer. His standpoint is avowedly pessimistic, and the topic is so inviting, that we regret to be obliged to postpone what we should like to say about it to another occasion. But it does appear to us that the occurrence of all these things together just at this moment is somewhat remarkable. When all England is bending up its energies to the coming contest, not only are the telegrams bringing news of the character we have mentioned— a thing not improbable taken by itself —but influential leaders of opinion are found to be inserting articles of more than usual power and earnestness, raising the question whether, after all, the expected contest is in any way necessary, and whether the policy which it is intended to snpport is not a gigantic blunder. This is not the case, be it observed, of a mere party opposition. Neither the Nineteenth nor the Contemporary are party organs, and indeed, if they were, the determination that Russia shall not go to Constantinople has loug been common to both parties alike.

The case stated above is one, we think, of a distinct wave of thought passing across the main current of public opinion, and the question arises to what cause the set of this wave is to be ascribed. It may be that> the suggestion of the Spectator, confirmed as it is by the reported proposals of the Czar, is coming to be believed in. We can conceive certainly that fcb.e occupation by Russia of Constantinople need not necessarily be fatal to British interests. It is no doubt true that the Dardanelles, with a Russian fleet behind them, •would be a different thing to the rest of Europe, from the Dardanelles in the hands of Turkey. Let it be possible for a Russian fleet to come out and scour the Mediterranean at pleasure, and then retreat safe from attack within the Black Sea, and the present conditions of European progress and civilisation will no doubt be seriously affected. But this supposition does not exhaust the whole of, the possibilities. The Dardanelles, however effectual in keeping hostile fleets out, will certainly not be lees so j in keeping a blockaded fleet within. If Austria is to have Salonica she will certainly not be long without keeping there a strong fleet of war ships, and a glance at the map will show what chance a Russian fleet would have of getting out in its presence. We imagine too that an English fleet also would have to be reckoned with, even from so far off as Malta. Great Britain has not yet been too late in arriving at Besica Bay. She has not j yet made use of Cyprus, but after all said it is not now denied that Famagosta is a harbor which will fully answer all purposes. It is possible indeed to suppose that mere British J interest need not stand in the way of the suggested alliance with „ Russia. But for all that we cannot understand how Great Britain can possibly be 'party to what is now beinpr talked of. For sixty years she has stood before Europe as the protectress of the liberties of the weaker States. In the present case she is especially bound to her high policy. But for her the Treaty of Berlin would never have

become part of the publio law of Europe, and almost the whole of European Turkey would simply have exchanged the fitful caprices, not always ill-humoured, of the Moslem, for the iron heel of Russia. From this fate England, more than any other European power, has saved it. The ten millions of Roumania, Bulgaria, Servia, and we suppose we may add Montenegro, have proved themselves, by the common consent of all who have watched their progress, notwithstanding the persistent efforts of Russia, to be worthy of their freedom. It would, we cannot but think, be to the lasting disgrace of England if she were now to stand by and see her work undone without striking a blow.