PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE IN VICTORIA.

Press, Volume XII, Issue 1614, 10 January 1868, Page 3

PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE IN VICTORIA.

The Saturday Review in an article on the contest still going on between the two Houses of the Victorian Legislature, makes the following remarks on the propriety of allowing the Upper House to have equal powers with the Lower in dealing with the Bills:— Up to the present time the difficulty probably continues, along with the con-

troversy to whicb-it has given rise.- It was not to be expected that the exercise ot an obje'timable power would be unquestioned, and the crisis has been fruitful in protests, remonstrances, and discussions. The constitution of the Colonial is founded on the model of the Imperial Parliament. The privileges of tho Assembly are identical with those of the House of Commons, while the powers of the Council are assimilated to those of the llou-<e of Lords. It is contended by the opponents of the Council that, as by the Bullish Constitution the House of Lords is forbidden to meddle with .-■ money bill which lias passed the Commons, so by the Colonial Constitution the Council is precluded from altering or rejecting any money bill which lias passed the Assembly. The protest of the minority of the Council against the vote of the majority distinctly alleges, " That the right possessed by the Legislative Council to reject such a bill is of the same character as the right of the House of Lords to reject a General Appropriation Bill, and of the Crown to veto the same, being a right that has never been exercised, by the House of Lords or by the Crown, at any period of British history." Yet it is quite easy to conceive that this right has never been exercised, without going so far as to deny that it exists. It is not a priori very likely that the Lords would reject any money bill which the Commons had risked the obloquy of passing. Money has not always been so easy to get that the Chamber which has not tiie authority to impose takes should exercise the power of remitting them. But although the Peers have never shown the disposition to wield this power, it is theirs by the recorded admission of the Commons. In a conference of 1671 they distinctly declared, " Your Lordships have a negative to the whole." And on another occasion it was acknowledged that " The Lords may pass or reject all, without diminution or alteration, or modification, not to rejection in toto. And this objection is confined to those which are exclusively financial in their character; that is, which impose or remit taxes, and do nothing else. Viewed, then, in reference to domestic precedent, the proceeding of the Colonial Council has not been unconstitutional. It has been unusual, and irregular, aud inexpedient. It has caused confusion and embarrasment in the colony, but to an infinitely less degree than a similar preceding on the part of our House o*' Lords would do here. The very magnitude of the inconvenience may insure its remedy. It is difficult to imagine that a sense of common interests will not induce the two Chambers to reconsider their differences, and agree in passing a bill equally demanded by the honour and the interests of Victoria. External circumstances favour such a reconcilation. The descent of the Duke of Edinburgh on the colony may perhaps afford the required deus ex machina, and unite all parties in loyal harmony. But supposing this done, and done quietly, another question still remains. Is it desirable that this strange demarcation of priveliges between the two Chambers should still exist? Why should not the Council and tbe Assembly have co-ordinate and coequal powers in passing or rejecting money bills ? The objections to the recognition of such a principle in England are founded on traditions handed down for ages most dissimilar to our own; but even in England they are becoming fainter every year. The taxes are theoretically considered a free gift of the Commons alone; and " the concurrence of the Peers and the Crown is only necessary to clothe it with a legal form." This maxim evidently bears the traces of an epoch when the Commonalty and the Barons voted their subsidies in different bodies and at different times. Nowadays the taxes which the Com mons impose, they impose upon Lords and Commons alike. Lords and Commons are equally concerned in their grant or their refusal. There is no reason, distinct from prejudice and sentiment, which is opposed to the interference of the Lords with money bills; and there is infinitely less ground of opposition to the interference of a Colonial Council with the money bills of a Colonial Assembly. In the Colonies there are no special and historical associations connected with either Chamber. The second Chamber is created to prevent undue and hasty legislation, and to aid mature and considerate legislation. It might as well, and as reasonably discharge this duty in the matter of a money bill as of any other. In fact, there are few money bills which do •not more or less involve questions of general policy, interesting to both branches of the Legislature. Thus, its express function would often be most beneficially fulfilled by the amendment and modification of in bills which, either incidentally or exclusively, provide grants of money. Such an interposition would be wholly in accordance with the general purposes of a Colonial Council, while the objection founded on its professed resemblance to the House of Peers only serves to bring out more strongly its essential dissimilarity, and to show the absurdity of the parallel. No colonist ever did or ever could see any resemblance between his Council and the English House of Lords. No Colonist will ever recognise any just reason for assigning to one Chamber, less powers than are possessed by the other. In a word, there is very little to'say against the Council's dealing with money bills, except that the Council is supposed to be a quasi House of Lords, and that m England the House of Lords is not allowed to deal with them. But if we were asked why the House of Lords should labour under this incapacity, we nnd ourselves unable to give a satisfactory reply; nor, if we look to the best and latest authority on the subject—the Resolutions of the Commons on the famous rejection of their Paper Duties Bill—do we find any argument stronger than the persistent assertion of a desply-rooted and traditional jealousy.