LIFTING THE LID.

Bruce Herald, Volume LV, Issue 62, 14 August 1919, Page 3

LIFTING THE LID.

TIE WORLD'S MOST CRITICAL ; ' i ■-MOMENTS. ;

INSIDE. bTORYOE THE LAST RETREAT.

• ■•'.'• Now that victory is ours, wc may look back with steady eyes at bad times when it was hard to know the truth and still keep faith and courage. •For tire British armies in France and Belgium, and for those who counted upon their strength, the darkest days of, all began in March of last year, when the Genwans launched their offensive against the British lines and drove us back in- hard! retreat over a great stretch of country which our .men had gained hy enormous sacrifice of life through years of fighting. I saw the scenes of that retreat, and 1 confess l now that, when I saw our liven coining back 1 over the old Somme battlefields', when I saw remnants of •our fiue divisions 1 so exhausted that they could hardly stand, and so weak iu numbers that they had no chance of resisting the enemy's, onslaught outside towns like Albert and Amiens, which had) been ours since Vthe early day? of the war, I was* haunted hy the thought that, ■ perhaps, after all our enormous efforts and losses, victory might not be ours. ~ England did) not ''know what touch-and-go it was on the edge of irreparable disaster. What were the causes of the greatest disaster that has ever befallen British arms? ** • The answer to that question, is not easy, because it involves many factors and events in the past history of the war. It is linked up with the battles of Flanders, fought .between July and December of 1917, followed by the adventure in the Camibrai salient, which- begun with a brilliant victory and ended with an unfortunate reverse at the close of the' year. Tho battles of Flanders had been designed to capture the ridges round Ypres and! gain the Belgian, coast at Ostend and Zee'brugge at a time when a great part -of the 'German army should be engaged by an' important and continuous series of -battles by the French in tho 'Champagne district under the: supreme command of General Nivelle. By- the greatest bad luck, partly owing to the successi of Hindenburg's new system of "elastic defence," the French attack did! not make progress, I and came to a dead halt, after heavy losses.

being replaced! ini many divisions 1 by new drafts, audi their strength was still further decreased' by the- loss of three of their finest divisions who were lushed off to Italy to tun*..the ticlfe. of the Italian disaster which had then happened. It was at that time, when, the British armies on the Western front were weakest, that Sir Douglas Haig was 1 called upon to take over a longer line of front south o$ St. Quentin, and it was at that time, in tire .'beginning of last year, that the Germans transferred! many of their divisions from' Russia to France and Belgium with the 'menace of an overwhelming attack upon' the British and Freu'ch lines (writes- Philip Gibbs ini Lloyds). The pressure upon Sir Douglas Haig to take over a- • longerfront was .insistent. Ho knew.'thei weakness of his strength with that German! .menace growing against him, 'but to satisfy France he yielded to the demandand our troops "side-slipped!" and took over' the. line of battle north and south of St. Quentin down to La Fere on. the Oise." Meanwhile the Gorman menace-was creeping nearer to us, and increasing in its frightful possibilities.-- In January there were 183 German.divisions on the Western front, about equal to tire ■Allied strength. 'By the beginning 'of '< Marclr there were 207 German divisions. During the weeks preceding the German onslaught, on March 21, I was about the lines from* Arras to the south of St. Quentin, against ' which the enemy's -assault was delivered, and had the opportunity of talking to many generals and officers about the probability of a huge German offensive. Out of 13 of these generals, commanding divisions upom which the attack would fall.if it came,. t'heTe were only two who believed in< its likelihood. The others saidl: "It is all bluff," or "G.H.Q. has the wind) up." Some of them standing as we talked in sight of the Geraisair lines, where there seemed to be utter solitude, and "rnc thing doing," except the usual harassing fire- from isolated batteries, were dogmatic in explaining to .me why the Germans would not risk their remaining .mam-power iiv such a gamble, which was bound! to fail". .... A few days later the tide of the German army had rolled over the positions which these general's had held.

800,000 'CASUALTIES. Th(T;British 'battles of Flanders began late, and British troops, instead of encountering an enemy who; should have been, heavily engaged at the same time opposite the French lines, had to attack the strongest- German divisions which- could 1 be replaced on -the orders of tire German Generar Staff by fresh liivisions from other parts of the line whenever they were shattered 'by the British assault. ■ . For nearly five months this haplened, our troops attacking and capuring the. ridges in the foulest condiions of rain- and mud, and, although we nflicted enormous losses upon the finest rdops of the German! army —I saw their lie-ad in heaps about the' "pill-boxes" or concrete blockhouses) on .the way o Passchendaele—our own casualties cached terrible figures, and we^f ailed o gain the Belgian coast. Lord! Northliffo's estimate was 800,000 casualties o the British armies in 1917, and 75 er cent, of those -were on the western ron-t. The adventure in the Cambrai salient i November of that year, when our irprise attack with tanks broke-the indenburg line, and when our gallant •oops after; all that fighting, in Flanjrs took. 90,000 prisoners and l much round, cost us - numbers of valuable ves a week later owing to the counter irprise by 'General van Marwitz, when lr men had" .to fight.'desperate reariard actions.-So at the end of 1917, ter all these bloody battles, the Brith' armies were terribly weakened in imbers, the gaps in their ranks not

AWAITING THE OFFENSIVE. ! A week or so 'before the opening of the 'German offensive I had an interview with 'General Gough, • commanding the Fifth Army, on the right of our Hive, througli which the enemy after : wards broke. He was not one. of those who disbelieved in the impending; attack, and) he was very frank in facing its possibilities. He showed an© maps of his Fifth Army front, pointed out how lie had adopted a system of defence by a -series of machine-gum redoubts in advance of the anain battle positions, and how behind that main battle line were three other lines upon which our men could fall 'back if hard pressed. Then he said: "If the enemy attacks ire great'strength we 'Shall have to give giovnd, and the public mustbe prepared for this. But the giving up of ground will not .matter very much so long as wo full 'back to other good positions and) 'keep our line intact. It will in no sense of the word .be a disaster.' After all, our natural line of defence is the 'River Sonnine. If we. had to lose that the situation would certainly he serious, but not e-ven then- a great 'disaster. . . . It would be a 'disaster' only if we lost our hold' on Amiens." MYSTERY BEHIND GERMAN LINES.

I am bound to say that these words made we feel) rather cold. The mere possibility of .losing the Sonwnei crossings so far behind our front at that time was' an awful thought, and the mention- of Amiens, 40 miles back from

the line, sent a shiver throught.one's• body. ... Wc waited with a dreadful apprehension! for the rolling up of the curtain- which, hid! the .mystery 'behind the; Germain lyres, arid we did! not have long to wait. The Freu'ch on our right were as ! fully aware of the monstrous concentration behind the enemy's front as our own Intelligence officers, but theyi we're convinced that at least half this weight would fall against themselves in the opening stage of the 'battle. It was a miscalculation. The full weight of the German blow was hurled against, the British lines -on- a 45 j mile' front, between 1 . Bullecourt, north of Bapaume, and La Fere, south of St. Quentin. That ground waa held' on the north by the Third British 'Army under General Sir .lulian. Byivg," and by the Fifth Army en'.the- south under General Sir Hubert Gough; and 48 British divisions' were attacked in the course of this offensive by 114 German divisions of.-pieked and, specially! trained storm troops.' AGAINST OVERWHELMING ODDS. They were overwhelming odds, and the luck of war was on their sidle at the beginning of the battles. Our new system of defence on: the Fifth Army front by which our front line was held •by a series of livachine.-g'Uiv redoubts in advance of the nwrin battle positions played into the. -hands- of the Germans' new method of attack, owing to the foggy weather in which the offensive opened. The enemy's new form, of assault, which they had first tried against the Italians with- startling success, was 'by what, is now known as "infiltration." That is to say, while they were attacking frontally under the cover of storms of high explosives and gas shells, • and feeling, for weaknesses in their f enemy's line, they widened any gap they might make, and dribbled through machine gunners of 'high skill and courage, with orders to penetrate as deeply as they could, and with the assurance that they would be folio wed and supported by a continuous chain of men also relying exclusively on •machine-gun fire. " So it happened that, although the greater part of our Third 'Army front held on to their trenches against the German .frontal attacks, which they met with a withering lire, causing immense slaughter in the enemy'-9 ranks, they 'found themselves under deadly machine-gun lire from their left and right flanks by bodies of .men who were driving wedges, them in cver-iix-rcasiiig numbers, which threatened to cut iiv behind them, aivd bar any way of escapeOn our Fifth Army front our system of redoubts, and the fog which enveloped them., so that our machine gunners could not see 20 yards ahead, made this method? of attack-easy. The British troops fought with enormous! heroism, and the ■German 1 dead lay in heaps before their lines, but this new method of attack surprised and con»fused them, and divisional -staffs were amazed -when they received. a;eportsi of the enemy having, broken through, to [ places behind our battle lines, or, as Uiappcned several times, gained their first 'knowledge' of this' danger by hearing the rattle of German machine-gun fire outside 'their huts.

The. garrisons of 'the forward redoubts had been quickly, overwhelmed, but many of them, fought to the death, as we know now. GENERAL- RETREAT ORDERED. By the end of 'that first day many British divisions had' 'been forced to give ground -and fall 'back to prevent theunselves being cut off. In the north the enemy hadi forced a. wed'ge between the 6th and 51-st 'divisions on the Third Army front, and was driving towards Bapaume. On the right of our line the Germans had broken through in several placesi between) the 30th and the 36th (Ulster); divisions and 'between the 14th and 58tii (London) divisions, near St. Quentin, amd were advancing on to Ham towards the crossings' of the Somrac. A general retreat was 'decided, with orders to'hold the line 'of the SoMime at all eosts. It was a difficult and tragic situa>tion for generals and staffs, as well as for (battalion officers amd men. All our well-ordered (machinery 'Of war was ! suddenly thrown into disorder like a watch which has lost its mainspring. The headquarters of armies, corps, and divisions were en the move like nomads who pitched! their cauips at night' and retreated 'hurriedly at dawn.'because a horde of barbarians was bearing down lip on them..' By this time the worst had happened. -In; spite of the help of. French cavalry •and the 'French 56th Division, which had

come to oui* aid at Guiscard,. wo-could J not stein l , the 'German tid'e y which was now im fulL.spate across our old'-battlo- • 'fields, and our 10 th 'Corps, with the 66th. and 1 24th 'divisions, with the 50t1 , ) 18th, ■and' St'h. supporting them, were', after fearful losses in rearguard action's, una'ble to hold the crossings of the Sonuine, and! tth enemyi passed over the fridges of St. Christ •and) Brie, which had not been iblown! up in time., . . ..Audi as General 'Gough tod •said, "If we lost the line of the Soinme the situation will j ! be serious. ; ' The way was •open- to Amiens, audi the only force that 'barred l the' way jwa-a.a miscellaneous, crowdl of, stragglers, collectedl under a brigadier 'named .Carey, from all those divisions which, had lo'st .most of their nienvin a fighting r'ptreat, .supplemented 'by clerks, orderlies, and signallers from' headquarters, and l , a< gallant section of Canadian armoured cars. ■lt•■.■was. " Carey te force" which •Amiens, in the days of greatest- peril 'Until the Australians came down from Flanders to strengthen our line and the French wished up to defend its southern approaches. I saw manyi scene's of that retreat from St. Quentin! to -Amiens, and from Bapaume to Albert and the 'AwcrC', and was in the midst of its turmoil and tragedy. They were terrible days,)' when all that <we had) 'gained seemedi lost. But even then: the courage of .our'men and the heroic, sacrifice of the rearguards, who fought to the death so- that the German onslaught should l 'be .cheeked, '■made one feel that England could mot ibe defeated!, whatever happened. It would! 'be a'bsurd to pretend; that our iineiii retreated always in good order, and that none of them were panicky when there were gaps in our line and Gewnang ons eaelr sidle of them. Panic there was here aiud) there among'--certain 'bodies of men, who fell ibaek too soon from positions they might have held for longer time. Contradictory orders were issued, .mistakes were unade by generals l and staff officers, the crossings of the So mine ■ were lost too easily—though, 'God' knows, 'many men diedl to hold them—and, if there had been more forethought in digging" trench systems and switch lines behind our ibattle positions the Germans, with all their weight of .me u", might never have driven' us back so far. "MY 'MEN ARE GLORIOUS."

The British Army was a human 'machine, audi a& such had; its weaknesses. But these English, Scottish, and' Irish hoops fought for the most part with high, grim courage, often in. isolated groups, standing amidst their dead and ■dying, and selling their own. lives 1 dearly, uivles'S surrounded and: captured.. "My men are glorious," saidla general of Yorkshire- troops; "'but so' tired that being attacked is l the only thing that keeps them l awake." .Tire Germans themselves paid a' tribute to' the Scottish troops of the 51st Division. In a message sent over in! a small 'balloon' they wrote: "Good old Fifty-first! Still sticking it! Cheery-'O! '■' All our troops kept "sticking it," with, few exceptions, audi for many 'days and nights fell back fighting against overwhelming numbers, weary, dazed!, spent, foriack of sleep or rest, | During those eight weeks 1 of the German offensive'against the {British lines the losses of the. British armies were 'more than 60 .per cent, of their, fighting strength. But those great gaps '.torn in their ranks were filled! up iby diraffcs of 800,000 'boys whom 'Lloyd George had "held up his sleeve," as we «ay, as England'si last reserve's. 'They were but 'lad's, 'mostly untrained, hut, mixed with the older men, they showed wonderful spirit, and it was they who in a great degree, only a few months later, lighting alongside Canadians and Australians .who had 'been spaced the sufferings : of the retreat, while American troops were fighting, and winning the desperate straggle', in the 'Argoiine, helped to inflict the last iblowsi which "broke the ibodyi and spirit of the German: army.