NAPOLEON'S LAST EXPERIMENT.

Press, Volume XI, Issue 1369, 28 March 1867, Page 3

NAPOLEON'S LAST EXPERIMENT.

[From the " Economist," January 26.] English opinion, and, for that matter, French opinion, too, is apt to be a little unfair to the Emperor of the French upon one point. It always judges his constitutional decrees as if they were efforts towards the revival of Parliamentary life. Now, although the world is still, after fifteen years of experience, very much in the dark about the Emperor's character —which puzzles even statesmen about his person —one, at least, of his convictions has become sufficiently clear. He does not like Parliamentary government, and has no intention whatever of bestowing it upon France. On the other hand, he does like liberty as he interprets it, and would, if he and his regime were once accepted, grant it in considerable measure; would, for example, concede absolutely free speech both to the Chamber and to society, provided such speech were not likely to break up his own power. No position would, probably, gratify him more than that of the Viceroy of India, who, surrounded by men absolutely free, and criticised by a Press almost without restraints, is, nevertheless, in politics, absolute as a Czar, irremovable, irresistible, and by the singular accidents of his posii tion, beyond the range even of the assassin's knife. It is towards such a position, not towards Parliamentary government, that the Emperor struggles, possibly from selfishness, possibly, also, from a genuine political conviction, shared by many thinkers who have no hope of thi'oues, that the evils of Parliamentary government, more especially its enormous waste of energy and time, overbalance its advantages ; that -epinion can be consulted without elections ; that, as Mr Disraeli once put it, an individual can represent a nation as well an an elected body. At all events, he believes he individually can, and is determined, therefore, to preserve the individual authority, with which a Parliamentary system is necessarily incompatible. The essence of that system is Ministerial responsibility, and the instant Ministerial responsibility begins, Cassarism ends. The Emperor does not intend it to end, and is rather afraid that discussion may end it, and therefore halts between two contradictory wishes, —a desire to give liberty as he understands it, and a desire to restrict freedom as members of Parliament consider freedom should be interpreted.

This contradiction is apparent in every line of the decree of the 19th January. By that decree, the Emperor stifles the most genuine expression of Parliamentary opinion,—the debate on the address. This debate always became a regular motion of censure, having for its object to force the Emperor into a change of policy, —to make Parliament, in fact, the ultimate ruler. It was probable that this year the debate would be more substantial than ever, the Opposition having been greatly strengthened by the plan for re-organising the army, — which, we are told, for reasons connected with promotion, is unpopular even with the army ; —and greatly irritated by recent events both in Mexico and Germany. In Mexico, the French have retreated before the Americans, and the French, though entirely indisposed to a war with the Union, are, at the same time, keenly sensitive to the humiliations

which the situation has rendera it necessary to endure. In Germany on the other hand, they think Napoleor has been out-manoeuvred, and, a; success is on the Continent the test o political skill, they are annoyed a 1 what seems to them to have been i needless failure. The debate might under such circumstances, become a Parliamentary indictment, and the Emperor has, accordingly, prohibited it, substituting the right' of interpellation. This substitute, which appears to be a little misunderstood even in France, really amounts to this. When the Government pleases, debates upon any subject may be sharper, more direct, more varied than before, an interpellation often involving a discussion ; but when it does not please, debate will either be at an end, or be confined to dry question and ; answer. The Emperor has not stopped debate, but has taken the right of stopping it whenever it threatens to assume what he would consider too grandiose a form —that is has become Parliamentary. The mode of stopping it is to use the committees, which are of course, selected from the majority, which discuss in secret, and which can stop the interpellation by refusing their consent. Of coarse, if the Emperor lost his majority, this instrument would break in his hand ; but in that event he would probably resume, by decree, the privileges which a decree has conceded. In practice, we have little doubt debate will be more lively than before, "but will steer clear of a few very important topics, such as the feeling of the French army employed in Mexico. ' '

Oil the other hand, the Emperor promises to relieve the Press from the exceptional laws which enable the Government at any moment to suppress any newspaper, aud to punish offences of the Press only through the judges in the first instance, or, as they are commonly called correctional tribunals. These judges are usually either old men longing for " good service pensions," which are grauted at discretion by the executive, or young men hoping for promotion. They are not barristers, as in England, but members of the administrative service, and it is said that since 1852.they have scarcely ever acquitted a political prisoner. Unfettered by juries, they can give summary punishment up to five years' imprisonment,"and the French are apt to regard them as mere servants of the police. Their proceedings, however, are public— subject to certain limitations on the right of reporting—and unless strongly pressed, it will be very inconvenient to them to harass excessively men among whom and with whom they must live. A regular prosecution , requires time, during which an irritable Minister may consider himself; and it is more than probable that. in Paris, the Press will Gnd itself more free, while in the provinces it will be relieved, to a great extent, from the most galling of all its restrictions, the virtual censorship exercised by the Prefects, who are very apt to entertain the regular official feeling that a criticism is an attack. The decree, therefore, while it restricts the Parliamentarism the Emperor dislikes, does something towards extending the liberty he desires. The third change effected by the decree is a curious one, and may have results not originally intended. We suspect its original motive was to get rid of a Premiership which began to be too efficacious, but the effect may not be that only. Under the existing system, France is governed like England, departraentally, each Minister being absolute in his own bureau, and responsible only to his Sovereign. Hut all the departments were represented in the Chamber on grave occasions by one man, the Minister of Staff-, M. Rouher, who thus became a sort of Premier, with authority to interfere everywhere, which authority it was often necessary to exercise. This arrangement tended to make one man a necessity/ an arrangement far too Parliamentary for the Emperor, who, accordingly, broke it up. Each Minister can now, if permitted, defend his Ministry, and M. Kouher's resignation would not throw the machine out of gear. To effect his end, the Emperor has, however, run the formidable risk that each Minister may look to Parliament as well as to himself, and may, for his own protection against attacks in the Chamber, feel inclined to combine with other Ministers, thus creating a true though informal Parliamentary authority. Should any cause weaken the Emperor's personal authority over all departments, or should hia intermittent fits of indifference become more frequent, this would probably be the case, but, at present, the innovation makes only one difference. It will be very difficult to place a man who cannot debate at the head of a great bureau, and debaters are not very common among the followers of the Emperor. The junction of the Ministry of State with that of Finance, is, probably, a momentary expedient for getting rid of M. Fould, of whom the Emperor is apparently weary. The public in Paris thinks M. Fould was too economical, but we believe this is a delusion, M. Fould being just as ready to obey his master as any other member of the Cabinet, and only economical as every Chancellor of the Exchequer feels inclined to be. "We have never been able to perceive either in his speeches or his acts any special genius for finance, and M. Eouher or M. Magne will, probably, carry on the work of the department at least as well, —the truth being, that as there is little intention of taking off taxes and great fear of laying them on, the Imperial regime scarcely admits of a financier who shall be more than an expert administrator and accountant. It is possible that M. Eouher was wanted to defend a large loan in the Chamber ; but it is extremely unlikely, one object very dear to the Emperor being to raise the price of rente. With French Three per Cents, at 69, while English Three per Cents, are 90, he can never feel that the public has a etrong faith in the security- of his regime,