The Press. TUESDAY, APRIL 27, 1869.

Press, Volume XIV, Issue 1882, 27 April 1869, Page 2

The Press. TUESDAY, APRIL 27, 1869.

Tae latest news from the North— which will not, we think, take any one by surprise—is that almost immediately on the departure of Colonel Whitmore for the East Coast Titokowaru has again made his appearance, none the worse for recent mishaps, and is moving down upon the districts from which he has been expelled at the head of a force said to number 500 men. He is expected to occupy Waitotara, in which case Patea will be again abandoned. Really, if it were not for the important consequences involved, the way in which the war is carried on would be exquisitely diverting. It is a perfect game at hide and seek, with the advantage to the hiders that they can never be caught, since if the colonial troops do have the luck to surprise a fortified pa in the middle of the bush, by a strange coincidence the occupante turn out to be devotedly loyal. The combatants advance and retire like the man and woman. iiL one

of those old-fashioned contrivances for showing the state of the weather. Enter colonial forces, exeunt Maoris. The Hauhausgo before, the Constabulary follow after j presently the Constabulary are wanted elsewhere, and no sooner are they off the scene, than, Westo, the Hauhaus are back again, lhe story of a campaign might be told atter the J ihatiner of the stage direc-

tions in Shakespeare's Henry VI. " Scene—the West Coast. En<Vr C. 1 Whitmore, with his forces, inarching. Alarums. Excursions. JSxit Titokowaru." And bo on, with variatioue. But there is no sign yet of the closing scene being at liand. All this might be very excellent comedy if it were played gratia; but unfortunately the colony has to pay for it at the rate, so says report, of £1000 a day. Nor does there seem any prospect of the performance coming to an end. For anything we can tell to the contrary it may go on ad infinitvm. Colonel "Whitmore may succeed in driving back Te Kooti (or his successor, if Tβ Kooti is really dead), but meanwhile Titokowaru will have it all his own way on the West Coast. When Colonel Whitmore returns to repel Titokowaru, Te Kooti in his turn will get the upper hand in the East.

This cannot be allowed to continue, j At the present rate of progress the war may go on for ever. We have now been fighting for some nine months, and seem no nearer a conclusion than when we began. No sooner is the enemy repulsed in one quarter \ than he breaks out in another. It is plain that there must be a complete alteration of system. The Q-overn-ment must understand that there are two distinct seats of disturbance in the North Island, and must take their measures accordingly. The East and West Coasts muet be placed under separate commands, and operations carried on on both sides simultaneously. There need be no difficulty about doing this. The men are ready and the leaders. We believe that the reinstatement of Mr McLean as General Government Agent, with full power to employ at discretion the native allies and whatever European force the Government could place at his disposal, would be the first step to a complete suppression of insurrection on the East Coast. Without any disparagement to Colonel Whitmore, whose services to the colony we gladly acknowledge, there is no man in New Zealand who, from local experience, intimate acquaintance with the natives, the confidence reposed in him both by the settlers and the Maoris, and tried administrative ability, can advance any claim whatever in comparison with those of Mr. McLean to be entrusted with the charge of affairs on that side of the island. If the entire management of the war on the East Coast were committed to Mr McLean, and Colonel Whitmore left free to operate against Titokowaru and the Ngatimaniapotos who are said to be assembled in force in the Upper Waitara, the enemy would be encountered on both his strongest points at once, blows would be dealt right and left full upon the centres of rebellion, and any success could be followed up unremittingly. The present desolutory step of warfare, in which the field is continually being changed, an advantage here balanced by a reverse there, and no advantage pushed home, would be exchanged for one which would be sharp, short, and decisive. It appears to us the simplest and yet the niost effective disposition of the colonial forces that could possibly be made.