Swedish Gullet In Nazi Clutch

Bay of Plenty Times, Volume LXVIII, Issue 13026, 3 May 1940, Page 7

Swedish Gullet In Nazi Clutch

resolved to invade di( i what might have Id in the circumstances: eXP the natural bridge bea ' S L« and the great north- <■* writes B. C. B. Mar!:ri Editor. : t „ral bridge is Denmark, T"' at n ‘ ,„ te gurender was of a she imd fol ' ««-* I,olicy 01 ° l ’ e " i?* cd nt weakness, desman regarded it as hope--11 ;; ‘ s 10 lin Europe as the conn:fff S"pra ctically neglocted t 0 : ' irnl ' -tidily she accepted German H ° ff Is illustrated after .he largest Danish newsff as compelled to sack its r 'editor for publishing a re- !° the Munich debate in the pon ( h House of Commons— because members bad criticised the "!! strength of a charming and .iltle nation o£ 3,700,000 1 sapped by the slump and uniZenlibyabarsh trade agree!!/which circumstances forced itltb Germany; by anting— the promotion of a movement among the Germans j i?ing in North Slesvfg and among t l,t Danish public. Their collapse was, therefore, the sJt ural climax of developments long recognised. Hitler’s assault was not directed against Denmark and Norway only, !n seizing Denmark he may be said to have aimed at making Sweden Us strategic prisoner. Let us look at the chains with which he hopes to hind Sweden. Down the years, Danish Helsingor, on the narrowest part of the Sound, looked across at Swedish Halsingborg, only two and a half miles away. Helsingor is in Germany to-day. A tiny water-jump of • two and a half miles is now the sole gap dividing the Reich, at one point, from King Gustav’s country. The new Germany .all but touches Sweden. The Swedish port normally most used, for North Sea and Atlantic trade is Goteborg, lying, of course, on the west coast.

II Is not situated on> the narrowest of the Dano-Swedish waters; nevertheless, it is so close to Denmark that German naval control of its trade—if the German Navy can operate anywhere—ought to be fairly simple. ■ ■ ■ 1 . ,

Denmark gives the Germans far more, however, than a wide control of Sweden’s western coast. The Danish Islands, blocking the south of the Baltic, leave only three slender channels for shipping to p'ass to and from Sweden’s long Baltic coastline. No northern Swedish outlet to the ! ea exists, except across invaded Norway; so that Sweden’s trade with the outside world, always very much Germany's mercy, now appears entirely so. Swedish . naval move3?nts - moreover, from east coast to *est and vice-versa must pass the G Maaa-Dariish gate.

k ever AW conditions ■ fit together to make possible the perfect cockade. They musf weigh like a ®°wtain of lead on , the policy voices that confront her.

*** mug t make up her mind her to wash her hands, of Nor'I s * ate ’ thereby rendering it for Hitler to put the last c Es to her encirclement. er Present declared intention is

I e .'^ bes disrupt the communiII % qi! uerman >' with Oslo across | Sweden may have to .‘oo, whether she will grant I t 0 tbe light of using I <:ir. sou for the passag ° f :itr ** war *Sear (big guns and passive equipment not suit- : ' or carriage by air).

Her present declared intention is to refuse a German demand, if made.

She will also have to say whether Hitler shall enjoy a monopoly now of the precious iron-ore mined chiefly in the north—the ore for which Hitler’s blast-furnaces are crying and the blast-furnaces of the Allies, too. On this question (at the moment of writing) no light has been thrown. The iron-ore line from Sweden to Narvik appears, however, to have been blocked, and it is through Narvik alone that the Allies can expect supplies.

It is evident that Germany may attack Sweden if the British Navy cuts the Reich off from Norway (as it is making a magnificent effort to do) and if Sweden furthermore persists in refusal to permit free passage to German forces.

Sweden will doubtless find courage if the Allies continue their successes in the north. Otherwise she is extremely liable to end by being compliant towards Germany.

Convinced that Hitler is on the eve of other onslaughts, and suspecting that the northern attack may be a feint, commentators have been concentrating once more on the peril to the Low Countries.

If Hitler’s plans lie in that direction, he seems more likely to strike at Holland alone than at Holland and Belgium, or Belgium alone. That is Decause possession of Holland would favour the development of a great air and sea offensive against Britain. The neutrality of Belgium—supposing that Belgium did remain neutral —-would form a barrier to keep the British and French armies in France from intervening. Holland and Belgium are not allied with each other, and the policy of the one in the event of an invasion of the other cannot be predicted. South-eastern Europe has been canvassed ag another possible offensive outlet for Hitler. Rather curiously, little has been said of Switzerland, in spite of the new anti-Allied campaign in the Italian Press.

It is worth, bearing in mind that if Mussolini ever decided on military co-operation with Hitler, the Gotthard railway, running adross Switzerland, might be indispensable. . The need squares with an old Italian desire (dating back long before the Great War) of acquiring the Italian-speaking Swiss canton of Ticino, through-which the southern branch of the Gotthard railway runs.