NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS.

Press, Volume IX, Issue 1082, 27 April 1866, Page 3

NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS.

[From the " Times," February 23.] The papers promised by the Boyal Speech on "the present state of New Zealand " have been already laid betore Parliament, and Parliament, we venture to say, has seldom been favored with information more complete or more decisive. We shall be excused, we hope, if we promise that the remarks we have offered from time to time on this subject will be fouud absolutely verified by the documents now published; but the whole narrative, as here detailed by the very actors'themselves, is so edifying that replace it clearly before the country, once for all, on the authority of the two Governments actually concerned. gome time ago the Government of New Zealand conceived " a policy." It was a new policy, adopted by a new Ministry, and communicated to the Home Government as the opening of a new era in the history of the colony. It consisted, briefly, in a claim to eelf-government on condition of selfdefence. Creditable as this resolution was to the colonial authorities, it had not been conceived simply in the lerenity of unclouded and disinterested wisdom. The Government and people of the colony had discovered that if they depended on an Imperial army for protection they must expect this army to be employed according to Imperial instructions, in opposition, perhaps, to their own views; and they had learnt also this farther lesson—that they must contribute to the maintenance of the force itself. Quickened by the convictions thus communicated, they resolved upon a policy of independence, and no sooner was it entertained than the most irresistible reasons were found for its justification. " Ministers," as these authorities state in a memorandum of their own, "are of opinion that the province of Auckland, for instance, having & population of about 37,000 European inhabitants, besides a very large proportion of friendly Natives, ought to be in a position to ward off any attack from the comparatively small and badly armed force which might be brought against it. They are aware that disasters to settlers in exposed positions may at times occur, but such disasters hare not been prevented by Imperial armies, nor could they were those forces doubled." In pursuance, therefore, of these most eeaable views, the Colonial Ministry proposed to establish an armed constabulary force capable of occupying dekatmn outposts, and to support this fcrte, when requisite, by Volunteer Corps and friendly Natives. They fubmitted that "aforce of the nature proposed has been proved to be Here effective fbr the special purposes required in New Zealand than large armies organised with a view to European warfare. Such a force, at lout, may, it is hoped be within the reach of the colony. The poaseenoa of it would entail no liability to interference in the management of our internal affairs, while, on the other hand, New Zealand has neither the means nor the desire to retain an Imperial army." Nothing could be plainer than the wisdom of thfiae opinions, which it is superfluous to add, found a ready echo in the opinions of Ministers at home. Accordingly our Colonial Secretary sent instructions to New Zealand for the withdrawal of five out of the ten regiments stationed in the colony, and for goeh. arrangements as would facilitate at no distant period the recall of tiie rest At this point, however, occurred one of tfce moat notable hitches in the exeeotion of the design. It was only an unavoidable incident of our colonial •yeten that the requisite orders had to be sent out with a qualification. If *c undertake to govern a country 20,000 miles off by directions from •ome, we must make allowance for poeibleeventa between the despatch and weeipt of instructions. It was conceivthat when these orders reached New fetind, the reduction of the army ■%bt,hythe occurrences of the interyeßiogsjx months, have been rendered ™J?we6»ble, and Sir Duncan therefore, the Commander-in-l!!!r ***^ m P e^a l forces, received, g^P^*,&P instruotione to send the Vβ Battalions home, a discretionary P°*w to detain them. Now, it hapP*wtfcat at this critical conjuncture, ?**&S,OOQ British troops might either teOßtarked for England or employed S*J»TK» in the colony, the New 7™* Government had obtained '"■"wable successes against the "■**jyi fa insurrection; but these :?**eies had been confined to a parj*«ar district. South of that dis*J* the Natives were still in arms, *«* uweed, threatening from a pecu«wj strong pa, or fortress, an im- £"*»* portion of the settlement. Grey, therefore, the Gov. *** «*»y, proposed to Genthat he should delay the Er? lre ' °* tta troops, and employ rj*m decisive and final operations Jgg* this pah and the rebels m it* £TO General Cameron refused, rjJHgms refusal on ground* which W P* , * l * Proved insufficient, fH***- He doubted whether operations proposed would be so jjTorsosuccessful as the Governor *»* eT en thought that more might ensue from a w which the Natives, if make M dearly Though allowances must eo ££*fcr changee of eeaaon and cirlteee .«>B almost certain "* » these Tiewß the General's cir-

cumspection was excessive, inasmuch as the very pa in question was afterwards taken with no great difficulty. Onthe other hand, as it was taken by the colonial forces, it is clear that Sir George Grey need not have made his requisisition for the retention of the troops, but the motives by which the General was otherwise actuated were both strong and rational. It was his duty to carry out the policy of the Imperial Government, and this policy he knew to consist in repressing needless expeditions, in discountenancing aggressive warfare, in opposing any rash extension of the settlement, especially in the direction indicated, and generally in abstaining from any operations which might commit the colony to further hostilities, and so retard the departure of the Imperial army. In these views he appears to have met with the approbation of his superiors, but the results on the spot were singularly and almost ludicrously mischievous. Sir George Grey could put such a stress on the Commander-in-Chief as would compel him to retain the troops; but the Commander-in-Chief could keep the troops so inactive that, for all the good they did, they might as well be on the high seas. The upshot was a quarrel between these two authorities, degenerating into a bitter and even violent correspondence, which both parties by this time must sufficiently regret. It is plain from the papers before us that more is to be said for the " forced inaction" ascribed by Sir George Grey to the British army under General Cameron's command than was at one time imagined; or, perhaps, we should rather put the case this way — that General Cameron had, for what he did, or left undone, more authority than was supposed. The great and very laudable object of the Home Government was to withdraw the army from New,. Zealand altogether, and to leave the colony to its own military resources. But this could obviously be done only at a period of peace ; and, therefore, the Commander-in-Chief was instructed to discourage all operations which might have the effect of extending or protracting the war. Sir George Grey and his Ministers thought the time was come for a decisive advance and a final blow, but it was excusable in the Commander-in-Chief to be incredulous about any finality in New Zealand wars. He saw that one insurgent tribe was conquered, at any rate for a time; and that another, which Sir George wished to attack, was inactive at the moment, and might continue so unless assailed. As to the prospects of the assault, he regarded them as very uncertain, and was, therefore, loth to engage the troops in any new expedition which might retard or destroy the consummation desired by his superiors. That he was guided in these views by the experience of previous failures, for which he or his system was responsible, is no doubt true. Had the organisation and traditions of a regular army been more favorable to success in bush fighting, the General need not have been so distrustful of another campaign in the bush ; but as things really stood, and as they had gone for some time, it is impossible to deny that he had some reason in shrinking from an expedition which might be the commencement of a new war. Meanwhile, however, the military and political deadlock had, at least, this happy effect —that ife brought about insensibly the conclusions most desired, "While Mr. Cardwell was representing it as " painfully evident that two campaigns have been more than enough of a contest in which 10,000 of the Queen's troops, aided by a colonial force sometimes nearly equal in number, have been engaged in war against a body of Natives never exceeding 2,000 in number at one time;" and while Sir George Grey was recording, with " all feelings of respect for the gallant British army " in the colony, that " its forced inaction rendered it a source of weakness," and " rather retarded than

promoted that peace " which it wished to establish, —while all this was going on, the colony was organising its Volunteers, and the Volunteers were taking pa after pa, and making short work of the war. In brief, the " present state of New Zealand," after all these troubles, is by no means unfatisfactory, and we hope that the plain moral of so interesting a story will be boldly and extensively applied.