BACKGROUND OF WAR

Bay of Plenty Beacon, Volume 3, Issue 286, 24 March 1941, Page 8

BACKGROUND OF WAR

SEA COMMERCE RAIDERS ENEMY'S LACK OF BASES Tlic destruction in Iho Indian Ocean by H.M.S. Leander of a fast Italian commevcc raider can be accepted as a sequel to the recent occupation by British troops of the ports of Italian Somaliland. The capture of Kismayu and Mogandishu deprived not only Italian, but also German commerce raiders of any base on tlio western side of the Indian Ocean. The only ports now* remaining in Italian possession on the African coast are Masisawa and one or two minor harbours in the Red Sea and their early capture is noAv particularly a foregone conclusion. The unhappy and forlorn position of Italy in the Mediterranean is yet another proof that the arm of sea power of a nation stretches precisely so far, standing by itself, as its ships can conduct the operations of sea warfare from the harbours and bases under its own controls

Germany's overseas operations in the Avar of 1914-18 were hampered largely by her lack or loss of bases. It was a matter of a few months before all her cruisers at large in the outer seas were hunted down and destroyed.. Merchant ships fitted out and armed as commerce raiders had a limited success. The most successful were the Moewe, which made tAvo cruises down, the Atlantic, sank some 20,000 tons of shipping and laid a minefield in which a British battleship was lost; and the Wolf, Avhich in a cruise of 64,000 miles lasting 451 days, sank 120,000 .tons of shipping.

Germany to-day possesses no overseas bases, and she had no cruisers abroad when the war started. The inglorious Admiral Graf Spee, of which so much was expected, had a brief career as a commerce raider. Attacks on convoys in the North Atlantic have indicated that other German warships have been out and about in a furtive manner.

Contrary to a widespread popular belief, however, depredations by enemy "surface" raiders, whether cruisers or converted merchant ships, during the present war, have been considerably less in respect of the numbers of ships, and the total volume of tonnage destroyed, than was the case in 1914-18.

A deficiency of bases may be sup~« pliccl if a nation is acting with an ally who possesses adequate ports, suitably situated. Thus, it is now known that German raiders in the Indian Ocean made use of Italian Somaliland ports; and there is reason to believe that those operating in the Pacific have enjoyed facilities made available by one of the Axis partners. It is notable that all the enemy raiders reported in recent months have been oil-engined ships of long fuel endurance.

On the other hand we are apt to forget how greatly the existence of an almost übiquitous British Empire contributes to the task of affording security to our sea-borne trade. If there were no friendly harbours in Australia or New Zealand, in Canada or Africa, in the Mediterranean or the Middle feast/ or the Far East—but these were neutral States taking precise andl strict views as to their obligations as neutrals; if there had been no establishment outside Great Britain where, ships could repair or refit beyond limits of time which international law permits, we should realise that overseas possessions are an integral element in sea power.

Germany's threat to British seaborne trade is great and serious; but up to the present it has been far, far less effective than Britain's blockade of Europe and her virtually complete throttling of the overseas trade of Germany and Italy, t