The Press. SATURDAY, JULY 21. 1888.

Press, Volume XLV, Issue 7124, 21 July 1888, Page 4

The Press. SATURDAY, JULY 21. 1888.

In our article the other day upon the possibility of an invasion of Great Britain, we took occasion to remind the would-be alarmists that England really had a fleet. The fact is by i<o means forgotten at Home, nor is forgotten either the use which in old time the fathers of our present generation of seamen knew how to make of it. The whole subject is, as might be expected, matter of earnest attention, and it may be worth while to recapitulate here some of the conclusions at which the authorities appear to be arriving. There never has been any doubt as to the thing that had to be done. Instead of waiting for the enemy to come over and blockade our ports, it has always been held to be the duty of our Navy to cross over to the other side and blockade theirs. " In those days," as we are reminded in the admirable paper lately read by Admiral Columb at the United Service Institution:—" In those days there was a certain denned way of looking at the situation of the British Islands as surrounded by water, at the water surrounding them, and at the possible enemies' coasts which bounded the water. Our Islands were strictly regarded as the capital of an Empire surrounded by" a water territory, the frontier of which waa the enemies' coasts." It was in this way, namely, by blockading Dunkirk, that as early as 1691 we prevented the Dunkirkers from stopping the trade of Newcastle by sinking ehipa in the Tyne. It was thus that Lord St. Vincent kept in check the combined fleets at Brest. It was thus that the British Commanders under Nelson and CoßNWAixis fairly held imprisoned all at one time the French and Spanish fleets at Toulon, Cadiz, Rochefort, Boulogne, Havre, Cherbourg, and, in short from St. Malo to the Texel. Nor was thia all. It need not be said that among so many blockading squadrons, especially when composed of sailing vessels, the line of blockade might somewhere be pierced. To meet this contingency a second line of defence was provided. Thi3 was the Downs Squadron, a squadron which it was provided might be doubled at short notice should need require, and which was ready to deal effectually with any hostile cruisers unlucky enough, as they might find, to escape the blockade. Even this was not all. Lord St. Vincbnt established a local guard in Ireland, in order to provide for the special protection of St. George's Channel and maintained a system of floating defences at Yarmouth, Leith, and other places along the East Coasts of England and Scotland. To all this he added, not because he considered it necessary, but, as he said, "just to calm the fears of the old ladies both in and out," £20,000 worth of pure coast defences. This was what was done by Lord St. Vincent. Another plan was that of Lord Howe. Discarding altogether the blockade system of Lord St. Vincent he left all the enemies' ports open for their ships to come out at their leisure. He kept ready to meet them a grand fleet at Torbay, with a reserve fleet off the Mersey. Considered as a defence against invasion, Lord Howe's plan was probably not inferior to that of Lord St. Vincent. At least it is not impugning the gallantry of our French neighbors to say that whatever they have done on land, at sea the British have not been mastered. But in regard to existing exigencies, it should seem even to a non-military critic to have a fatal defect. It makes no sufficient provision, if indeed it can be said to make any, for the protection of our merchant shipping. It is being pointed out, and with much force, that dependent as Great Britain is for her food upon foreign supplies, there is no need for an invasion. All that has to be dong is to intercept the grain-carryine chips, and bo starve England into

submission. As it is calculated by experts that there are aO k "... usually in the British Island, more than a few months' supply o f corn beyond what is in actual consumption, the force of this considera. tion is obvious, and in this point of view the very preponderance of our mercantile marine is even a source of "" relative weakness. Wo cannot retaliate upon the enemy, for where they take ten of our ships we can hardly take one of theirs. It may be ta\A certainly that privateering was done away with by the declaration of Parjg of IS7O. Unhappily, however, it has yet to be seen, whether, in face of the refusal of so important a power as the United States to adhere to the Declaration, other Powers will Hold themselves bound by it under so enormous a temptatiou as must %y p re . sented by thejjwhole commercial marine of Great Britain afloat. But it is to be said that this danger has not been overlooked. In these days of telegraphs, systematized as their use can now- be by the Intelligence Depart ment which the authorities at Home have at last established, it is easy to have early information as to the putting to sea of any foreign vessel fitted for war; and the plan has been, bo soon as such information is received to detail off specifically a fast ship of our own marine to follow that vessel wherever she goes; with full power of course, to act as occasion may require. It certainly appears to us that this arrangement has a promising look about it. Whatever the quantity of our mercantile shipping afloat, out enemy's means of oflence against it must after all bo limited by the ' number of his own cruisers, and if each of these is to be hunted down in tho manner we have described, the injury it is capable of receiving will form, we venture to think, a material ■ clement in the general calculation.. But it is time here to return to the question of blockade. The couditions no doubt are materially altered by steam. The enemy's fleet in guard of his transports can, of course, now come out whenever it feels disposed to hazard a battle. " Wind and weather permitting" is in regard to this a phrase comparatively of the past. But so also is it with regard to the blockading squadron. That cannot now, as in Lord St. Vincent's time, be blown off by a gale. It has too, what the blockaded fleet certainly has not, a command of reserves. These may now be effected to a degree which could not in old times be depended on to afford decisive aid, perhaps, in the midst of an engagement. There is also on the side of the blockaders all the additional power derived from the increased range of projectiles. Sir Charles Napier had no difficulty in setting on fire the fortifications of Cronstadt from rafts, which the Russians were unable to touch. Even if some harbors are now made deep enough for the transporta • not to be reached effectually by such a fire, it is still clear that a protecting fleet issuing out to drive off the blockaders must run a gauntlet of" some miles in length before it can even come into the engagement. Wβ know, too, that all these possibilities are accurately rioted at headquarters. It comes out now and then that the object tions and anxieties even of honest critic* are left unanswered, not because the Government of the day is not fully prepared to meet them, but because ; they do uot choose to expose their plans to a possible enemy. It ia nofy we suppose, generally known here,?bufc we see no reason why it should not be stated, that independently of all open. preparations for defence, there is ft - night patrol constantly maintained upon the waters, visiting the places whose security may depend upon the actual condition of their defences. It" comes and goes unseen, and nothing W; , known of its arrival or departure except in the shape of a friendly intimation received soon after from the authorities at head quarters that such and such a point may need looking after. Looking thus at the whole question we cannot . bring ourselves to doubt that the eViv dences of preparation patent to ourselves are supplemented by proofe the strength of which maybe better understood by those who are responsible for the defence of Great Britain. We are i of therae who have been looking for- j ward to the early probability of a great war, and who think that of that war it ■will be impossible for England to remain an unconcerned spectator. Just now the kaleidoscope is being strangely shifted. But the same elements are there, however the appearance may be altered ; and the question to our minds ia rather hot : the outbreak will come about than whether it can be indefinitely poet- - poned. Thus holding, it is notwithoW satisfaction that we can believe from the evidence before us that for the struggle when it comes Great Britain ; will be well prepared.

In the course of the debate on the question of the responsibility of the Government for all parliamentary expenditure, -which took place last nigfcV reference was once or twice made to the report of the Legislative Expenditure Committee of 1886. A brief outline of the recommendations of that Committee may not prove unintereefr ing at the present time. In the fiw* place the Committee expressed the opinion that the number of member in each House of the Legislature could be reduced with advantage to the t colony, both in the matter of good goj vernment and saving of expense. ,Wefl» the recommendation has been acted upon, and the number of the House 'W Representatives reduced to 74, tM alteration to take effect from the date of the dissolution of the present Pa» liament. The Committee also suggested the reduction of the honorarium to £150, and the Parliamentary Honorarium aud Privileges Act of W session has given effect to the recoffl , mendatioß. Members of the Low* House now receive £150 for the* services, and Legislative Councillor £100. This has, of courses material saving in the cost of the I*B*J lative Department, and the report «■■ the Committee, no doubt, very largely influenced public opinion in favor or those changes. The Committee, » addition, strongly urged the necessity, of making the Government direct!/ responsible for all Parliamentary•«** penditure, and of placing all office* under the control of Ministers. At was urged that if certain officers, wboee time is now only partially employe*, had their whole time engaged to w* service of the colony a comidertfM

could be effected without S the slightest degree impairing Sβ efficient of the public serv.ee »£ Committee strongly condemned 2, .practice of voting annually r^ em addition to the salaries fixed Estate, and urged that the anmud £* ahould be put an end to and the JJ amount payable to officers holdSTsUrtutory appointments fixed by ELlation. The present practice, as know, ie to vote a sum each .Lion in addition to the salaries fixed jTthe Legislative Officers' Salaries Act. This practice and the system of -mating bonuses and gratuities- to '■ officers in the public service are highly onsatisfactory, and should be put an "erf to without delay. We have on Jjjany occasions in the&e columns dwelt extravagance and waste in the Legislative Department generally. Some economies,* as we have shown, have note teen effected, but much yet renauas to be accomplished. We hope the exhaustive discussion which took • place last evening over the question of Jeponsibility for'the estimates of this department will have the effect of competing the House to make still greater reductions.