The Press. TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10,1878.

Press, Volume XXX, Issue 4094, 10 September 1878, Page 2

The Press. TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10,1878.

The English Protectorate over the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey is a matter of such importance, and has lately been brought so prominently forward, that it will be well to review the causes and coneeqnences of the arrangement. „., The obligations of England all over the world were, even previous to the Convention, so vast.that it must have been clear to every one that it was moeir undesirable to add to them. Our stores of men and wealth, though large, are not inexhaustible. Setting apart altogether the responsibilities of the Empire with regard to Canada, the Australias, the Cape, and other colonies, it is obvious that it must require enormous exertions on the part of a nation numbering about thirty-two millions to rule satisfactorily over and guard from external enemies, a nation of 200 millions, living, as do our Indian subjects, at a great distance and in a i climate unsuited to permanent European settlement, But, as a well considered article in the Times has recently put it, the question is not whether in itself it was desirable either to annex Cyprus or to guarantee the integrity of Asiatic Turkey, but whether we could practically avoid, sooner or later, some such responsibility, and whether consequently we have in fact taken upon ourselves any greater obligation than potentially attached to us before. It must be taken into consideration that the Convention only came into force conditionally on Russia being placed in possession of Batoum, Kara, and Ardahan. Had not Russia elected to occupy this territory, the Convention would have remained a dead letter. Lord Beaconsfield, who started for Berlin with the instrument in his pocket, would in all probability not have allowed it to see the light of day. But with the Muscovite occupation, England was forced to make a new start, and to consider its position from an entirely fresh point of view.

What would he the "probable effect of Russia gaining such a foothold in .Asiatic Turkey if unchecked by any counter movement on the part of England, was well pointed out by Lord Salisbury in a despatch to Sir Austen Layard. It would, he argued, tend to create, a sense of the instability of the Ottoman Power throughout the • populations of Syria, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia. Even if the new Russian acquisitions were not intentionally used as a base for fnrther intrigue, their, mere retention would exercise a powerful influence in disintegrating the Asiatic dominions of the Porte. In plain words the Czar would begin to be recognised as the natural heir to the Sultan's authority. "It is," continued Lord Salisbury, "impossible for Her " Majesty's Government ;to accept, ' ; without making an effort to avert it, " the effect which" such* state of feeling " would produce upon regions whose po- " litical condition deeply concerns the " Oriental interests of Great Britain." It is impossible to deny that Lord Salisbury's argument is based on fact. All parties agree that the Turkish rule in Asia Minor, would, if left to itself, infallibly decay; and in such a case, even if Russia were not possessed of the ambitious instincts with which she |is credited, she would find herself almost compelled, in the interests of humanity and civilisation, to interfere in the affairs of a neighbouring state where misrule and disorganisation were the order of the day; therefore, unless Great Britain were prepared to see Russia dominant in Asia Minor and the Euphrates valley, she was compelled to make a forward -movement; At the same time, the susceptibilities of other nations, and the engagements entered into by former treaties, had-to be taken into consideration. ■ ! ;The vantage points from which England could watoh most conveniently the affairs of Asia Minor, and those of the JEJastern Mediterranean in general, were the Dardanelles, Egypt, Syria, Mitylene, or Cyprus. It appeared necessary that-one of these positions should be occupied by tile British Government. But the- Dardanelles was barred by' treaty; ~to have taken Egypt or Syria would have offended France; and sou practically the choice Was limited to. Mitylene or Cyprus, and, wisely no doubt, .the the Government chose Cyprus. - "Its. occupation interfered with no previ6ußjtreaties, but was a purely private! arrangement between the --imW Great Britain. As a further securijby: ; . England guaranteed the integrity of Asia Tifinor! to the Sultan, provided that he would mtrpduce. such reforms- as would/;.deprive Russia of any excuse for interference in the affairs of its neighbour. On this condition alone did the Government consent to protect the sick iman'against his' powerful enemy. And it has in consequence naturally devolved' upon ' the to see fihat tie bargain shall not end in such a fiasco as followed the treaty of 1856, when'the same promise? we re-made, but with no intention whatever ofitheir being carried into effect Hence the late telegrams to the effect that European aid will be called in as an efficient means for the better regulation of the provinces and for the prevention of new disasters. Italy and the Republican and Ultramontane organs in France stormed at the new arrangements, but, as in the case of the purchase of the Suez canal, it will soon be found that England has not made a forward movement with any intention of aggrandisement, but on principles of pure self-preservation. So much for ihe causes that led to the convention.

With regard to the consequences, we are at present in possession of so few facts that we cannot say for certain what are the details of the scheme, much less profess to prophesy what will be the more general results that will be the consequence of so radical a change in the position of the Empire in the East. High authorities hare expressed a hope that it may be a temporary civil tutelage, and not a permanent military occupation. Panaceas for the cure of the existing chaos are pouring in. Sir George Campbell has laid down plane by which, the various populations of Asia Minor might, where possible, be allowed to manage their own local affairs. For instance, in distrieta where Kurds, Maronites, Armenians, or Greeks formed almost exclusively the respective populations, there these \ people might severally be permitted to exercise local powers, regulated in; matters of general interestT>y a central authority; and even where such an arrangement was impracticable, on account of the mixed nature of the population of any place, that as much. prominence as possible shonld be given to j the question of nationality—in fact,

that a species of West Asian federation should be founded. The difficulty of carrying such a plan into effect of course lies in the facl that although the various peoples tinder the Turkish rule have for centuries been under one Government, yet their views and individual aims are almost as diverse and hostile as when they were first conquered by die Turks. One thing, however, is certain, that the first step towards reform will be to break up the dominant clique of Turkish Pashas who have so long abused their authority, and whose power ias rested, not on claims of superiorintelli- , gence, but on, back.... stairs influence . and harem intrigues. Luckily the liberal party in Turkey will be most willing to meet the English Government in its ! efforts in this direction, and the reptrt just received by telegram that Midlat Pasha, the head of that party, is about to be appointed Governor General of Atia Minor is one of good augury. It may certainly be a strain on the magnanimity of the liberal Tnrt to acquiesce in aiy arrangement which may tend to oust iis nation from the hitherto exclusive position which it has held, but it is to be hoped that, as presumably we are in Abia Minor with no intention of pennamnt occupation, but with merely the view of setting matters straight and establishing a permanent and well regulated Government, we may have the support of ihe most enlightened section of the nation. If they consent to work with us as a body the task will be much lightened, and there will be a fair prospect of bringing to a happy termination an experimert which the exigencies of an exceptionil position alone can justify. Should they be willing to waive the extreme pretensions of a dominant sect, and to work amicably with European, Armenian, and Greek, in fine should they recognise thfit their duty to the State is one affair, and that their duty toward Mohomet is quite another matter, a most invaluable point will have been gained, for it will then have become possible for a Turk to be truly patriotic in the widest sense of the term.