VOLUNTEER AND SERVICE NOTES.

Press, Volume XLIV, Issue 6924, 2 December 1887, Page 2

VOLUNTEER AND SERVICE NOTES.

'i m ' ■ ■ [Br an Ex-Naval Officer.] [WeeMy Press.) Coast defence has become a term at once breezy, vague, and nautical, and very fewpersons agree as to its significance. The official mind has taken it to mean the defence of our ports, and concentrated itenergies on those points. It will be ad-, mitted all round that New Zealand has' erected forts and batteries which are highly creditable to the colony, and they will always be as a monument which speaks of the earnest purpose of the Government in whoso day they were erected. If these places were properly garrisoned our ports would be as wellguarded as those of any country in the world.

Coast defence has been used as a term for so many purposes that it has at length become somewhat cloudy; sometimes it includes the assemblage of forces at threatened places, the erection of fortifications, the establishment of gunboats, &.., or the patrol of a capable fleet at sea. Coast defence may involve either of these but in using the term so generally we are apt to got mixed. We may mean defence against the landing of an army or against the depredations of a fillibustering expedition, or against a single-armed vessel. From time to time officers come and report upon our defences. The visitor inspects the forts, and gives his opinion, which is sure to be favourable, because the forts themselves being all that is necessary for their particular purpose, it cannot be otherwise. These people do not give us the benefit of their views as to what we should do to guard against attacks which are probable, they simply tell us that certain defences have been provided, and they are good. A good architect could tell us as much. Now, however, a visitor is with us who is turning his attention to ascertain what is for our best, to look at our probable danger, and to help us to guard against it. Many of our preconceived notions will probably be disturbed; there may be some who will be inclined to set our visitor down as a man with a fad, who is not worth more than passing notice. To regard General Schaw's opinion in this way will be ungenerous and altogether wrong. He is disinterested, and experienced, and must not be found fault with if he is outspoken. He has been asked for j his opinion, not to stroke us down and tell us that we are going on all right, but to let us know our real position, and whether it pleases us or not he is going to give that for which he has been asked. One of the first items which has come to us is tho opinion of the General thafcwithoufc a capable fleet at sea we are absolutely unsecured. So far the General is unquestionably right. We then hear, that the arrangements for giving us security, are to be based upon the decision of the late Conference at Home, and the Government are in communication with the Australian Governments with a view to our contributing to the cost of tho additions which have been made to the Imperial fleet on the Australian Station. It may be a question whether it is right for either of the Governments to share in this expense, if it is right to do so now, we have in former years been behind in our obligations with regard to the Australian squadron; there cannot, however, be any question as to the necessity for the increase in the number of men-of-war in these waters; but this is not the capable fleet at sea which is required for New Zealand. General Schaw and Sir William Jervoisarc right in principle, but the details are decidedly wrong.

It is the FmsT pkixciplk of naval WAB— A PRINCIPLE AS WELL ESTABLISHED AS THE FIRST LAW OF MOTION — THAT NAVAL DEFENSIVE FORCE MUST BE PLACED WHERE THE ENEMY IS, "KOT WHERE HE IS not. The defence of Australasia against the Russian fleetmust be oft Vladivostock, and not off either Melbourne or Sydney. This is quite evident, because Auckland, Lyttelton, Brisbane, Freemantle, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Singapore, Hong -Cong, &c, are alias open to the attack of a Russian squadron as either Melbourne or Sydney. If tho hypothesis is, that in order to meet it, -Melbourne and Sydney are to have each a squadron in attendance, so must each- of the above ports, and it is for this reason that I said in my notes of last week that we do not require expensive ironclad coast defence, vessels such aa the Cerberus, &c. What we and all places similarly situated do want is.?>i'n_>r Naval defence, for the protection of our territorial waters against the raider and the commerce destroyer. It is not only the only safe defence against this kind of attack, but it may be a preventive. The best of blockades will not prevent the exit and entrance of raiders prepared for that special purpose, and local floatingde. fence isalone competent to warn them offPor months pastthishasbeen urged in these papers, and if anything is to be done now it ought to be considered in the scheme for the defence of New Zealand.

There are many people here who are inclined to pooh-pooh suggested precautions with regard to Russian designs upon England's colonial possessions. Perhaps the following incident will shew what Russian designs really are :— A short time ago a Russian squadron was at anchor in one of the northern ports of China in company with the English squadron, and all was harmony. At daylight one morning the Russians prepared for sea, and by eight o'clock they had disappeared; The English Admiral remarked that he thought it strange and rather uncivil in them not having proffered the usual courtesy of carriage of letters, etc. In three days' time a steamer came from the South bringing news of one of the not infrequent Russian scares. Away at full speed went the English Squadron, only to find the; Russian ships stationed at the many crossings on our many trade lines, and in the vicinity of our principal ports, quite near enough to have a hold 6n the port, but not near enough to flurry the game till the right moment had arrived.

The captain of the ship that was paying this attention to Hong Kong mentioned on his way home, at the Cape of Good Hope to the captain of one of the English men-of-war,"how deeply he regretted that war had not broken out at that time, as he was bound to obtain a very large sum of money by way of ransod*- from Hong Kong, and failing cash he would have taken Sycee sliver or opium. He also mentioned that all the ships of their squadron were in their proper places for the destruction of our commerce before the /English ships* had notice. Thus may causejßßrprise to some of the readers of this journal, it is .nevertheless a startling | factijtfeftb the Russians had better intelligenuft than the English adm«ral ;: «knd were ablfctoplace their ships in their assigned positions at their ease... Whpt has happened way happen to us at any time but without) the peaceful denouement. We; may* wake up some day and find ourselves held_tjii>.ransom by some raideEthat has «-on_s-down from the Sea of Japan (all the since Hamilton, our coaling and Bt_J--<M- in the fairway of the Japanese Sea has been given up.) It Is true then that General Schaw and Sir William Jervois are right in saying thai' we are without security until we have a capable fleet at sea. Equally true tb_it the Government of New Zealand are off on the wrong tack in trying to provide this fleet by subsidising the Imperial Go vernment whose doty ft is to provide a fleet for the Australian Station as they have done _dtherto. We must hove our own Naval, defence for the protection of our* _____.ri__ waters; until this is-pro-vided we shall be absolutely without security, and General Schaw's labours will have been in vain. The present GoTemraent should showvis the matte-tot

jOurte_ritomic-astdef-nceth eft , m I i estness of purpose as tb__f o | [ment in whose day our __£fi VCra * !were decided on; member tho fact that territory f 2 ' i defence when "* !necc ßs ity for territorial eoS !&£. though the latter, however compS maybe, can never even modify thfnelL s*ty for the former. Then before 3TI S j «ng the Australian Squadron the/wm provide first for our own territorial w_l_. !.ffirtff kind ° f <^^% j Coast defence cannot supersede te_r..__ rial water defence, it can only aid ££ .floating treasure may have to _»k *_. | shelter of the fixed defences, reasonable fortifications, chains of submarine mines, &_, may be admitted as economical and proper provision against ; the pursuit of shipping into close harbow, and sheltered anchorages, without involv ing any question of attack on territory..". ' Our belt of territorial waters contain*, treasures which can be most easily and speedily struck at by the enemy; It m us t therefore, be defended, and it cannot b. defended by any arrangements for territorial coast defence, however vast or skiL fully planned. The question of whether the belt of ter- ' rttorial waters can be made impervious to all attacks, or where it must prove to be I certainly pervious, must depend upon how far the enemy's forces can be masked ot points far removed from tho outskirts ot the belt. The outworks of the citadel cannot be assailed until the enemy has crossed the distant frontier. If the defending armies hold the bridges and passoa across the frontier, the outworks of thf citadel will never even be menaced. Our water belt is absolutely impervious if our enemies' ports, which are the passes into our ocean country, can be efficient!)-" blockaded. This point should be remembered by those who propose to spend large sums of money upon territorial coast defence. Our fortifications, &c, will only be new* sary to afford shelter to vessels which ut pursued. What we have to guard against is _» operations of the raiders, specially fitted as commerce destroyers. These vessels can not be shut in by a blockade. Some vrilj always run the gauntlet of the blockading fleet. The British Fleet off Vladivostock may ( knock the Russian Fleet into a cocked hat, and a splendid victory chronicled. Still tho raider would turn up on our coast.. The raiders on British Commerce nevet swarmed in the English Channel befor. the battle of Trafalgar as they did after it, and British Merchant Shipping never suffered in isolated cases as it did when the English fleets sailed over the seaa in undisputed supremacy. We are in great danger and should pr, pare to meet it in a systematic way. In the evtut of war with Russia the Australian Fleet would be engaged as I blockading squadron, and not a vessel of i| would be anywhere near us ; of what ust would our forts bo. Wo must have t local fleet. The Russian Pacific Squadron has tlire* armoured aud six unarmoured ships. -Tin British Australian fleet has one armoured and six unarmoured ships. j The 81-ton muzzle-loader referred to in last week's notes is used a good deal In the navy, but not altogether. England has 305 guns afloat capable of penetrating ten to fifteen inches of unbacked iron 1 of thes« 300 are muzzle-loaders. A mu-zle-loadei duly mounted under armour is not in an} way inferior to a breech-loader of equal penetrating power similarly mounted. There may be a slower rate of fire with the muzzle-loader, if so it is of course at a disadvantage, this is not always the case. The advantage of a breech-loader Is not in comparative power when mounted and afloat, but in the saving it effects in spacfi and weight per inch, of its penetrating power. France has only 309 guns capable of pene« crating ten to fifteen inches. In t__ French navy the belt armour of forty ship* out of sixty-two does not exceed ten inches; in twenty-four ships it exceeds I fifteen. The English navy has in her ships belt armour not exceeding ten Loches to the proportion of forty-three to twentfnine exceeding ten inches. In sixteen cases the belt exceeds fifteen inches. The speed of the ship from which the guais fixed may of course greatly add to or detract from the value of the weapon. Not long ago the torpedo boat waste b. everything in naval warfare. It U —$ dropping out of favour. The failure d speed at sea is killing it. It cannot use its weapon unless it'g'fclose to the enemy. It is subject to <U- | struction by gunfire as It approaches, t_» | the longer it takes the more certain It i* to be destroyed in this way. The Australian Naval and XRltUtrf Gazette says: "Lord Wolseley is watching with interest the career of the MoonteRifles in Victoria. In converestion v*i~* the Victorian Minister of Defence hat \ month his Lordship stated that the efflrps carries out the very idea he has been so long trying to get adopted on a large _c_te in England." Through the reiterated alarms of the Bombay press we are told the qa__tfem<. the harbour defences of. that place M* come to the front. It Is pointed o_fc--& it is not from want of men that any of wtf Indian ports could be lost to an enenr?**" the danger would lie In deficient arm* ments. . ' ■ ■ It is not generally known that powerful Indian Navy. Indbon-enao* Navy of its own in the days ot W<& "Ferooz, w ' ,r ßent__ck,"" "Coromand-^, *» Bat that service was done away w__ , *w» the service now known as baJaSs vernment ____■___—a rather vague t»*T regulated by the Secretary of S£» for India, aided by the fflfl&g department of the India "««" and by the Supreme Government » n ***2 This service is not as its title mlgM J<**j one to suppose, thai of soldiers fle****-'" board ship, but it is for all purpo^ v Indian Navy. There are clock.***"**J* Bombay and Calcutta. The fie** «£ sLsts of 49 vessels, divided as follow si-£ sea-going, about 13,000 tons; I™*ftZ river vessels, about 1800 tons ;5 i tons; 7 taxret, torpedo, I vessels, 10,000 tons, 18 mattstofP™ I launches, __a, 800 tons. Then I from the .Royal Navy .are 1 with __c >dian Marine. The a § Lascars. »In time of war,, the nam* » Marine would come under the *oh**** g of the Royal Navy. The Berriee to ****** | suppression of piracy, transport <* ¥?**£ '■ and acting as police of those partsc* *-***•- g aeanot readied by the R. -_____. || "In the French army **• * J iff staffs, and axe now regularly ,| They wear big- -akle-j-ck § trowsera, artUlery jackets, **«» I |guis*iL_«b-a--A«L-outhcar-n. I armed with revolver in | 'sling. They are paid five I with allowances for wear M ! clo-hes and v_Mc-es, and they ****&> M | to choose-any type of eyrie. M 1 __he cy-lfa*, section 1 lions in Eiwlandjon-tofc- oj "• ""J § two non-commhaioneA §f

!__' «__ selected are from I- to 25, from ***_ •__?_*?aTpronouaced med-caDy fit, They are required „. bTKOOdm-rk-rnci.. and to poas-M a - > L*l& f tetogn-phy or army afgnai'S. and ot surveying or drawing. The : n_-cc is given to rear-drmng safety «"- JSZ fa »« <xrries a rifl ! l ,uns °° Sftecl-- and tools, and he must knowledge of construction, and Se to execute simple repairs. lbs corresponds as closely as possible to his battalion. -Kith regard to the possible shelling of * rhristchurcb from off New Brighton, I ate that the forty-ton guns with which -JLBussian men-of-war are supplied are throwing a shell 18 miles. -- it the trial of the forty-ton gun at '«ae__ess a shell was thrown from that Ijjjje. to Shoebury—eighteen miles. No to say more on this point.